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107Evident, but rationally unacceptableAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (3). 1987.This Article does not have an abstract
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13D. M. Armstrong's "The Nature of Mind and Other Essays" (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (4): 622. 1982.
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71Why solve the Gettier problem?In D. F. Austin (ed.), Philosophical Analysis, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 55--58. 1988.
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168Against moral dilemmasPhilosophical Review 91 (1): 87-97. 1982.E j lemmon, B a o williams, Bas van fraassen, And ruth marcus have argued on behalf of the existence of moral dilemmas, I.E., Cases where an agent is subject to conflicting absolute moral obligations. The paper criticizes this support and contends that no moral dilemma is possible
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814Disjunctivists hold that perceiving external objects is fundamentally different from any experiential state that is not a perception. In fact, roughly speaking, disjunctivists say that they have nothing in common. Suppose that it appears to someone as though she perceives something. Disjunctivists say that there are two disparate sorts of facts that could make this true. Either she is genuinely perceiving something, or she is in an experiential state of merely apparent perception. An apparent pe…Read more
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112Innocuous InfallibilityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2): 406-408. 2002.Alan Sidelle has offered an argument to show that internalism about justification implies us to have a certain sort of infallibility concerning some internal facts. This is true but harmless to internalism.
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