•  2
    A Mysterious Case of Missing Value
    Philosophic Exchange 45 (1): 1-22. 2016.
    Sometimes there are conflicts about what we ought to do according to differing evaluative dimensions, like morality and self-interest. After sketching an interpretation of "ought" claims of all sorts, it is argued that there is no overriding evaluation that authoritatively resolves the conflicts. It is further argued that this is not altogether disappointing.
  •  320
    Propositional justification
    Philosophical Studies 38 (1): 65-68. 1980.
  •  325
    The truth connection
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (3): 657-669. 1992.
  •  502
    Metaphysics and the morality of abortion
    Mind 108 (432): 619-646. 1999.
    Conclusions about the morality of abortion have been thought to receive some support from metaphysical doctrines about persons. The paper studies four instances in which philosophers have sought to draw such morals from metaphysics. It argues that in each instance the metaphysics makes no moral difference, and the manner of failure seems indicative of a general epistemic irrelevance of metaphysics to the moral issue.
  •  795
    The generality problem for reliabilism
    with E. Conee and R. Feldman
    Philosophical Studies 89 (1): 1-29. 1998.
  •  154
    Good to know
    Philosophical Studies 174 (2): 311-331. 2017.
    Our curiosity has us interested in finding out the truth. Knowing the fact of the matter fulfills the interest. This fulfillment is something satisfying about knowledge. Additionally, knowledge is a good way for a person to relate to a proposition. Knowing is good because of what knowledge is. In other words, knowledge is intrinsically good. The credibility of these assessments calls for some explanation. A traditional view is that knowledge is justified true belief with no Gettier accidents. Th…Read more