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144Seeing the truthPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4): 847-857. 1998.Some propositions are obvious in their own right. We can `just see' that they are true. So there is some such epistemic phenomenon as seeing the truth of a proposition. This paper investigates the nature of this phenomenon. The aptness of the visual metaphor is explained. Accounts of the phenomenon requiring qualia by which the truth is apprehended are disputed. A limited theory is developed and applied
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123Good to knowPhilosophical Studies 174 (2): 311-331. 2017.Our curiosity has us interested in finding out the truth. Knowing the fact of the matter fulfills the interest. This fulfillment is something satisfying about knowledge. Additionally, knowledge is a good way for a person to relate to a proposition. Knowing is good because of what knowledge is. In other words, knowledge is intrinsically good. The credibility of these assessments calls for some explanation. A traditional view is that knowledge is justified true belief with no Gettier accidents. Th…Read more
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51Epistemology and the Psychology of Human JudgmentPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3): 837-840. 2008.
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5510 Phenomenal KnowledgeIn Yujin Nagasawa, Peter Ludlow & Daniel Stoljar (eds.), There's Something About Mary, Mit Press. pp. 197. 2004.
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481Internalism defendedIn Hilary Kornblith (ed.), American Philosophical Quarterly, Blackwell. 2001.
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41Stich and Nisbett on justifying inference rulesPhilosophy of Science 50 (2): 326-331. 1983.Stich and Nisbett offer an analysis of the concept of a justified inference rule, building upon the efforts of Goodman. They fault Goodman's view on the grounds that it is incompatible with some recent psychological research on reasoning. We criticize their proposal by arguing that it is subject to much the same objections as those they raise against other accounts
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108Some Virtues of EvidentialismVeritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 50 (4): 95-108. 2005.O evidencialismo é, primordialmente, uma tese sobre a justificação epistêmica e, secundariamente, uma tese sobre o conhecimento. Sustenta que a justificação epistêmica é superveniente da evidência. As versões do evidencialismo diferem quanto ao que conta como evidência, quanto ao que seja possuir algo como evidência e quanto ao que um dado corpo de evidência apóia. A tese secundária é a de que o apoio evidencial é necessário ao conhecimento. O evidencialismo ajuda a formular as questões epistemo…Read more
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6Rational Disagreement DefendedIn Richard Feldman & Ted A. Warfield (eds.), Disagreement, Oxford University Press. 2010.This chapter formulates a rational uniqueness principle holding that those who are epistemic peers on a proposition, in that they know that they share all rational considerations concerning the truth of the proposition, cannot be justified in having different attitudes toward it. It then argues against the principle, primarily on the grounds that such peers may rationally regard themselves as differing in their basis for rational belief, or their evidence, on the topic. The rationality of their …Read more
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Contextualism contested some moreIn Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Blackwell. pp. 62-66. 2013.
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1The nature of knowledgeIn Andrew Cullison (ed.), The Continuum Companion to Epistemology, Continuum. pp. 18. 2012.
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388Metaphysics and the morality of abortionMind 108 (432): 619-646. 1999.Conclusions about the morality of abortion have been thought to receive some support from metaphysical doctrines about persons. The paper studies four instances in which philosophers have sought to draw such morals from metaphysics. It argues that in each instance the metaphysics makes no moral difference, and the manner of failure seems indicative of a general epistemic irrelevance of metaphysics to the moral issue.
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12Seeing the TruthPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4): 847-857. 1998.Some propositions are obvious in their own right. We can ‘just see’ that they are true. So there is some such epistemic phenomenon as seeing the truth of a proposition. This paper investigates the nature of this phenomenon. The aptness of the visual metaphor is explained. Accounts of the phenomenon requiring qualia by which the truth is apprehended are disputed. A limited theory is developed and applied.
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109Evident, but rationally unacceptableAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 65 (3). 1987.This Article does not have an abstract
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71Why solve the Gettier problem?In D. F. Austin (ed.), Philosophical Analysis, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 55--58. 1988.
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16D. M. Armstrong's "The Nature of Mind and Other Essays" (review)Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 42 (4): 622. 1982.
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