Michael Pakaluk

In Books VIII and IX of his masterpiece of moral philosophy, the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle gives perhaps the most famous of all philosophical discussions of friendship. Michael Pakaluk presents the first systematic study in English of these books, showing how important Aristotle's treatment of friendship is to his ethics as a whole. Pakaluk's fresh and scrupulously accurate translation is accompanied by a detailed philosophical commentary which reveals the remarkably coherent structure of the books and unfolds with lucidity the various arguments contained within Aristotle's terse and compressed text. Pakaluk looks at the logical form of Aristotle's analysis of friendship, at his subtle view of the relationship between friendship and justice, at the role of reciprocity in friendship, at civic friendship and its relation to the family, and at the development of friendship out of self-love and reflexive consciousness. This volume will be a valuable tool for anyone studying Aristotle's ethics, especially readers with no Greek.

This thesis is an investigation of Aristotle's theory of friendship, as found in books VIII and IX of the Nicomachean Ethics. It has two major concerns: first, Aristotle's theory of goodness; second, Aristotle's view of the relationship between self-love and love of another. Aristotle's theory of goodness is important, because friendship consists of love, and love is always on account of some good. Thus, Aristotle's distinctions among various goods underlie his theory of the various sorts of friendships and their nature. Aristotle's views on the relationship between self-love and friendship are examined to discover a theory different from contemporary theories of morality, which are vexed by the problem of the relationship between egoism and altruism. The first chapter examines the Platonic background of Aristotle's theory of friendship. The Lysis is given special attention, and then Aristotle's criticism of the Platonic theory of the good in EN I.6 is examined as giving us Aristotle's positive theory of goodness. This positive theory is used in the second chapter to understand Aristotle's division of friendship into three forms. It is argued that, according to Aristotle, just as being varies categorically, so goodness varies categorically; thus love and friendship also vary categorically. The third chapter examines Aristotle's thesis that friendship 'comes from' self-love. It is claimed that this is intended to show that self-love is social, not that sociability is selfish. Aristotle's saying that a 'friend is another self' is interpreted as a qualified metaphor based on an unanalyzeable analogy. It is claimed that Aristotle's understanding of analogy enables him to take a position on the relationship between self-love and love of another unavailable to moderns. The final chapter attempts an interpretation of the difficult argument in EN IX.9, 1170b13ff. It is argued that Aristotle is trying to explain how a person's own life is good for him and pleasant to him, and that Aristotle is claiming that this is how a friend is good for and pleasant to a good person.

I provide a reading of Reid as an 'encyclopaedist', in Alasdair MacIntyre's sense, that is, as a scientist who conceives of himself as part of a broader scientific community, and who aims to make a contribution through work in a particular field. Reid's field is pneumatology. On this conception, Reid's recourse to 'common sense' is of a piece with the postulation, by any scientist, of a natural endowment for members of the same ostensible kind. Reid should therefore be understood as rejecting the classical tradition of epistemology and any conception of epistemology as first philosophy. His view resembles, rather, the modern position of 'natural epistemology', though admittedly, on account of his doctrine of active power, he is not committed to 'naturalism' in the contemporary sense