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224Naturalistic Ethics and the Argument from EvilFaith and Philosophy 8 (3): 368-379. 1991.Philosophical naturalism is a cluster of views and impulses typically taken to include atheism, physicalism, radical empiricism or naturalized epistemology, and some sort of relativism, subjectivism or nihilism about morality. I argue that a problem arises when the naturalist offers the argument from evil for atheism. Since the argument from evil is a moral argument, it cannot be effectively deployed by anyone who holds the denatured ethical theories that the naturalist typically holds. In the c…Read more
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73Introduction to Special Issue on the Problem of the CriterionPhilosophical Papers 40 (3): 279-283. 2011.Philosophical Papers, Volume 40, Issue 3, Page 279-283, November 2011
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124Who Needs Valid Moral Arguments?Argumentation 17 (1): 35-42. 2003.Why have so many philosophers agonised over the possibility of valid arguments from factual premises to moral conclusions? I suggest that they have done so, because of worries over a sceptical argument that has as one of its premises, `All moral knowledge must be non-inferential, or, if inferential, based on valid arguments or strong inductive arguments from factual premises'. I argue that this premise is false
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154An aristotelian business ethics?Journal of Applied Philosophy 15 (1). 1998.Elaine Sternberg's Just Business is one of the first book-length Aristotelian treatments of business ethics. It is Aristotelian in the sense that Sternberg begins by defining the nature of business in order to identify its end, and, thence, normative principles to regulate it. According to Sternberg, the nature of business is 'the selling of goods or services in order to maximise long-term owner value', therefore all business behaviour must be evaluated with reference to the maximisation o…Read more
Leeds, West Yorkshire, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
| Epistemology |
| Philosophy of Religion |
| Meta-Ethics |
| Normative Ethics |