-
98Naturalistic Ethics and the Argument from EvilFaith and Philosophy 8 (3): 368-379. 1991.Philosophical naturalism is a cluster of views and impulses typically taken to include atheism, physicalism, radical empiricism or naturalized epistemology, and some sort of relativism, subjectivism or nihilism about morality. I argue that a problem arises when the naturalist offers the argument from evil for atheism. Since the argument from evil is a moral argument, it cannot be effectively deployed by anyone who holds the denatured ethical theories that the naturalist typically holds. In the c…Read more
-
85Intuitionism and subjectivismMetaphilosophy 22 (1-2): 115-121. 1991.I define ethical intuitionism as the view that it is appropriate to appeal to inferentially unsupported moral beliefs in the course of moral reasoning. I mention four common objections to this view, including the view that all such appeals to intuitionism collapse into “subjectivism”, i.e., that they make truth in ethical theory depend on what people believe. I defend intuitionism from versions of this criticism expressed by R.M. Hare and Peter Singer.
-
74Who Needs Valid Moral Arguments?Argumentation 17 (1): 35-42. 2003.Why have so many philosophers agonised over the possibility of valid arguments from factual premises to moral conclusions? I suggest that they have done so, because of worries over a sceptical argument that has as one of its premises, `All moral knowledge must be non-inferential, or, if inferential, based on valid arguments or strong inductive arguments from factual premises'. I argue that this premise is false
Leeds, West Yorkshire, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
Areas of Specialization
| Epistemology |
| Philosophy of Religion |
| Meta-Ethics |
| Normative Ethics |