•  1615
    The Stoics on Hypotheses and Hypothetical Arguments
    Phronesis 42 (3): 299-312. 1997.
    ABSTRACT: In this paper I argue (i) that the hypothetical arguments about which the Stoic Chrysippus wrote numerous books (DL 7.196) are not to be confused with the so-called hypothetical syllogisms" but are the same hypothetical arguments as those mentioned five times in Epictetus (e.g. Diss. 1.25.11-12); and (ii) that these hypothetical arguments are formed by replacing in a non-hypothetical argument one (or more) of the premisses by a Stoic "hypothesis" or supposition. Such "hypotheses" or su…Read more
  •  1525
    Pre-Stoic Hypothetical Syllogistic in Galen
    The Bulletin of the Institute of Classical Studies 57-72. 2002.
    ABSTRACT: This paper traces the evidence in Galen's Introduction to Logic (Institutio Logica) for a hypothetical syllogistic which predates Stoic propositional logic. It emerges that Galen is one of our main witnesses for such a theory, whose authors are most likely Theophrastus and Eudemus. A reconstruction of this theory is offered which - among other things - allows to solve some apparent textual difficulties in the Institutio Logica.
  •  179
    Propositional Logic in Ammonius
    In Helmut Linneweber-Lammerskitten & Georg Mohr (eds.), Interpretation und Argument, Koenigshausen & Neumann. 2002.
    ABSTRACT: This paper collects the evidence in Ammonius' surviving works for elements of a propositional logic, coming to the conclusion that Ammonius had a theory of hypothetical syllogisms in the tradition of Aristotle and the Peripatetics, with Platonic elements mixed in, and using some Stoic elements, but not a propositional logic in the narrower sense as we find it in Stoic logic.
  •  1685
    Kant's Categories of Freedom
    In Hariolf Oberer & Gerhard Seel (eds.), Kant: Analysen, Probleme, Kritik, Königshausen & Neumann. 1988.
    ABSTRACT: A general interpretation and close textual analysis of Kant’s theory of the categories of freedom (or categories of practical reason) in his Critique of Practical Reason. My main concerns in the paper are the following: (1) I show that Kant’s categories of freedom have primarily three functions: as conditions of the possibility for actions (i) to be free, (ii) to be comprehensible as free and (iii) to be morally evaluated. (2) I show that for Kant actions, although qua theoretical obje…Read more