Andrew R. Hamilton

The modern conception of self-consciousness holds that, in self-conscious thought, I think of myself as both subject and object; and that the subject is essentially embodied. This understanding begins with Kant. An anti-metaphysical treatment regards 'What is a self?' as expressing a pseudo-problem; it regards the claim of an immaterial self as nonsensical, and diagnoses its postulation. A moderate anti- metaphysical position analyses self-consciousness by appeal to the Analytic Principle: that self-consciousness is a phenomenon expressed -- or interpreted -- by use of a device with the properties of the first person. This article proposes a strong interpretation of the Principle, involving the conceptual holism of self-consciousness and self-reference. But how essential is the use of 'I' to self-consciousness? In the name-user scenario, each speaker uses their own name self-consciously to self-refer. However, in this scenario, against appearances, 'I' is not in fact eliminated without loss of the language's expressive power, and so the Analytic Principle is preserved.

Groups, individuals, and evolutionary restraints : the making of the contemporary debate over group selection Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-14 DOI 10.1007/s10539-011-9255-5 Authors Andrew Hamilton, Center for Biology and Society, School of Life Sciences, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287-4501 USA Christopher C. Dimond, Center for Biology and Society, School of Life Sciences, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287-4501 USA Journal Biology and Philosophy Online ISSN 1572-8404 Print ISSN 0169-3867.

The aesthetics of imperfection emphasises spontaneity, disruption, process and energy over formal perfection and is often ignored by many commentators or seen only in improvisation. This comprehensive collection is the first time imperfection has been explored across all kinds of musical performance, whether improvisation or interpretation of compositions. Covering music, visual art, dance, comedy, architecture and design, it addresses the meaning, experience, and value of improvisation and spontaneous creation across different artistic media. A distinctive feature of the volume is that it brings together contributions from theoreticians and practitioners, presenting a wider range of perspectives on the issues involved. Contributors look at performance and practice across Western and non-Western musical, artistic and craft forms. Composers and non-performing artists offer a perspective on what is 'imperfect' or improvisatory within their work, contributing further dimensions to the discourse. The Aesthetics of Imperfection in Music and the Arts features 39 chapters organised into eight sections and written by a diverse group of scholars and performers. They consider divergent definitions of aesthetics, employing both 18th-century philosophy and more recent socially and historically situated conceptions making this an essential, up-to-date resource for anyone working on either side of the perfection-imperfection debate.

© The Author 2017. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Analysis Trust. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please email: [email protected] this very wide-ranging and absorbing monograph, Nicholas Wolterstorff argues that modern aestheticians ignore the varieties of engagement with art, in an exclusive focus on disinterested attention. This, he argues, is because they assume the ‘grand narrative concerning art in the modern world’. According to Wolterstorff, this narrative holds that in the Early Modern period in the West, members of the bourgeoisie increasingly engaged works of the arts as objects of disinterested attention. The narrative claims that this change represented the arts coming into their own, and that works of art, so engaged, are socially other and transcendent. The change arose through the emergence of a bourgeoisie with leisure and a secular civil society; thus ‘contemplation as a way of engaging with works of arts came...

Ludwig Wittgenstein is arguably the most important philosopher of the twentieth century. In On Certainty he discusses central issues in epistemology, including the nature of knowledge and scepticism. The Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Wittgenstein and On Certainty introduces and assesses: Wittgenstein's career and the background to his later philosophy the central ideas and text of On Certainty , including its responses to G.E. Moore and discussion of fundamental issues in the theory of knowledge Wittgenstein's continuing importance in contemporary philosophy. This GuideBook is essential reading for all students of Wittgenstein, and for those studying epistemology and philosophy of language. On Certainty, Wittgenstein's final work, addresses a category of "world-picture" propositions discovered by G.E. Moore. These challenge Wittgenstein's enduring commitment to a well-defined category of empirical propositions, and help to generate a critique of scepticism. Developing Wittgenstein's view that scepticism is self-undermining, the Guidebook offers a combative yet therapeutic interpretation that locates On Certainty between the standpoints of Kant and Hume

Rhythm is the fundamental pulse that animates poetry, music, and dance across all cultures. And yet the recent explosion of scholarly interest across disciplines in the aural dimensions of aesthetic experience--particularly in sociology, cultural and media theory, and literary studies--has yet to explore this fundamental category. This book furthers the discussion of rhythm beyond the discrete conceptual domains and technical vocabularies of musicology and prosody. With original essays by philosophers, psychologists, musicians, literary theorists, and ethno-musicologists, The Philosophy of Rhythm opens up wider-and plural-perspectives, examining formal affinities between the historically interconnected fields of music, dance, and poetry, while addressing key concepts such as embodiment, movement, pulse, and performance. Volume editors Peter Cheyne, Andy Hamilton, and Max Paddison bring together a range of key questions: What is the distinction between rhythm and pulse? What is the relationship between everyday embodied experience, and the specific experience of music, dance, and poetry? Can aesthetics offer an understanding of rhythm that helps inform our responses to visual and other arts, as well as music, dance, and poetry? And, what is the relation between psychological conceptions of entrainment, and the humane concept of rhythm and meter? Overall, The Philosophy of Rhythm appeals across disciplinary boundaries, providing a unique overview of a neglected aspect of aesthetic experience.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Mild Cognitive Impairment:Which Kind Is It?Andy Hamilton (bio)Keywordshuman kinds, mild cognitive impairment, multiple personality disorder, practical kinds, social constructionThere is much stimulating material in the Graham and Ritchie's paper (2006), concerning not just disease-classification but also the ethics of diagnosis. My concern is with the way in which they adduce Ian Hacking's views in the philosophy of science in support of their own. The authors quote with approval his "dynamic nominalism" and its influence on Zachar's concept of "practical kinds." Hacking's view, as the authors quote it, is that "People classified in a certain way tend to conform to or grow into the ways that they are described; but they also evolve in their own ways, so that the classifications and descriptions have to be constantly revised" (1995, 21). The act of classifying changes both the classifier and the subject of classification, resulting in facts and categories that are both socially created and real. Hacking calls this "the looping effect of human kinds," and comments that "Multiple personality [disorder] is an almost too perfect illustration of this feedback effect" (1995, 21). The authors comment that Zachar (2000) builds on Hacking's position, discarding essentialist notions of classification that are limited to inherent biological properties, and turning instead to "practical kinds—nonarbitrary cultural artifacts intended to meet pragmatic needs (e.g. therapeutic, predictive prognostic, labeling effects, and physiology)" (Graham and Ritchie 2006, 36). Practical kinds, they believe, offer a way out of the clinical approach focused on mild cognitive impairment (MCI) as a precursor to, or mild form of, Alzheimer's disease. The inclination of the authors, as I read them, is to treat MCI as a practical or human kind, and not, like Alzheimer's disease, as a natural kind.My concern is whether the "looping effect of human kinds" can be transferred to the case of MCI from Hacking's original case study in Rewriting the Soul, multiple personality disorder (MPD). Hacking wished there to undermine the traditional debate over whether MPD is a "social or psychiatric artifact." He claims, correctly I think, that the presupposition behind the question "Is MPD a real disorder as opposed to a product of social circumstances?" should be rejected. The fact that a disorder is a product of social circumstances does not make it less real (1995, 12). On the looping of human kinds, Hacking comments that "The concept of child abuse [implicated in MPD] may itself be so made and molded by attempts at knowledge and intervention, and social reaction to these studies, that there is no stable object, child abuse, to have knowledge about." This is a "no fact of the matter" response, and it [End Page 51] is based on the recognition of conceptual change. He later adds that child abuse "is a real evil, and it was so before the concept was constructed. It was nevertheless constructed. Neither reality nor construction should be in question" (1995, 61, 68). However, Hacking's conclusions about the reality of MPD express only a muted skepticism. Utilitarian skeptics approach this question by asking, "What is the most effective treatment?" Hacking writes that "in their hearts [such skeptics] suspect that the outcome of multiple therapy [therapy that condones or even encourages the development of multiples in the patient] is a type of false consciousness" (1995, 267). The skeptics about MPD are making a moral judgment, he believes; but on whether that moral judgment is correct, he is silent, although the suspicion must be that he agrees with it.How do these considerations apply to the case of MCI? Graham and Ritchie rightly note that classifying a subject as suffering from MCI, and informing them of the diagnosis, will affect them adversely—it will cause suffering not least because there is at present no cure. However, it must surely be conceded that any disease at all—physical or mental—is a social entity insofar as it involves behavioral ascriptions to the subject concerning their incapacity. The authors also note the vested interests—especially from the pharmaceutical industry—in developing a diagnostic category of MCI. These interests are present in the development of any significant diagnostic...