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5510 Phenomenal KnowledgeIn Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument, Mit Press. pp. 197. 2004.
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481Internalism defendedIn Hilary Kornblith (ed.), Epistemology: Internalism and Externalism, Wiley-blackwell. 2001.
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43Stich and Nisbett on justifying inference rulesPhilosophy of Science 50 (2): 326-331. 1983.Stich and Nisbett offer an analysis of the concept of a justified inference rule, building upon the efforts of Goodman. They fault Goodman's view on the grounds that it is incompatible with some recent psychological research on reasoning. We criticize their proposal by arguing that it is subject to much the same objections as those they raise against other accounts
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6Rational Disagreement DefendedIn Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement, Oxford University Press. 2010.This chapter formulates a rational uniqueness principle holding that those who are epistemic peers on a proposition, in that they know that they share all rational considerations concerning the truth of the proposition, cannot be justified in having different attitudes toward it. It then argues against the principle, primarily on the grounds that such peers may rationally regard themselves as differing in their basis for rational belief, or their evidence, on the topic. The rationality of their …Read more
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108Some Virtues of EvidentialismVeritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 50 (4): 95-108. 2005.O evidencialismo é, primordialmente, uma tese sobre a justificação epistêmica e, secundariamente, uma tese sobre o conhecimento. Sustenta que a justificação epistêmica é superveniente da evidência. As versões do evidencialismo diferem quanto ao que conta como evidência, quanto ao que seja possuir algo como evidência e quanto ao que um dado corpo de evidência apóia. A tese secundária é a de que o apoio evidencial é necessário ao conhecimento. O evidencialismo ajuda a formular as questões epistemo…Read more
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Contextualism contested some moreIn Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Blackwell. pp. 62-66. 2013.
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388Metaphysics and the morality of abortionMind 108 (432): 619-646. 1999.Conclusions about the morality of abortion have been thought to receive some support from metaphysical doctrines about persons. The paper studies four instances in which philosophers have sought to draw such morals from metaphysics. It argues that in each instance the metaphysics makes no moral difference, and the manner of failure seems indicative of a general epistemic irrelevance of metaphysics to the moral issue.
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1The nature of knowledgeIn Andrew Cullison (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Epistemology, Continuum. pp. 18. 2012.
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12Seeing the TruthPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4): 847-857. 1998.Some propositions are obvious in their own right. We can ‘just see’ that they are true. So there is some such epistemic phenomenon as seeing the truth of a proposition. This paper investigates the nature of this phenomenon. The aptness of the visual metaphor is explained. Accounts of the phenomenon requiring qualia by which the truth is apprehended are disputed. A limited theory is developed and applied.
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112Evident, but rationally unacceptableAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (3). 1987.This Article does not have an abstract
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71Why solve the Gettier problem?In D. F. Austin (ed.), Philosophical Analysis, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 55--58. 1988.
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16D. M. Armstrong's "The Nature of Mind and Other Essays" (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (4): 622. 1982.
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814Disjunctivists hold that perceiving external objects is fundamentally different from any experiential state that is not a perception. In fact, roughly speaking, disjunctivists say that they have nothing in common. Suppose that it appears to someone as though she perceives something. Disjunctivists say that there are two disparate sorts of facts that could make this true. Either she is genuinely perceiving something, or she is in an experiential state of merely apparent perception. An apparent pe…Read more
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170Against moral dilemmasPhilosophical Review 91 (1): 87-97. 1982.E j lemmon, B a o williams, Bas van fraassen, And ruth marcus have argued on behalf of the existence of moral dilemmas, I.E., Cases where an agent is subject to conflicting absolute moral obligations. The paper criticizes this support and contends that no moral dilemma is possible
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78Innocuous InfallibilityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 64 (2): 406-408. 2002.Alan Sidelle has offered an argument to show that internalism about justification implies us to have a certain sort of infallibility concerning some internal facts. This is true but harmless to internalism.
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