•  381
    Counterfactuals and context
    Analysis 68 (1). 2008.
    It is widely agreed that contraposition, strengthening the antecedent and hypothetical syllogism fail for subjunctive conditionals. The following putative counter-examples are frequently cited, respectively.
  •  141
    In defence of a perspectival semantics for 'know'
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86 (3). 2008.
    Relativism offers an ingenious way of accommodating most of our intuitions about 'know': the truth-value of sentences containing 'know' is a function of parameters determined by a context of use and a context of assessment. This sort of double-indexing provides a more adequate account of the linguistic data involving 'know' than does standard contextualism. However, relativism has come under recent attack: it supposedly cannot account for the factivity of 'know', and it entails, counterintuitive…Read more
  •  369
    Non-Visual Consciousness and Visual Images in Blindsight
    Consciousness and Cognition 21 (1): 595-596. 2012.
    In a recent response paper to Brogaard (2011a), Morten Overgaard and Thor Grünbaum argue that my case for the claim that blindsight subjects are not visually conscious of the stimuli they correctly identify rests on a mistaken necessary criterion for determining whether a conscious experience is visual or non-visual. Here I elaborate on the earlier argu- ment while conceding that the question of whether blindsight subjects are visually con- scious of the visual stimuli they correctly identify la…Read more
  •  146
    An empirically-informed cognitive theory of propositions
    Canadian Journal of Philosophy 43 (5): 534-557. 2013.
    (2013). An empirically-informed cognitive theory of propositions. Canadian Journal of Philosophy: Vol. 43, Essays on the Nature of Propositions, pp. 534-557.
  •  202
    Williamson on counterpossibles
    The Reasoner. 2007.
    Lewis/Stalnaker semantics has it that all counterpossibles (i.e., counterfactual conditionals with impossible antecedents) are vacuously true. Non-vacuism, by contrast, says the truth-values of counterpossibles are affected by the truth-values of the consequents. Some counterpossibles are true, some false. Williamson objects to non-vacuism. He asks us to consider someone who answered ‘11’ to ‘What is 5 + 7?’ but who mistakenly believes that he answered ‘13’. For the non-vacuist, (1) is false, (2…Read more
  •  157
    Epistemological contextualism and the problem of moral luck
    Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 84 (4). 2003.
    We have a strong intuition that a person’s moral standing should not be affected by luck, but the fact is that we do blame a morally unfortunate person more than her fortunate counterpart. This is the problem of moral luck. I argue that the problem arises because account is not taken of the fact that the extension of the term ‘blame’ is contextually determined. Loosely speaking, the more likely an act is to have an undesirable consequence, the more its agent is to blame. But how likely a consequ…Read more
  •  276
    Are There Unconscious Perceptual Processes?
    Consciousness and Cognition 20 (2): 449-63. 2011.
    Blindsight and vision for action seem to be exemplars of unconscious visual processes. However, researchers have recently argued that blindsight is not really a kind of uncon- scious vision but is rather severely degraded conscious vision. Morten Overgaard and col- leagues have recently developed new methods for measuring the visibility of visual stimuli. Studies using these methods show that reported clarity of visual stimuli correlates with accuracy in both normal individuals and blindsight pa…Read more
  •  382
    I will begin with a brief presentation of C & H’s arguments against nonindexical contextualism, temporalism, and relativism. I will then offer a general argument against the monadic truth package. Finally, I will offer arguments in favor of nonindexical contextualism and temporalism.
  •  196
    Wide-Scope Requirements and the Ethics of Belief
    In Jonathan Matheson & Rico Vitz (eds.), The Ethics of Belief, . forthcoming.
    William Kingdon Clifford proposed a vigorous ethics of belief, according to which you are morally prohibited from believing something on insufficient evidence. Though Clifford offers numerous considerations in favor of his ethical theory, the conclusion he wants to draw turns out not to follow from any reasonable assumptions. In fact, I will argue, regardless of how you propose to understand the notion of evidence, it is implausible that we could have a moral obligation to refrain from believing…Read more
  •  402
    The trivial argument for epistemic value pluralism. Or how I learned to stop caring about truth
    In Adrian Haddock, Alan Millar & D. Pritchard (eds.), Epistemic Value, Oxford University Press. 2008.
    Relativism offers a nifty way of accommodating most of our intuitions about epistemic modals, predicates of personal taste, color expressions, future contingents, and conditionals. But in spite of its manifest merits relativism is squarely at odds with epistemic value monism: the view that truth is the highest epistemic goal. I will call the argument from relativism to epistemic value pluralism the trivial argument for epistemic value pluralism. After formulating the argument, I will look at thr…Read more
  •  13
    Deaf hearing: Implicit discrimination of auditory content in a patient with mixed hearing loss
    with Kristian Marlow, Morten Overgaard, Bennett L. Schwartz, Cengiz Zopluoglu, Steffie Tomson, Janina Neufed, Christopher Sinke, Christopher Owen, and David Eagleman
    Philosophical Psychology 30 (1-2): 21-43. 2017.
    We describe a patient LS, profoundly deaf in both ears from birth, with underdeveloped superior temporal gyri. Without hearing aids, LS displays no ability to detect sounds below a fixed threshold of 60 dBs, which classifies him as clinically deaf. Under these no-hearing-aid conditions, when presented with a forced-choice paradigm in which he is asked to consciously respond, he is unable to make above-chance judgments about the presence or location of sounds. However, he is able to make above-ch…Read more
  •  193
    The Phenomenal Use of 'Look'
    Philosophy Compass. forthcoming.
    The article provides the state of the art on the debate about whether the logical form of ‘look’ statements commits us to any particular theory of perceptual experience. The debate began with Frank Jackson’s (1977) argument that ‘look’ statements commit us to a sense-datum theory of perception. Thinkers from different camps have since then offered various rejoinders to Jackson’s argument. Others have provided novel arguments from considerations of the semantics of ‘look’ to particular theories o…Read more
  •  142
    That May Be Jupiter: A Heuristic for Thinking Two-Dimensionally
    American Philosophical Quarterly 44 (4). 2007.
    According to epistemic two-dimensionalism, every expression is associated with two kinds of meaning: a primary intension (a “Fregean” component) and a secondary intension (a “Russellian” component). While the rst kind of meaning lines up with the speaker’s abilities to pick out referents of correctly employed expressions in hypothetical scenarios, the second kind of meaning is a version of what standard semanticists call “semantic content”—a kind of content which does not pivot on speaker abilit…Read more
  •  373
    Conscious Vision for Action Versus Unconscious Vision for Action?
    Cognitive Science 35 (6): 1076-1104. 2011.
    David Milner and Melvyn Goodale’s dissociation hypothesis is commonly taken to state that there are two functionally specialized cortical streams of visual processing originating in striate (V1) cortex: a dorsal, action-related “unconscious” stream and a ventral, perception-related “conscious” stream. As Milner and Goodale acknowledge, findings from blindsight studies suggest a more sophisticated picture that replaces the distinction between unconscious vision for action and conscious vision for…Read more
  •  190
    Moral Relativism and Moral Expressivism
    Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (4): 538-556. 2012.
    Though moral relativism has had its supporters over the years, it is not a dominant position in philosophy. I will argue here, though, that the view is an attractive position. It evades some hardcore challenges that face absolutism, and it is reconcilable with an appealing emotivist approach to moral attitudes. In previous work, I have offered considerations in favor of a version of moral relativism that I call “perspectivalism.” These considerations are primarily grounded in linguistic data. He…Read more
  •  672
    Knobe argues that people’s judgments of the moral status of a side-effect of action influence their assessment of whether the side-effect is intentional. We tested this hypothesis using vignettes akin to Knobe’s but involving economically or eudaimonistically (wellness-related) negative side-effects. Our results show that it is people’s sense of what agents deserve and not the moral status of side-effects that drives intuition.
  •  318
    Color experience in blindsight?
    Philosophical Psychology 24 (6). 2011.
    Blindsight, the ability to blindly discriminate wavelength and other aspects of stimuli in a blind field, sometimes occurs in people with lesions to striate (V1) cortex. There is currently no consensus on whether qualitative color information of the sort that is normally computed by double opponent cells in striate cortex is indeed computed in blindsight but doesn?t reach awareness, perhaps owing to abnormal neuron responsiveness in striate or extra-striate cortical areas, or is not computed at …Read more
  •  433
    Introduction to Relative Truth
    Synthese 166 (2): 215-229. 2009.