• Possibility, Necessity, and Existence: Abbagnano and His Predecessors (review)
    Interpretation 22 (2): 289-294. 1995.
  •  62
    Being and Number in Heidegger's Thought
    History and Philosophy of Logic 30 (2): 202-204. 2009.
    M. ROUBACH. Being and Number in Heidegger's Thought. Translation from the Hebrew by Nessa Olshansky-Ashtar. London and New York: Continuum International Publishing Group, 2008. viii + 139 pp. £65.0...
  •  17
    Philosophical abstracts
    American Philosophical Quarterly 24 (1): 435-457. 1987.
  •  56
    Visual Intelligence in Painting
    Review of Metaphysics 59 (2): 333-354. 2005.
    Philosophers have long agreed that thinking is expressed in the use of language, that we “think in the medium of words.” It is also true, however, that we think in the medium of pictures, and it is likely that these two ways of thinking are interrelated; certainly, we could not think in pictures if we did not have words, and perhaps we could not use words, in principle, unless we were also engaged in some sort of picturing, at least in our imagination. An ideographic language like Chinese would …Read more
  •  20
    Logische Untersuchungen Ergänzungsband (review)
    Review of Metaphysics 61 (2): 425-426. 2007.
  • Introduction to Phenomenology
    Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 62 (3): 600-601. 2000.
  •  24
    Referring
    Review of Metaphysics 42 (1). 1988.
    WHEN WORDS APPEAR THEY INTERRUPT the dense continuity of things. Pictures do so as well, but in a different way. The things surrounding me form a dense continuum: my attention can move from one thing to another without leaving what is immediately there. I can go from the table to the rug to the chair to the lamp and to the wall. But if at some point I come to a picture, this plain sequence is broken, and although it may quickly be picked up again, it is interrupted by the picture. When I hit the…Read more
  •  182
    Husserl’s Discovery of Philosophical Discourse
    Husserl Studies 24 (3): 167-175. 2008.
    Husserl’s Idea of Phenomenology is his first systematic attempt to show how phenomenology differs from natural science and in particular psychology. He does this by the phenomenological reduction. One of his achievements is to show that the formal structures of intentionality are more akin to logic than to psychology. I claim that Husserl’s argument can be made more intuitive if we consider phenomenology to be the study of truth rather than knowledge, and if we see the reduction as primarily a m…Read more