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117Why solve the Gettier problem?In D. F. Austin (ed.), Philosophical Analysis, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 55--58. 1988.
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586Internalism defendedIn Hilary Kornblith (ed.), Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 1-18. 2001.
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210The Basic Nature of Epistemic JustificationThe Monist 71 (3): 389-404. 1988.The leading approaches to the nature of epistemic justification are the sides taken in two controversies: coherentism versus foundationalism, and externalism versus internalism. The former dispute has time-tested durability; the latter threatens to become equally persistent. Nevertheless, it will be argued here that these controversies have satisfactory resolutions. It will be argued that each of the four approaches is fundamentally right. Each has a plausible core that combines consistently wit…Read more
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78Review of Jonathan Sutton, Without Justification (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (12). 2007.
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137Comments on bill Lycan's Moore against the new skepticsPhilosophical Studies 103 (1): 55-59. 2001.
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275Typing problemsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1): 98-105. 2002.Guided by the work of William Alston, Jonathan Adler and Michael Levin propose a solution to the generality problem for reliabilism. In some respects their proposal improves on those we have discussed. We argue that the problem remains unsolved
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80Isolating Intrinsic ValueIn Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Recent work on intrinsic value, Springer. pp. 11--13. 2005.
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278Modal realism, counterpart theory, and the possibility of multiversal rectitudeAnalysis 71 (4): 680-684. 2011.Jim Stone has argued that a multiversal version of Modal Realism together with Counterpart Theory cannot account for a certain intuitive possibility. Roughly, it is the possibility that all free moral choices of a certain sort are the right choices in all cases in the multiverse. The present work offers an explanation of how the metaphysics in question can account for the intuitive possibility in question.
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102Utilitarianism and Co-operation by Donald Reagan (review)Journal of Philosophy 80 (7): 415-424. 1983.
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311The Moral Value in PromisesPhilosophical Review 109 (3): 411. 2000.Holly Smith poses a challenging moral problem. She offers examples that appear to show that the moral significance of promising can be nefariously exploited. Her leading example is this.
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174Stich and Nisbett on justifying inference rulesPhilosophy of Science 50 (2): 326-331. 1983.Stich and Nisbett offer an analysis of the concept of a justified inference rule, building upon the efforts of Goodman. They fault Goodman's view on the grounds that it is incompatible with some recent psychological research on reasoning. We criticize their proposal by arguing that it is subject to much the same objections as those they raise against other accounts.
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225Epistemology and the Psychology of Human JudgmentPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3): 837-840. 2008.
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212Review: Criterial Problems (review)Philosophical Studies 143 (3): 417-426. 2009.The two main topics of the paper are an allegedly justified reliability requirement for knowledge and an alleged incoherence among three propositions asserted by Cartesian foundationalism. It is argued that neither the allegation of justified reliability nor the allegation of incoherence is correct.
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356PeerageEpisteme 6 (3): 313-323. 2009.Experts take sides in standing scholarly disagreements. They rely on the epistemic reasons favorable to their side to justify their position. It is argued here that no position actually has an overall balance of undefeated reasons in its favor. Candidates for such reasons include the objective strength of the rational support for one side, the special force of details in the case for one side, and a summary impression of truth. All such factors fail to justify any position.
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1772EvidentialismPhilosophical Studies 48 (1). 1985.Evidentialism is a view about the conditions under which a person is epistemically justified in having a particular doxastic attitude toward a proposition. Evidentialism holds that the justified attitudes are determined entirely by the person's evidence. This is the traditional view of justification. It is now widely opposed. The essays included in this volume develop and defend the tradition.Evidentialism has many assets. In addition to providing an intuitively plausible account of epistemic ju…Read more
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227Innocuous InfallibilityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2): 406-408. 2002.Alan Sidelle has offered an argument to show that internalism about justification implies us to have a certain sort of infallibility concerning some internal facts. This is true but harmless to internalism.
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269The comforts of homePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2): 444-451. 2005.The paper argues against Timothy Williamson's anti-luminosity argument. It also offers an argument against luminosity from the possibility of defeat of introspective justification.
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83Phenomenal KnowledgeIn Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument, Mit Press. pp. 197. 2004.
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