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1201EvidentialismPhilosophical Studies 48 (1). 1985.Evidentialism is a view about the conditions under which a person is epistemically justified in having a particular doxastic attitude toward a proposition. Evidentialism holds that the justified attitudes are determined entirely by the person's evidence. This is the traditional view of justification. It is now widely opposed. The essays included in this volume develop and defend the tradition.Evidentialism has many assets. In addition to providing an intuitively plausible account of epistemic ju…Read more
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190PeerageEpisteme 6 (3): 313-323. 2009.Experts take sides in standing scholarly disagreements. They rely on the epistemic reasons favorable to their side to justify their position. It is argued here that no position actually has an overall balance of undefeated reasons in its favor. Candidates for such reasons include the objective strength of the rational support for one side, the special force of details in the case for one side, and a summary impression of truth. All such factors fail to justify any position.
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208The specificity of the generality problemPhilosophical Studies 163 (3): 751-762. 2013.In “Why the generality problem is everybody’s problem,” Michael Bishop argues that every theory of justification needs a solution to the generality problem. He contends that a solution is needed in order for any theory to be used in giving an acceptable account of the justificatory status of beliefs in certain examples. In response, first I will describe the generality problem that is specific to process reliabilism and two other sorts of problems that are essentially the same. Then I will argue…Read more
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86The moral value in promisesPhilosophical Review 109 (3): 411-422. 2000.Holly Smith poses a challenging moral problem. She offers examples that appear to show that the moral significance of promising can be nefariously exploited. Her leading example is this
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127Friendship and consequentialismAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2). 2001.This Article does not have an abstract
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50Review of Jonathan Sutton, Without Justification (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (12). 2007.
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74Critical Notices: Epistemology and the psychology of human judgmentPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3): 837-840. 2008.No Abstract
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991Phenomenal knowledgeAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (2): 136-150. 1994.This Article does not have an abstract
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16The Nature and the Impossibility of Moral PerfectionPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4): 815-825. 1994.
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95Against an epistemic dilemmaAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (4). 1994.This Article does not have an abstract
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147The comforts of homePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2). 2005.The paper argues against Timothy Williamson's anti-luminosity argument. It also offers an argument against luminosity from the possibility of defeat of introspective justification.
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67Supervenience and intentionalityIn Elias E. Savellos & Ümit D. Yalçin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays, Needham Heights: Cambridge. 1995.
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38Review: Criterial Problems (review)Philosophical Studies 143 (3). 2009.The two main topics of the paper are an allegedly justified reliability requirement for knowledge and an alleged incoherence among three propositions asserted by Cartesian foundationalism. It is argued that neither the allegation of justified reliability nor the allegation of incoherence is correct.
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9Contextualism ContestedIn Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Blackwell. pp. 47-56. 2013.
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7The Moral Value in PromisesPhilosophical Review 109 (3): 411. 2000.Holly Smith poses a challenging moral problem. She offers examples that appear to show that the moral significance of promising can be nefariously exploited. Her leading example is this
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2A Mysterious Case of Missing ValuePhilosophic Exchange 45 (1): 1-22. 2016.Sometimes there are conflicts about what we ought to do according to differing evaluative dimensions, like morality and self-interest. After sketching an interpretation of "ought" claims of all sorts, it is argued that there is no overriding evaluation that authoritatively resolves the conflicts. It is further argued that this is not altogether disappointing.
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