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798Is There a True Metaphysics of Material Objects?Noûs 36 (s1): 118-145. 2002.I argue that metaphysical views of material objects should be understood as 'packages', rather than individual claims, where the other parts of the package include how the theory addresses 'recalcitant data', and that when the packages meet certain general desiderata - which all of the currently competing views *can* meet - there is nothing in the world that could make one of the theories true as opposed to any of the others.
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236Does hylomorphism offer a distinctive solution to the grounding problem?Analysis 74 (3): 397-404. 2014.The Aristotelian doctrine of hylomorphism has seen a recent resurgence of popularity, due to the work of a number of well-known and impressive philosophers. One of the recently motivating virtues claimed for the doctrine is its ability to solve the grounding problem for philosophers who believe in coinciding entities. In this brief article, I will argue that when fully spelled out, hylomorphism does not, in fact, contribute a distinctive solution to this problem. It is not that it offers no solu…Read more
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146An argument that internalism requires infallibilityPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (1): 163-179. 2001.Most contemporary internalists are fallibilists, denying that there need be anything about which we are infallible for us to have knowledge or justified beliefs. At the same time, internalists standardly appeal to ‘internal twins’ in arguing against externalism and motivating internalism---a Cartesian demon can ruin the ‘external’ relations we have to the world, but one is equally well justified in one’s beliefs whether or not one is subject to such deception. Even if one doesn’t motivate one’s …Read more
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153The Structure of Objects (review)Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2): 371-374. 2010.This Article does not have an abstract
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147Identity and the Identity-likePhilosophical Topics 20 (1): 269-292. 1992.Some relations - like supervenience and composition - can appear very much like identity. Sometimes, the relata differ only in modal, or modally-involved features. Yet, in some cases, we judge the pairs to be identical (water/H2O; Hesperus/Phosphorus), while in others, many judge one of the weaker relations to hold (c-fiber firing/pain; statues/lumps). Given the seemingly same actual properties these pairs have, what can justify us in sometimes believing identity is the relation, and sometimes s…Read more
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258A sweater unraveled: Following one thread of thought for avoiding coincident entitiesNoûs 32 (4): 423-448. 1998.One obvious solution to the puzzles of apparently coincident objects is a sort of reductionism - the tree really just is the wood, the statue is just the clay, and nothing really ceases to exist in the purported non-identity showing cases. This paper starts with that approach and its underlying motivation, and argues that if one follows those motivations - specifically, the rejection of coincidence, and the belief that 'genuine' object-destroying changes must differ non-arbitrarily from acciden…Read more
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679On the metaphysical contingency of laws of natureIn John Hawthorne & Tamar Szabó Gendler (eds.), Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford University Press. pp. 309--336. 2002.This paper defends the traditional view that the laws of nature are contingent, or, if some of them are necessary, this is due to analytic principles for the individuation of the law-governed properties. Fundamentally, I argue that the supposed explanatory purposes served by taking the laws to be necessary --showing how laws support counterfactuals, how properties are individuated, or how we have knowledge of properties--are in fact undermined by the continued possibility of the imagined scenari…Read more
Madison, Wisconsin, United States of America
Areas of Specialization
Metaphysics |
Philosophy of Language |
Epistemology |
Areas of Interest
Metaphilosophy |
Philosophy of Mind |
Meta-Ethics |
PhilPapers Editorships
Anti-Essentialism |