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170Self—SupportPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (2): 419-446. 2012.This essay investigates the evidential support that we have for seemingly ‘self-evident’ propositions, that is, propositions the truth of which seems quite obvious to us just in virtue of what they say. The essay argues that in no case is our evidence identical to the proposition.
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194Debasing Skepticism RefutedEpisteme 12 (1): 1-11. 2015.A belief is debased when believing is given a basis that is not proper for knowledge, such as wishful thinking or superstition. The possibility of a debasing demon is the possibility of a maximally powerful agent who aims to prevent knowledge by debasing beliefs. Jonathan Schaffer contends that the debasing demon is a threat to all knowledge. Schaffer does not assess the strength of the skeptical challenge from debasing. It is argued here that debasing does not strengthen any case for skepticism…Read more
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