Christian J. Feldbacher-Escamilla

In this contribution the socalled Meno-Problem will be discussed. With respect to theories the problem is the following question: Why is it epistemologically more valuable to know a true theory than to simply believe it? A classical answer in reabilist accounts to this problem refers to the value of the operation which is used for gathering knowledge. But there is a gap in the argumentation as far as one is not allowed to derive from this assumption the conclusion that also the result of the operation is valuable. We are going to show a difference between true theories which are just believed and theories which are also known to be true. This difference seems to allow one to close the mentioned gap.

This paper discusses one of the advantages of applying formal methods in ethics. First, an approach from democratic morality—which is a special case of contractualist ethics that brings together theories of legal and moral philosophy—will be adopted, in order to argue for the non-trivial thesis that moral norms are increasingly democratically motivated. To accept this thesis also as a desired way of justifying ethical principles raises some issues, such as the problem of providing adequate principles for moral opinion pooling. Secondly, it is therefore shown how formal criteria of rationality provide at least a partial solution to such problems. In a broad context this results can be seen as formal preliminaries to contractualist ethics

In their paper on the influence of meta-induction to the wisdom of the crowd, Paul Thorn and Gerhard Schurz argue that adding meta-inductive methods to a group influences the group positively, whereas replacing independent methods of a group with meta-inductive ones may have a negative impact. The first fact is due to an improvement of average ability of a group, the second fact is due to an impairment of average diversity within a group by meta-induction. In this paper some critical remarks to meta-inductive group expansion and replacement are made. In particular it is stressed that both ability and diversity are of equal importance to a group's performance.

In diesem Beitrag wird das Verhalten des Papstes im europäischen Dialog der Religionen und Weltanschauungen kritisch erörtert. Am Anfang steht eine kurze Analyse der Sprache der Religionen bzw. Weltanschauungen, die in Anlehnung an Joseph Maria Bochenski durchgeführt ist. Es wird dabei die Auffassung vertreten, dass Religionen und manche Weltanschauungen Behauptungen über die Wirklichkeit aufstellen, Sprache in einer deskriptiv-kognitiven Funktion verwenden, dass ein solcher Sprachgebrauch eine epistemische Verpflichtung auf Bescheidenheit mit sich bringt und dass eine solche Verpflichtung wiederum eine Basis für einen ernstgemeinten europäischen Dialog bieten könnte. Danach werden von einem theologischen Standpunkt ausgehend Bedingungen dafür untersucht, dass ein europäischer Dialog stattfinden kann. Anhand konkreter Beispiele, im Speziellen anhand der "Regensburger Rede" und der "Neuformulierung der Karfreitagsfürbitte für die Juden", wird gezeigt, wie sich der Papst im europäischen Dialog tatsächlich verhält und wie von Seiten der jeweiligen Religion auf dieses Verhalten eingegangen wird. Da er vor allem in der menschlichen Vernunft eine Brücke für einen europäischen Dialog sieht, wird anschließend auf seine Argumentation für eine Ausweitung der Vernunft und seinen Gebrauch der Wörter "Vernunft" und "Glauben" eingegangen. Dabei wird hauptsächlich auf Schriften, in denen der Papst seine Überzeugung ausdrückt, dass Religion und Vernunft sich gegenseitig korrigieren, begrenzen und unterstützen müssen, Bezug genommen. Abschließend wird ein bestimmtes Argument des Papstes für diese Überzeugung expliziert und bewertet.

One problem of intergenerational justice concerns the question whether the present generation bears moral responsibility for future generations and how to justify such a responsibility. A way of justification is to take a person-affecting view of ethics, according to which no action is morally bad per se, but only with respect to someone (e.g. with respect to future generations). Against a person-affecting view sometimes the so-called non-identity-problem is posed. This problem states that there are actions which - from a person-affecting point of view - have to be considered as bad for a person, although without execution of the action the person would not exist. In this paper I will try to show how this conflict can be solved by an exact analysis of its structure.

One challenge of societies in the 21st century is the conflict of norms between different cultures. In Ancient Greece, too, such conflicts arose, and great thinkers offered great solutions. In this contribution we will argue for the following: - Ancient ethical theories were not only individual ethical theories but also social ethical theories (II). - The ancient methods of scientific examinations are useful not only in classical sciences but also in ethics (III). - Accepting the result of (III) yields highly interesting theoretical results about conflicts of norms between different cultures (IV).

Eleonore Stump claims in her book "Wandering in Darkness" that the problem of evil can be solved best by the help of narratives. This - so Stump - is due to the fact that narratives allow one to get a general view about relevant parts of the discussion of suffering. In this context she distinguishes the more detailed view of the discussion from a more general one by two different modes of cognition: the mode of gathering "knowledge that" and that one of gathering "knowledge how". Knowledge by narratives is a subcategory of the last-mentioned one. In the paper I argue for the thesis that this distinction is not really crucial for Stump's argumentation and that in fact only "knowledge that" is relevant for her proposed solution.

The SOPhiA conferences are intended to give young predoctoral philosophers the possibility to actively attend a professional conference, to tackle current, as well as classical, philosophical problems, and to discuss their own approaches with promising students from many dierent countries as well as with wellestablished experts. We are firmly convinced that this is a natural and necessary step for promoting the next generation of analytic philosophers and thus, strengthening analytic philosophy in general. Because we believe that the methods of analytic philosophy can be fruitfully applied to all areas of philosophy, the SOPhiA conferences do not have a thematic focus; this is also reflected by the fact that the talks given at SOPhiA 2011 covered all areas of philosophy.

In philosophy of science concept formation and reduction is usually discussed with respect to definability. In the paper at hand this discussion is slightly expanded to an investigation of concept formation and reduction by analogies. It is argued that many kinds of such analogies bear some important features of partial contextual definitions. With the help of a detailed investigation of the so-called gene-meme-analogy it is then demonstrated how the meme-concept is introduced via analogies into an expanded theory of (cultural) evolution. As a consequence it is shown that the diversity of meanings of the meme-concept fits into the current state of establishing this analogy.