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29Utilitarianism and Co-operation by Donald Reagan (review)Journal of Philosophy 80 (7): 415-424. 1983.
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91The nature and the impossibility of moral perfectionPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4): 815-825. 1994.
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27Isolating Intrinsic ValueIn Toni Rønnow-Rasmussen & Michael J. Zimmerman (eds.), Analysis, Springer. pp. 11--13. 2005.
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176Modal realism, counterpart theory, and the possibility of multiversal rectitudeAnalysis 71 (4): 680-684. 2011.Jim Stone has argued that a multiversal version of Modal Realism together with Counterpart Theory cannot account for a certain intuitive possibility. Roughly, it is the possibility that all free moral choices of a certain sort are the right choices in all cases in the multiverse. The present work offers an explanation of how the metaphysics in question can account for the intuitive possibility in question
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103The Basic Nature of Epistemic JustificationThe Monist 71 (3): 389-404. 1988.The leading approaches to the nature of epistemic justification are the sides taken in two controversies: coherentism versus foundationalism, and externalism versus internalism. The former dispute has time-tested durability; the latter threatens to become equally persistent. Nevertheless, it will be argued here that these controversies have satisfactory resolutions. It will be argued that each of the four approaches is fundamentally right. Each has a plausible core that combines consistently wit…Read more
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82Hedonistic UtilitarianismPhilosophical Review 110 (3): 428. 1998.This is a wide-ranging defense of a distinctive version of hedonistic act utilitarianism. It is plainly written, forthright, and stimulating. Also, it is replete with disputable assertions and arguments. I shall pursue one issue here, after sketching the project of each substantial chapter.
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1Externally enhanced internalismIn Sanford Goldberg (ed.), Internalism and externalism in semantics and epistemology, Oxford University Press. pp. 51--67. 2007.
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12Self—SupportPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 84 (2): 419-446. 2011.This essay investigates the evidential support that we have for seemingly ‘self-evident’ propositions, that is, propositions the truth of which seems quite obvious to us just in virtue of what they say. The essay argues that in no case is our evidence identical to the proposition .
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