-
388Metaphysics and the morality of abortionMind 108 (432): 619-646. 1999.Conclusions about the morality of abortion have been thought to receive some support from metaphysical doctrines about persons. The paper studies four instances in which philosophers have sought to draw such morals from metaphysics. It argues that in each instance the metaphysics makes no moral difference, and the manner of failure seems indicative of a general epistemic irrelevance of metaphysics to the moral issue.
-
12Seeing the TruthPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4): 847-857. 1998.Some propositions are obvious in their own right. We can ‘just see’ that they are true. So there is some such epistemic phenomenon as seeing the truth of a proposition. This paper investigates the nature of this phenomenon. The aptness of the visual metaphor is explained. Accounts of the phenomenon requiring qualia by which the truth is apprehended are disputed. A limited theory is developed and applied.
-
107Evident, but rationally unacceptableAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (3). 1987.This Article does not have an abstract
-
71Why solve the Gettier problem?In D. F. Austin (ed.), Philosophical Analysis, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 55--58. 1988.
-
13D. M. Armstrong's "The Nature of Mind and Other Essays" (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (4): 622. 1982.
-
168Against moral dilemmasPhilosophical Review 91 (1): 87-97. 1982.E j lemmon, B a o williams, Bas van fraassen, And ruth marcus have argued on behalf of the existence of moral dilemmas, I.E., Cases where an agent is subject to conflicting absolute moral obligations. The paper criticizes this support and contends that no moral dilemma is possible
-
814Disjunctivists hold that perceiving external objects is fundamentally different from any experiential state that is not a perception. In fact, roughly speaking, disjunctivists say that they have nothing in common. Suppose that it appears to someone as though she perceives something. Disjunctivists say that there are two disparate sorts of facts that could make this true. Either she is genuinely perceiving something, or she is in an experiential state of merely apparent perception. An apparent pe…Read more
-
111Innocuous InfallibilityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2): 406-408. 2002.Alan Sidelle has offered an argument to show that internalism about justification implies us to have a certain sort of infallibility concerning some internal facts. This is true but harmless to internalism.
-
86Seeming evidenceIn Chris Tucker (ed.), Seemings and Justification: New Essays on Dogmatism and Phenomenal Conservatism, Oxford University Press Usa. pp. 52. 2013.
-
8"Empirical Justification" by Paul K. Moser (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 48 (3): 563. 1988.
-
24Review of Jonathan Adler, Belief's Own Ethics (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2002 (10). 2002.
-
164Typing problemsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1): 98-105. 2002.Guided by the work of William Alston, Jonathan Adler and Michael Levin propose a solution to the generality problem for reliabilism. In some respects their proposal improves on those we have discussed. We argue that the problem remains unsolved
-
796Evidentialism: Essays in EpistemologyOxford University Press. 2004.Evidentialism holds that the justified attitudes are determined entirely by the person's evidence. This book is a collection of essays, mostly jointly authored, that support and apply evidentialism.
-
29Utilitarianism and Co-operation by Donald Reagan (review)Journal of Philosophy 80 (7): 415-424. 1983.
-
91The nature and the impossibility of moral perfectionPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4): 815-825. 1994.
-
27Isolating Intrinsic ValueIn Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Analysis, Springer. pp. 11--13. 2005.
-
176Modal realism, counterpart theory, and the possibility of multiversal rectitudeAnalysis 71 (4): 680-684. 2011.Jim Stone has argued that a multiversal version of Modal Realism together with Counterpart Theory cannot account for a certain intuitive possibility. Roughly, it is the possibility that all free moral choices of a certain sort are the right choices in all cases in the multiverse. The present work offers an explanation of how the metaphysics in question can account for the intuitive possibility in question
-
104The Basic Nature of Epistemic JustificationThe Monist 71 (3): 389-404. 1988.The leading approaches to the nature of epistemic justification are the sides taken in two controversies: coherentism versus foundationalism, and externalism versus internalism. The former dispute has time-tested durability; the latter threatens to become equally persistent. Nevertheless, it will be argued here that these controversies have satisfactory resolutions. It will be argued that each of the four approaches is fundamentally right. Each has a plausible core that combines consistently wit…Read more
-
82Hedonistic UtilitarianismPhilosophical Review 110 (3): 428. 1998.This is a wide-ranging defense of a distinctive version of hedonistic act utilitarianism. It is plainly written, forthright, and stimulating. Also, it is replete with disputable assertions and arguments. I shall pursue one issue here, after sketching the project of each substantial chapter.
-
12Self—SupportPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (2): 419-446. 2011.This essay investigates the evidential support that we have for seemingly ‘self-evident’ propositions, that is, propositions the truth of which seems quite obvious to us just in virtue of what they say. The essay argues that in no case is our evidence identical to the proposition .
-
1Externally enhanced internalismIn Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and externalism in semantics and epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 51--67. 2007.
-
5RepliesIn Trent Dougherty (ed.), Evidentialism and its Discontents, Oxford University Press. 2011.
Rochester, New York, United States of America