Dimitris Vardoulakis

Those of Collingwood's interpreters who insist that the science of being was abandoned in the later writings, tend to display also a marked dissatisfaction with the logic of question and answer, at least as it is presented in the Essay on Metaphysics. The most influential statement of this interpretation is undoubtedly Rex Martin's. It was initially published as an article in 1989 and was later institutionalized through its incorporation in his 'Editor's Introduction' to the Oxford University Press revised edition of the Essay. I start from the assumption that Collingwood should be read as a hermeneutic philosopher. Having shown elsewhere what this means for Collingwood's conception of being and ontology, I will concentrate here to show that Collingwood's hermeneutics cannot be reconciled with an interpretation that finds no place for question and answer in his philosophy. The logic of question and answer is indispensable to the hermeneutics of Collingwood. I will argue that Martin's expunction of question and answer from Collingwood's philosophy rests on an a sense of meaning that is foreign both to hermeneutics and to Collingwood

In The Principles of Art, R. G. Collingwood pursues, on the one hand, a ‘definition’ of art, and, on the other, a ‘metaphysics’. The Principles is divided into three Books. Book I is devoted mostly to craft, while Book II pertains largely to metaphysics. The fact that Book II is twice the size of Book III, where the discussion of ‘art proper’ takes place, is proof enough that the metaphysical part of the Principles is not a mere excursus. Collingwood’s ontology is indispensable for understanding his aesthetics, and vice versa. The crucial link is the imagination. What Collingwood calls ‘total imaginative experience’ is described in the Principles as the sine qua non of both thought and sensibility. The aim of this article is to examine the ontological import of Collingwood’s conception of the total imagination.

Sophocles seems to have already reached in Antigone the same insight about the body politic which will again be expressed in the seventeenth century by Spinoza: namely, the political has as its condition of possibility the potential for being challenged from within. Sophocles’ play starts immediately after Thebes has successfully stoved off a challenge from an external enemy – from Argos, another city state. However, during the battle, Eteocles, the king, and his own brother, Polynices, who in fact was heading the Argeans, both died. Thus afterwards Creon is elected ruler of Thebes. Creon’s first act of government is to decree that Polynices’ body is to remain unburied. If the new king thought that the worse was past him after the end of the battle, he was sorely mistaken. A challenge to his degree from one of the citizens and his own niece, Antigone, will not only lead to the decimation of his own family, but also to the new king being stranded alone at the end of the play, in charge of a self-incurred desert. Antigone, a stubborn teenage girl, is the cause of challenging the sovereign of Thebes and hence the city’s body politic