Riccardo Martinelli

La percezione musicale ha avuto un ruolo significativo nella storia della psicologia della Gestalt. Muovendo dalle critiche di Mach ed Ehrenfels alla dottrina elaborata da Helmholtz e dall’elaborazione teorica di Stumpf, destinata a fungere da ponte concettuale, il lavoro analizza la riflessione svoltasi in seno alla psicologia della Gestalt. Sorprendentemente, Köhler non si concentra sulle Gestalten musicali complesse, ma sulle qualità tonali più elementari, mostrandone la totale irriducibilità a fattori fisico-fisiologici. Sulla stessa linea è anche Hornbostel, il quale amplia tuttavia il discorso mediante il richiamo al complesso antropologico dei vissuti umani, musicali ed extramusicali, che rimandano a un determinato contesto culturale, saldando così il nesso tra psicologia della Gestalt e ricerca nel campo etnomusicologico.

This essay illustrates the main aspects of the discussion between Brentano and Stumpf about «tonal fusion». In his Tonpsychologie, Stumpf essentially moved from a Brentanian standpoint. Yet, he did not adopt Brentano’s subsequently developed new theory of «sensible qualities», so that a polemic eventually arouse between them. Far from representing a marginal issue, the episode is relevant to our understanding of their relationship. The discussion as to the mechanism of tonal fusion reveals a general divergence between Brentano and Stumpf concerning the idea of human sensibility as a whole and of the method of psychology.

In his first two Critiques, Kant makes a distinction between the empirical and the intelligible character. Yet, in his Pragmatic anthropology Kant adds the human beings’ “natural aptitude” to the customary dichotomy of “way of sensing” and “way of thinking”. In this paper, I investigate Kant’s concept of natural aptitude in his Pragmatic anthropology and in his Lectures on anthropology. Most probably, Kant’s sources lie in the Scholastic doctrine of the “character of scholars”. The “good mind” that Kant associates with the human beings’ natural aptitude – in sharp contrast with the autonomy implied by moral character – nevertheless reveals its significance in compensating for the human species’ “pragmatic predisposition”. To some extent, then, natural aptitude contributes to the pursuit of nature’s providential goals.

Il saggio analizza l’Antropologia pragmatica di Kant alla luce degli altri scritti critici e precritici, delle Lezioni, delle fonti e del dibattito critico internazionale più recente. Viene chiarito anzitutto il rapporto tra antropologia e critica della ragione: gli esiti della Dialettica trascendentale impongono a Kant di individuare un nuovo assetto per la scienza empirica dell’uomo superando la prospettiva scolastica. Ciò si manifesta nell’adozione del termine «antropologia», che tuttavia Kant distingue dalle antropologie mediche del tempo, per lo più deterministiche, grazie all’impostazione «pragmatica». La psicologia empirica viene inglobata ma riformata nel nuovo progetto: nella Didattica Kant sottolinea gli aspetti problematici o «negativi» nell’uso delle facoltà: si individuano così gli «elementi» di un’antropologia poi utilizzati nella Caratteristica per definire il senso della «destinazione» razionale dell’uomo nel senso del concetto cosmico della filosofia.

Stumpf’s doctrine of the categories is of great importance for our understanding of his philosophy. This theme had been widely discussed among German thinkers after Kant; Brentano himself had repeatedly dealt with it since his early works. However, Stumpf considerably diverges from Brentano on this crucial philosophical topic. Although a systematic discussion can be found only in Stumpf’s posthumous Erkenntnislehre, his core ideas on the categories can be traced to his early work on space of 1873. In fact, Stumpf claims that the peculiar relationship between extension and color is analogous to the relationship that holds between substance and accidents. Thus, like any other category, substance empirically stems from perception. Sensory experience, for Stumpf, is made up of perceptual wholes, whose attributes are typically bound to each other, rather than separately given in bundles, as Hume and other associationists used to assume. Thus, the achievements of Stumpf’s holist psychology effectively contributes a solution to this classic metaphysical problem.

Together with other influential psychologists of the time, Wundt considers internal data as absolute evidence, grounding psychology on this assumption. In opposition to his former mentor, Külpe aims at rehabilitating Kant’s transcendental aesthetics. Yet, he is far from embracing transcendentalism and rejects Kant’s skepticism as to the possibility of a scientific psychology. Nevertheless, Külpe believes that Kant is right in considering internal data as unreliable for scientific purposes: accordingly, psychology should share the same scientific methodology of any other science.