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78Pre-punishment, communicative theories of punishment, and compatibilismPacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2): 125-136. 2012.Saul Smilansky holds that there is a widespread intuition to the effect that pre-punishment – the practice of punishing individuals for crimes which they have not committed, but which we are in a position to know that they are going to commit – is morally objectionable. Smilanksy has argued that this intuition can be explained by our recognition of the importance of respecting the autonomy of potential criminals. (Smilansky, 1994) More recently he has suggested that this account of the intuition…Read more
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75Simulation, co-cognition, and the attribution of emotional statesEuropean Journal of Philosophy 11 (3): 353-374. 2003.In this paper I argue that there is a viable simulationist account of emotion attribution. However, I also try to say something specific about the form that this account ought to take. I argue that someone who wants to give by a simulationist account of emotion attribution should focus on similarities between emotions and perceptual judgments.
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69Christian List and Philip Pettit , Group Agency: The Possibility, Design and Status of Corporate Agents . Reviewed byPhilosophy in Review 33 (2): 138-141. 2013.This is a short review of List and Pettit's influential book 'Group Agency'
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64Needs and Moral Necessity – Soran ReaderPhilosophical Quarterly 60 (241): 882-884. 2010.This is a review of Soran Reader's monograph 'Needs and Moral Necessity'. Although my response to her book is largely positive, I have reservations about her views of the scope of the ethical, and the coherence of her views with the McIntyrean concept of practice which she espouses.
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41Punishment, Jesters and Judges: a Response to Nathan HannaEthical Theory and Moral Practice 22 (1): 3-12. 2019.Nathan Hanna has recently argued against a position I defend in a 2013 paper in this journal and in my 2016 book on punishment, namely that we can punish someone without intending to harm them. In this discussion note I explain why two alleged counterexamples to my view put forward by Hanna are not in fact counterexamples to any view I hold, produce an example which shows that, if we accept a number of Hanna’s own assumptions, punishment does not require an intention to harm, and discuss whether…Read more
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34Posidonije o emocijama i nekonceptualnom sadržajuProlegomena 10 (2): 185-213. 2011.In this paper I argue that the work of the unorthodox Stoic Posidonius - as reported to us by Galen - can be seen as making an interesting contribution to contemporary debates about the nature of emotion. Richard Sorabji has already argued that Posidonius' contribution highlights the weaknesses in some well-known contemporary forms of cognitivism. Here I argue that Posidonius might be seen as advocating a theory of the emotions which sees them as being, in at least some cases, two-level intentio…Read more
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31The Contents of Perception and the Contents of EmotionNoûs 49 (2): 275-297. 2014.Several philosophers think there are important analogies between emotions and perceptual states. Furthermore, considerations about the rational assessibility of emotions have led philosophers—in some cases, the very same philosophers—to think that the content of emotions must be propositional content. If one finds it plausible that perceptual states have propositional contents, then there is no obvious tension between these views. However, this view of perception has recently been attacked by ph…Read more
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27Introduction: Nonparadigmatic PunishmentsJournal of Applied Philosophy 38 (3): 357-365. 2021.This is an introduction to the Symposium on Nonparadigmatic Forms of Punishment. We explain what we mean by calling certain instances of punishment 'nonparadigmatic' and explain why nonparadigmatic punishments are of philosophical interest. We then introduce the contributions to the Special Issue and conclude by outlining directions that future research on nonparadigmatic punishment might take. We focus on three particular ways in which punishment might be nonparadigmatic: cases involving nonsta…Read more
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26Macrocognition: A Theory of Distributed Minds and Collective Intentionality (review)Journal of Social Ontology 1 (2): 381-383. 2015.
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25The Duties of Non-Agential Groups: Some Comments on Stephanie Collins’ Group DutiesJournal of Social Ontology 6 (1): 117-125. 2020.
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23Expressive Theories of PunishmentIn Matthew C. Altman (ed.), The Palgrave Handbook on the Philosophy of Punishment, Palgrave-macmillan. pp. 245-265. 2022.In this chapter, Wringe considers expressivist accounts of punishment with particular emphasis on the work of Joel Feinberg, Jean Hampton, and Antony Duff. After distinguishing between definitional and justificatory versions of expressivism and examining the case for definitional expressivism, Zaibert argues first that a recognition of the expressive functions of punishment does not require us to accept an expressive definition of punishment. He also argues that the best-known versions of justif…Read more
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18Simulation, Co‐cognition, and the Attribution of Emotional StatesEuropean Journal of Philosophy 11 (3): 354-374. 2003.
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16Global Collective Obligations, Just International Institutions and PluralismIn Manuel Knoll, Stephen Snyder & Nurdane Şimşek (eds.), New Perspectives on Distributive Justice: Deep Disagreements, Pluralism, and the Problem of Consensus, De Gruyter. pp. 345-360. 2018.
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13Can Visual Experience have a Propositional Content?Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 57 151-155. 2018.Call the view that perceptual states can have propositional contents the ‘propositional view’ - or PV for short. Proponents of PV include John McDowell and Susanna Siegel; Anil Gupta and Charles Travis are prominent opponents. In this paper, I wish to address an argument against PV put forward by Anil Gupta. Gupta argues that the conjunction of PV with two further claims, which he calls the ‘Equivalence constraint’ and the ‘reliability constraint’, leads to skepticism. I shall argue that even if…Read more
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1Collective Responsibility: Perspectives on Political Philosophy from Social Ontology (edited book)Springer. forthcoming.
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Sympathy and Simulation: A Humean Contribution to the Theory of Mind DebateYeditepe'de Felsefe (Philosophy at Yeditepe) 3. 2004.
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Global obligations and the human right to healthIn Kendy Hess, Violetta Igneski & Tracy Lynn Isaacs (eds.), Collectivity: Ontology, Ethics, and Social Justice, Rowman & Littlefield International. 2018.
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Mind |
Social and Political Philosophy |
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind |
Social and Political Philosophy |