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195PeerageEpisteme 6 (3): 313-323. 2009.Experts take sides in standing scholarly disagreements. They rely on the epistemic reasons favorable to their side to justify their position. It is argued here that no position actually has an overall balance of undefeated reasons in its favor. Candidates for such reasons include the objective strength of the rational support for one side, the special force of details in the case for one side, and a summary impression of truth. All such factors fail to justify any position.
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88The moral value in promisesPhilosophical Review 109 (3): 411-422. 2000.Holly Smith poses a challenging moral problem. She offers examples that appear to show that the moral significance of promising can be nefariously exploited. Her leading example is this
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129Friendship and consequentialismAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 79 (2). 2001.This Article does not have an abstract
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50Review of Jonathan Sutton, Without Justification (review)Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2007 (12). 2007.
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75Critical Notices: Epistemology and the psychology of human judgmentPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 77 (3): 837-840. 2008.No Abstract
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996Phenomenal knowledgeAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (2): 136-150. 1994.This Article does not have an abstract
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16The Nature and the Impossibility of Moral PerfectionPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (4): 815-825. 1994.
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95Against an epistemic dilemmaAustralasian Journal of Philosophy 72 (4). 1994.This Article does not have an abstract
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147The comforts of homePhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 70 (2). 2005.The paper argues against Timothy Williamson's anti-luminosity argument. It also offers an argument against luminosity from the possibility of defeat of introspective justification.
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67Supervenience and intentionalityIn Elias E. Savellos & Ümit D. Yalçin (eds.), Supervenience: New Essays, Needham Heights: Cambridge. 1995.
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45Review: Criterial Problems (review)Philosophical Studies 143 (3). 2009.The two main topics of the paper are an allegedly justified reliability requirement for knowledge and an alleged incoherence among three propositions asserted by Cartesian foundationalism. It is argued that neither the allegation of justified reliability nor the allegation of incoherence is correct.
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9Contextualism ContestedIn Matthias Steup & John Turri (eds.), Contemporary Debates in Epistemology, Blackwell. pp. 47-56. 2013.
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7The Moral Value in PromisesPhilosophical Review 109 (3): 411. 2000.Holly Smith poses a challenging moral problem. She offers examples that appear to show that the moral significance of promising can be nefariously exploited. Her leading example is this
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2A Mysterious Case of Missing ValuePhilosophic Exchange 45 (1): 1-22. 2016.Sometimes there are conflicts about what we ought to do according to differing evaluative dimensions, like morality and self-interest. After sketching an interpretation of "ought" claims of all sorts, it is argued that there is no overriding evaluation that authoritatively resolves the conflicts. It is further argued that this is not altogether disappointing.
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144Seeing the truthPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 58 (4): 847-857. 1998.Some propositions are obvious in their own right. We can `just see' that they are true. So there is some such epistemic phenomenon as seeing the truth of a proposition. This paper investigates the nature of this phenomenon. The aptness of the visual metaphor is explained. Accounts of the phenomenon requiring qualia by which the truth is apprehended are disputed. A limited theory is developed and applied
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123Good to knowPhilosophical Studies 174 (2): 311-331. 2017.Our curiosity has us interested in finding out the truth. Knowing the fact of the matter fulfills the interest. This fulfillment is something satisfying about knowledge. Additionally, knowledge is a good way for a person to relate to a proposition. Knowing is good because of what knowledge is. In other words, knowledge is intrinsically good. The credibility of these assessments calls for some explanation. A traditional view is that knowledge is justified true belief with no Gettier accidents. Th…Read more
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