Andrew Hamilton

Aesthetics and Music is a rich and interesting study. Hamilton's approach is innovative. He interleaves chapters on the history of philosophical thought about music with more theoretical discussions of music, sound, rhythm and improvisation, but does not cover the work–performance relation, depiction or expression. He draws on an atypically broad range of examples, including avant-garde, medieval, non-Western and jazz. The assumptions are humanist: ‘I wish to argue for an aesthetic conception of music as an art … according to which music is a human activity grounded in the body and bodily movement and interfused with human life’.The historical chapters are valuable and not without analysis and criticism. Hamilton shows how the ancient Greek theorists were more interested in music's mathematical properties as reflecting the underlying harmony of relations between cosmic bodies than in the practice of musicians. While they equated the value of art with its contribution to an education for citizenship and while their concept of the arts differed …

The history of science often has difficulty connecting with science at the lab-bench level, raising questions about the value of history of science for science. This essay offers a case study from taxonomy in which lessons learned about particular failings of numerical taxonomy in the second half of the twentieth century bear on the new movement toward DNA barcoding. In particular, it argues that an unwillingness to deal with messy theoretical questions in both cases leads to important problems in the theory and practice of identifying taxa. This argument makes use of scientific and historical considerations in a way that the authors hope leads to convincing conclusions about the history of taxonomy as well as about its present practice

Rhythm is the fundamental pulse that animates poetry, music, and dance across all cultures. And yet the recent explosion of scholarly interest across disciplines in the aural dimensions of aesthetic experience--particularly in sociology, cultural and media theory, and literary studies--has yet to explore this fundamental category. This book furthers the discussion of rhythm beyond the discrete conceptual domains and technical vocabularies of musicology and prosody. With original essays by philosophers, psychologists, musicians, literary theorists, and ethno-musicologists, The Philosophy of Rhythm opens up wider-and plural-perspectives, examining formal affinities between the historically interconnected fields of music, dance, and poetry, while addressing key concepts such as embodiment, movement, pulse, and performance. Volume editors Peter Cheyne, Andy Hamilton, and Max Paddison bring together a range of key questions: What is the distinction between rhythm and pulse? What is the relationship between everyday embodied experience, and the specific experience of music, dance, and poetry? Can aesthetics offer an understanding of rhythm that helps inform our responses to visual and other arts, as well as music, dance, and poetry? And, what is the relation between psychological conceptions of entrainment, and the humane concept of rhythm and meter? Overall, The Philosophy of Rhythm appeals across disciplinary boundaries, providing a unique overview of a neglected aspect of aesthetic experience.

Wittgenstein had little to say directly on philosophy of history. But some pertinent remarks in _On Certainty_ have received little attention, apart from in Elizabeth Anscombe's short article on Hume and Julius Caesar. That article acknowledges its debt to _On Certainty,_ which responses to Anscombe have failed to recognise. Wittgenstein focuses in _On Certainty_ on apparently empirical propositions that seem to be certainties, but in fact form a rule-like framework for judging. I have called these _Moorean propositions_, and the present article develops the suggestion that history as a discipline rests on them. The result is a qualification of empiricism in philosophy of history.

Scruton is a self-confessed elitist for whom culture is ‘the creation and creator of elites’, though its meaning ‘lies in emotions and aspirations that are common to all’. This article argues that one can uphold his humane conception of the value of high culture without endorsing elitism. It develops a surprisingly unelitist strand in Scruton's thinking into a meritocratic middle way between elitism and populism, in order to explain why art is in some sense an elite product, but with communal resonance. This aim is furthered by interpreting high culture in terms of the less elitist concept of the classic.

Ludwig Wittgenstein is arguably the most important philosopher of the twentieth century. In On Certainty he discusses central issues in epistemology, including the nature of knowledge and scepticism. The Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Wittgenstein and On Certainty introduces and assesses: Wittgenstein's career and the background to his later philosophy the central ideas and text of On Certainty , including its responses to G.E. Moore and discussion of fundamental issues in the theory of knowledge Wittgenstein's continuing importance in contemporary philosophy. This GuideBook is essential reading for all students of Wittgenstein, and for those studying epistemology and philosophy of language. On Certainty, Wittgenstein's final work, addresses a category of "world-picture" propositions discovered by G.E. Moore. These challenge Wittgenstein's enduring commitment to a well-defined category of empirical propositions, and help to generate a critique of scepticism. Developing Wittgenstein's view that scepticism is self-undermining, the Guidebook offers a combative yet therapeutic interpretation that locates On Certainty between the standpoints of Kant and Hume

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Mild Cognitive Impairment:Which Kind Is It?Andy Hamilton (bio)Keywordshuman kinds, mild cognitive impairment, multiple personality disorder, practical kinds, social constructionThere is much stimulating material in the Graham and Ritchie's paper (2006), concerning not just disease-classification but also the ethics of diagnosis. My concern is with the way in which they adduce Ian Hacking's views in the philosophy of science in support of their own. The authors quote with approval his "dynamic nominalism" and its influence on Zachar's concept of "practical kinds." Hacking's view, as the authors quote it, is that "People classified in a certain way tend to conform to or grow into the ways that they are described; but they also evolve in their own ways, so that the classifications and descriptions have to be constantly revised" (1995, 21). The act of classifying changes both the classifier and the subject of classification, resulting in facts and categories that are both socially created and real. Hacking calls this "the looping effect of human kinds," and comments that "Multiple personality [disorder] is an almost too perfect illustration of this feedback effect" (1995, 21). The authors comment that Zachar (2000) builds on Hacking's position, discarding essentialist notions of classification that are limited to inherent biological properties, and turning instead to "practical kinds—nonarbitrary cultural artifacts intended to meet pragmatic needs (e.g. therapeutic, predictive prognostic, labeling effects, and physiology)" (Graham and Ritchie 2006, 36). Practical kinds, they believe, offer a way out of the clinical approach focused on mild cognitive impairment (MCI) as a precursor to, or mild form of, Alzheimer's disease. The inclination of the authors, as I read them, is to treat MCI as a practical or human kind, and not, like Alzheimer's disease, as a natural kind.My concern is whether the "looping effect of human kinds" can be transferred to the case of MCI from Hacking's original case study in Rewriting the Soul, multiple personality disorder (MPD). Hacking wished there to undermine the traditional debate over whether MPD is a "social or psychiatric artifact." He claims, correctly I think, that the presupposition behind the question "Is MPD a real disorder as opposed to a product of social circumstances?" should be rejected. The fact that a disorder is a product of social circumstances does not make it less real (1995, 12). On the looping of human kinds, Hacking comments that "The concept of child abuse [implicated in MPD] may itself be so made and molded by attempts at knowledge and intervention, and social reaction to these studies, that there is no stable object, child abuse, to have knowledge about." This is a "no fact of the matter" response, and it [End Page 51] is based on the recognition of conceptual change. He later adds that child abuse "is a real evil, and it was so before the concept was constructed. It was nevertheless constructed. Neither reality nor construction should be in question" (1995, 61, 68). However, Hacking's conclusions about the reality of MPD express only a muted skepticism. Utilitarian skeptics approach this question by asking, "What is the most effective treatment?" Hacking writes that "in their hearts [such skeptics] suspect that the outcome of multiple therapy [therapy that condones or even encourages the development of multiples in the patient] is a type of false consciousness" (1995, 267). The skeptics about MPD are making a moral judgment, he believes; but on whether that moral judgment is correct, he is silent, although the suspicion must be that he agrees with it.How do these considerations apply to the case of MCI? Graham and Ritchie rightly note that classifying a subject as suffering from MCI, and informing them of the diagnosis, will affect them adversely—it will cause suffering not least because there is at present no cure. However, it must surely be conceded that any disease at all—physical or mental—is a social entity insofar as it involves behavioral ascriptions to the subject concerning their incapacity. The authors also note the vested interests—especially from the pharmaceutical industry—in developing a diagnostic category of MCI. These interests are present in the development of any significant diagnostic...

The aesthetics of imperfection emphasises spontaneity, disruption, process and energy over formal perfection and is often ignored by many commentators or seen only in improvisation. This comprehensive collection is the first time imperfection has been explored across all kinds of musical performance, whether improvisation or interpretation of compositions. Covering music, visual art, dance, comedy, architecture and design, it addresses the meaning, experience, and value of improvisation and spontaneous creation across different artistic media. A distinctive feature of the volume is that it brings together contributions from theoreticians and practitioners, presenting a wider range of perspectives on the issues involved. Contributors look at performance and practice across Western and non-Western musical, artistic and craft forms. Composers and non-performing artists offer a perspective on what is 'imperfect' or improvisatory within their work, contributing further dimensions to the discourse. The Aesthetics of Imperfection in Music and the Arts features 39 chapters organised into eight sections and written by a diverse group of scholars and performers. They consider divergent definitions of aesthetics, employing both 18th-century philosophy and more recent socially and historically situated conceptions making this an essential, up-to-date resource for anyone working on either side of the perfection-imperfection debate.

The pervasive dispositional model of belief is misguided. It fails to acknowledge the authority of first‐person ascriptions or avowals of belief, and the “decision principle”– that having decided the question whether p, there is, for me, no further question whether I believe that p. The dilemma is how one can have immediate knowledge of a state extended in time; its resolution lies in the expressive character of avowals – which does not imply a non‐assertoric thesis – and their non‐cognitive status. The common claim that there are higher‐order beliefs concerning ones present beliefs is rejected as unintelligible. The decision principle is defended against claims of “unconscious belief”; there is no interesting such category, since all beliefs are liable at some time to be considered, but mostly to be out of mind. Belief is not constituted by a disposition, but is connected with dispositions – it is an “attitude concept”.

Ludwig Wittgenstein is arguably the most important philosopher of the twentieth century. In _On Certainty_ he discusses central issues in epistemology, including the nature of knowledge and scepticism. _The Routledge Philosophy Guidebook to Wittgenstein and On Certainty_ introduces and assesses: Wittgenstein's career and the background to his later philosophy the central ideas and text of _On Certainty_, including its responses to G.E. Moore and discussion of fundamental issues in the theory of knowledge Wittgenstein's continuing importance in contemporary philosophy. This _GuideBook_ is essential reading for all students of Wittgenstein, and for those studying epistemology and philosophy of language. _On Certainty, _Wittgenstein's final work, addresses a category of "world-picture" propositions discovered by G.E. Moore. These challenge Wittgenstein's enduring commitment to a well-defined category of empirical propositions, and help to generate a critique of scepticism. Developing Wittgenstein's view that scepticism is self-undermining, the _Guidebook _offers a combative yet therapeutic interpretation that locates _On Certainty_ between the standpoints of Kant and Hume.