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329Seeing the truthPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4): 847-857. 1998.Some propositions are obvious in their own right. We can `just see' that they are true. So there is some such epistemic phenomenon as seeing the truth of a proposition. This paper investigates the nature of this phenomenon. The aptness of the visual metaphor is explained. Accounts of the phenomenon requiring qualia by which the truth is apprehended are disputed. A limited theory is developed and applied.
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Contextualism contested some moreIn Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 62-66. 2013.
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64Review of Jonathan Adler, Belief's Own Ethics (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002 (10). 2002.
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2A Mysterious Case of Missing ValuePhilosophic Exchange 45 (1): 1-22. 2016.Sometimes there are conflicts about what we ought to do according to differing evaluative dimensions, like morality and self-interest. After sketching an interpretation of "ought" claims of all sorts, it is argued that there is no overriding evaluation that authoritatively resolves the conflicts. It is further argued that this is not altogether disappointing.
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192Some Virtues of EvidentialismVeritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 50 (4): 95-108. 2005.O evidencialismo é, primordialmente, uma tese sobre a justificação epistêmica e, secundariamente, uma tese sobre o conhecimento. Sustenta que a justificação epistêmica é superveniente da evidência. As versões do evidencialismo diferem quanto ao que conta como evidência, quanto ao que seja possuir algo como evidência e quanto ao que um dado corpo de evidência apóia. A tese secundária é a de que o apoio evidencial é necessário ao conhecimento. O evidencialismo ajuda a formular as questões epistemo…Read more
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