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11Is it Always Fallacious to Derive Values From Facts?Argumentation 9 (4): 553-562. 1995.Charles Pigden has argued for a logical Is/Ought gap on the grounds of the conservativeness of logic. I offer a counter-example which shows that Pigden’s argument is unsound and that there need be no logical gap between Is-premises and an Ought-conclusion. My counter-example is an argument which is logically valid, has only Is-premises and an Ought-conclusion, does not purport to violate the conservativeness of logic, and does not rely on controversial assumptions about Aristotelian biology o…Read more
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10Review: T.L.S. Sprigge,The Rational Foundations of Ethics (review)Philosophical Books 30 (1): 49-51. 1989.
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5Commentary: Practical Wisdom and TheoryCambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 21 (3): 404-408. 2012.This paper is an ethical reflection on the real-life case of "Angela", a highly intelligent but severely anorexic young woman who wishes to refuse all but palliative treatment. It is part of CQHE's "Ethics Committees and Consultants at Work" series, in response to the essay, "Starving for Perfection."
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4Stephen T. Davis God, reason and theistic proofs. (Edinburgh university press, 1997). (review)Religious Studies 35 (1): 99-111. 1999.
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14Utilitarian EschatologyAmerican Philosophical Quarterly 28 (4): 339-47. 1991.Traditional utilitarianism, when applied, implies a surprising prediction about the future, viz., that all experience of pleasure and pain must end once and for all, or infinitely dwindle. Not only is this implication surprising, it should render utilitarianism unacceptable to persons who hold any of the following theses: that evaluative propositions may not imply descriptive, factual propositions; that evaluative propositions may not imply contingent factual propositions about the future; tha…Read more
Leeds, West Yorkshire, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Religion |
Meta-Ethics |
Normative Ethics |