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Harald A. Wiltsche

Linkoping University
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  •  Publications
    40
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 More details
  • Linkoping University
    Division for Philosophy and Applied Ethics
    Professor
University of Graz
Institute of Philosophy
PhD, 2008
Email (login required)
CV
Homepage
Linköping, Sweden
Areas of Specialization
Philosophy of Physical Science
General Philosophy of Science
Phenomenology
Epistemology
Continental Philosophy of Science
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Physical Science
Continental Philosophy
General Philosophy of Science
Phenomenology
Continental Philosophy of Science
  • All publications (40)
  •  29
    Index of Subjects
    with Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl
    In Harald A. Wiltsche & Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (eds.), Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives. Proceedings of the 37th International Wittgenstein Symposium, De Gruyter. pp. 419-424. 2014.
  •  36
    Table of Contents
    with Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl
    In Harald A. Wiltsche & Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (eds.), Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives. Proceedings of the 37th International Wittgenstein Symposium, De Gruyter. 2014.
  •  84
    Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives. Proceedings of the 37th International Wittgenstein Symposium (edited book)
    with Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl
    De Gruyter. 2014.
    Ludwig Wittgenstein
  •  110
    Lee Hardy, Nature’s Suit. Husserl’s Phenomenological Philosophy of the Physical Sciences: Athens: Ohio University Press, 2013 (Series in Continental Thought, Vol. 45). ISBN 978-0-8214-2066-9, 272 pp. US-$ 34.95 (pbk) (review)
    Husserl Studies 31 (2): 175-182. 2015.
    The debate about scientific realism has occupied center stage in philosophy of science since its very inception. The main question is whether or not scientific theories are true descriptions of the world. Or, to give the question a slightly different spin: What grounds do we have for believing in the reality of the unobservable entities postulated by contemporary science ? Although the main arena of this debate is analytic philosophy, it is clear that these questions are no less important for ph…Read more
    The debate about scientific realism has occupied center stage in philosophy of science since its very inception. The main question is whether or not scientific theories are true descriptions of the world. Or, to give the question a slightly different spin: What grounds do we have for believing in the reality of the unobservable entities postulated by contemporary science ? Although the main arena of this debate is analytic philosophy, it is clear that these questions are no less important for philosophers with phenomenological leanings. Should phenomenologists advocate SR or should they opt for scientific anti-realism ? And, on a more historical note, which of these options is most appropriate from the viewpoint of Husserl’s work?Such are the questions that Lee Hardy tries to answer in his book. Hardy’s main thesis is “that Husserl was indeed an instrumentalist, but that his instrumen ..
    Edmund HusserlInstrumentalism
  •  947
    Einführung in die Wissenschaftstheorie
    Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht/UTB. 2013.
    General Philosophy of Science, MiscPhilosophy of Physical Science
  •  318
    What is Wrong with Husserl's Scientific Anti-Realism?
    Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 55 (2): 105-130. 2012.
    Abstract Not much scholarly work is needed in order to stumble across many passages where Edmund Husserl seems to advocate an anti-realist attitude towards the natural sciences. This tendency, however, is not well-received within the secondary literature. While some commentators criticize Husserl for his alleged scientific anti-realism, others argue that Husserl's position is much more realist than the first impression indicates. It is against this background that I want to argue for the followi…Read more
    Abstract Not much scholarly work is needed in order to stumble across many passages where Edmund Husserl seems to advocate an anti-realist attitude towards the natural sciences. This tendency, however, is not well-received within the secondary literature. While some commentators criticize Husserl for his alleged scientific anti-realism, others argue that Husserl's position is much more realist than the first impression indicates. It is against this background that I want to argue for the following theses: a) The basic outlook of Husserl's epistemology as well as his more substantial comments regarding the natural sciences indeed result in a (sophisticated version of) scientific anti-realism which bears certain resemblances to Bas van Fraassen's constructive empiricism; b) This scientific anti-realism can be defended against the two most common objections raised in the secondary literature; c) It is only by means of this sophisticated version of scientific anti-realism that phenomenology can circumvent the problem of ?scientific objectivism?
    Husserl: Philosophy of ScienceVarieties of Scientific RealismAlternatives to Scientific Realism, Mis…Read more
    Husserl: Philosophy of ScienceVarieties of Scientific RealismAlternatives to Scientific Realism, Misc
  •  46
    Frontmatter
    with Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl
    In Harald A. Wiltsche & Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (eds.), Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives. Proceedings of the 37th International Wittgenstein Symposium, De Gruyter. 2014.
  •  150
    Mechanics Lost: Husserl’s Galileo and Ihde’s Telescope
    Husserl Studies 33 (2): 149-173. 2017.
    Don Ihde has recently launched a sweeping attack against Husserl’s late philosophy of science. Ihde takes particular exception to Husserl’s portrayal of Galileo and to the results Husserl draws from his understanding of Galilean science. Ihde’s main point is that Husserl paints an overly intellectualistic picture of the “father of modern science”, neglecting Galileo’s engagement with scientific instruments such as, most notably, the telescope. According to Ihde, this omission is not merely a his…Read more
    Don Ihde has recently launched a sweeping attack against Husserl’s late philosophy of science. Ihde takes particular exception to Husserl’s portrayal of Galileo and to the results Husserl draws from his understanding of Galilean science. Ihde’s main point is that Husserl paints an overly intellectualistic picture of the “father of modern science”, neglecting Galileo’s engagement with scientific instruments such as, most notably, the telescope. According to Ihde, this omission is not merely a historiographical shortcoming. On Ihde’s view, it is only on the basis of a distorted picture of Galileo that Husserl can “create“ the division between Lifeworld and the “world of science“, a division that is indeed fundamental for Husserl’s overall position. Hence, if successful, Ihde’s argument effectively undermines Husserl’s late philosophy of science. The aim of this paper is to show that Ihde’s criticism does not stand up to closer historical or philosophical scrutiny.
    History of PhysicsContinental Philosophy of ScienceHusserl: Philosophy of Science
  •  1749
    The Body, Thought Experiments, and Phenomenology
    with Yiftach J. H. Fehige
    In Yiftach J. H. Fehige & Harald Wiltsche (eds.), Thought Experiments in Philosophy, Science, and the Arts, . 2012.
    An explorative contribution to the ongoing discussion of thought experiments. While endorsing the majority view that skepticism about thought experiments is not well justified, in what follows we attempt to show that there is a kind of “bodiliness” missing from current accounts of thought experiments. That is, we suggest a phenomenological addition to the literature. First, we contextualize our claim that the importance of the body in thought experiments has been widely underestimated. Then we d…Read more
    An explorative contribution to the ongoing discussion of thought experiments. While endorsing the majority view that skepticism about thought experiments is not well justified, in what follows we attempt to show that there is a kind of “bodiliness” missing from current accounts of thought experiments. That is, we suggest a phenomenological addition to the literature. First, we contextualize our claim that the importance of the body in thought experiments has been widely underestimated. Then we discuss David Gooding's work, which contains the only explicit recognition of the importance of the body to understanding thought experiments. Finally, we introduce a phenomenological perspective of the body, which will give us the opportunity to sketch the power and promise of a phenomenological approach to thought experiments
    Thought Experiments
  •  33
    Introduction
    with Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl
    In Harald A. Wiltsche & Sonja Rinofner-Kreidl (eds.), Analytic and Continental Philosophy: Methods and Perspectives. Proceedings of the 37th International Wittgenstein Symposium, De Gruyter. pp. 1-8. 2014.
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