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26Bayesian defeat of certaintiesSynthese 203 (2): 1-38. 2024.When P(E) > 0, conditional probabilities P(H|E)\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$(H|E)$$\end{document} are given by the ratio formula. An agent engages in ratio conditionalization when she updates her credences using conditional probabilities dictated by the ratio formula. Ratio conditionalization canno…Read more
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7Rationality as a Constitutive IdealIn Ernie Lepore & Kurt Ludwig (eds.), Blackwell Companion to Donald Davidson, Blackwell. 2013.A striking thesis lies at the core of Davidson's philosophy: when we attribute intentional content to another creature's mental states and speech acts, we must treat the creature as largely conforming to our own rational norms. I will discuss how this thesis informs Davidson's treatment of rationality and intentionality. After reviewing some historical background, I present basic aspects of Davidson's position. I then examine various worries about the position. I conclude by highlighting some ke…Read more
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11Millikan on Honeybee Navigation and CommunicationIn Dan Ryder, Justine Kingsbury & Kenneth Williford (eds.), Millikan and her critics, Wiley. 2013.This chapter contains section titles: Insect Cognition The Science of Honeybee Navigation and Communication Representation and Truth‐Conditions Psychological Structure Pushmi‐Pullyu Representations Folk Psychology as an Explanatory Paradigm.
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54Shadows of Syntax: Revitalizing Logical and Mathematical ConventionalismHistory and Philosophy of Logic 1-5. forthcoming..
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1Bayesian perceptual psychologyIn Mohan Matthen (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Perception, Oxford University Press Uk. 2015.
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66Reflecting on diachronic Dutch booksNoûs 57 (3): 511-538. 2023.Conditionalization governs how to reallocate credence in light of new evidence. One prominent argument in favor of Conditionalization holds that an agent who violates it is vulnerable to a diachronic Dutch book: a series of acceptable bets offered at multiple times that inflict a sure loss. van Fraassen argues that an agent who violates the Principle of Reflection is likewise vulnerable to a diachronic Dutch book. He concludes that agents should conform to both Conditionalization and Reflection.…Read more
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72An Improved Dutch Book Theorem for ConditionalizationErkenntnis 87 (3): 1013-1041. 2022.Lewis proved a Dutch book theorem for Conditionalization. The theorem shows that an agent who follows any credal update rule other than Conditionalization is vulnerable to bets that inflict a sure loss. Lewis’s theorem is tailored to factive formulations of Conditionalization, i.e. formulations on which the conditioning proposition is true. Yet many scientific and philosophical applications of Bayesian decision theory require a non-factive formulation, i.e. a formulation on which the conditionin…Read more
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69On the proper formulation of conditionalizationSynthese 198 (3): 1935-1965. 2021.Conditionalization is a norm that governs the rational reallocation of credence. I distinguish between factive and non-factive formulations of Conditionalization. Factive formulations assume that the conditioning proposition is true. Non-factive formulations allow that the conditioning proposition may be false. I argue that non-factive formulations provide a better foundation for philosophical and scientific applications of Bayesian decision theory. I furthermore argue that previous formulations…Read more
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5Levels of Computational ExplanationIn Thomas M. Powers (ed.), Philosophy and Computing: Essays in epistemology, philosophy of mind, logic, and ethics, Springer. 2017.
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65Copeland and Proudfoot on computabilityStudies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 43 (1): 199-202. 2012.Many philosophers contend that Turing’s work provides a conceptual analysis of numerical computability. In (Rescorla, 2007), I dissented. I argued that the problem of deviant notations stymies existing attempts at conceptual analysis. Copeland and Proudfoot respond to my critique. I argue that their putative solution does not succeed. We are still awaiting a genuine conceptual analysis
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42A dutch book theorem and converse dutch book theorem for Kolmogorov conditionalizationReview of Symbolic Logic 11 (4): 705-735. 2018.
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109Perceptual Co-ReferenceReview of Philosophy and Psychology 11 (3): 569-589. 2020.The perceptual system estimates distal conditions based upon proximal sensory input. It typically exploits information from multiple cues across and within modalities: it estimates shape based upon visual and haptic cues; it estimates depth based upon convergence, binocular disparity, motion parallax, and other visual cues; and so on. Bayesian models illuminate the computations through which the perceptual system combines sensory cues. I review key aspects of these models. Based on my review, I …Read more
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57This paper discusses how to update one’s credences based on evidence that has initial probability 0. I advance a diachronic norm, Kolmogorov Conditionalization, that governs credal reallocation in many such learning scenarios. The norm is based upon Kolmogorov’s theory of conditional probability. I prove a Dutch book theorem and converse Dutch book theorem for Kolmogorov Conditionalization. The two theorems establish Kolmogorov Conditionalization as the unique credal reallocation rule that avoid…Read more
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86An interventionist approach to psychological explanationSynthese 195 (5): 1909-1940. 2018.Interventionism is a theory of causal explanation developed by Woodward and Hitchcock. I defend an interventionist perspective on the causal explanations offered within scientific psychology. The basic idea is that psychology causally explains mental and behavioral outcomes by specifying how those outcomes would have been different had an intervention altered various factors, including relevant psychological states. I elaborate this viewpoint with examples drawn from cognitive science practice, …Read more
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Is Thought Explanatorily Prior to Language?Dissertation, Harvard University. 2003.In this dissertation, I explore the relation between language and thought. I criticize theories that explain the representational dimension of language in terms of the representational dimension of thought. I also investigate the prospects for theories that treat neither thought nor language as explanatorily prior to the other. ;The first chapter, "The Diversity of Representational Content," examines one of the most important arguments for treating thought as explanatorily prior to language. Man…Read more
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109A Linguistic Reason for TruthfulnessIn Dirk Greimann & Geo Siegwart (eds.), Truth and Speech Acts: Studies in the Philosophy of Language, Routledge. pp. 250-279. 2007.This paper further develops the non-restrictive dialectical perspective. Many philosophers hold that truthfulness is somehow constitutive of assertion. I argue against this view while simultaneously attempting to ground truthfulness in assertion’s essential features. I argue that truthfulness is the prima facie best way to avoid decisive counter-arguments against what one says. Moreover, avoiding decisive counter-arguments is a constitutive goal of rational dialectic. Thus, while truthfulness is…Read more
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83A striking thesis lies at the core of Davidson‟s philosophy: when we attribute intentional content to another creature‟s mental states and speech acts, we must treat the creature as largely conforming to our own rational norms. I will discuss how this thesis informs Davidson‟s treatment of rationality and intentionality. After reviewing some historical background, I present basic aspects of Davidson‟s position. I then examine various worries about the position. I conclude by highlighting some ke…Read more
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222Chrysippus' dog as a case study in non-linguistic cognitionIn Robert W. Lurz (ed.), The Philosophy of Animal Minds, Cambridge University Press. pp. 52--71. 2009.I critique an ancient argument for the possibility of non-linguistic deductive inference. The argument, attributed to Chrysippus, describes a dog whose behavior supposedly reflects disjunctive syllogistic reasoning. Drawing on contemporary robotics, I urge that we can equally well explain the dog's behavior by citing probabilistic reasoning over cognitive maps. I then critique various experimentally-based arguments from scientific psychology that echo Chrysippus's anecdotal presentation.
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197Against Structuralist Theories of Computational ImplementationBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (4): 681-707. 2013.Under what conditions does a physical system implement or realize a computation? Structuralism about computational implementation, espoused by Chalmers and others, holds that a physical system realizes a computation just in case the system instantiates a pattern of causal organization isomorphic to the computation’s formal structure. I argue against structuralism through counter-examples drawn from computer science. On my opposing view, computational implementation sometimes requires instantiati…Read more
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146Shifting the burden of proof?Philosophical Quarterly 59 (234): 86-109. 2009.Dialectical foundationalists, including Adler, Brandom, Leite, and Williams, claim that some asserted propositions do not require defense just because an interlocutor challenges them. By asserting such a proposition, the speaker shifts the burden of proof to her interlocutor. Dialectical egalitarians claim that all asserted propositions require defense when challenged. I elucidate the dispute between dialectical foundationalists and egalitarians, and I defend a broadly egalitarian stance against…Read more
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209Predication and cartographic representationSynthese 169 (1). 2009.I argue that maps do not feature predication, as analyzed by Frege and Tarski. I take as my foil (Casati and Varzi, Parts and places, 1999), which attributes predication to maps. I argue that the details of Casati and Varzi’s own semantics militate against this attribution. Casati and Varzi emphasize what I call the Absence Intuition: if a marker representing some property (such as mountainous terrain) appears on a map, then absence of that marker from a map coordinate signifies absence of the c…Read more
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185A theory of computational implementationSynthese 191 (6): 1277-1307. 2014.I articulate and defend a new theory of what it is for a physical system to implement an abstract computational model. According to my descriptivist theory, a physical system implements a computational model just in case the model accurately describes the system. Specifically, the system must reliably transit between computational states in accord with mechanical instructions encoded by the model. I contrast my theory with an influential approach to computational implementation espoused by Chalm…Read more
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111Review of Christopher Gauker's Words without Meaning (review)Philosophical Review 115 (1): 121-124. 2006.
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436Cognitive maps and the language of thoughtBritish Journal for the Philosophy of Science 60 (2): 377-407. 2009.Fodor advocates a view of cognitive processes as computations defined over the language of thought (or Mentalese). Even among those who endorse Mentalese, considerable controversy surrounds its representational format. What semantically relevant structure should scientific psychology attribute to Mentalese symbols? Researchers commonly emphasize logical structure, akin to that displayed by predicate calculus sentences. To counteract this tendency, I discuss computational models of navigation dra…Read more
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330Assertion and its constitutive normsPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1): 98-130. 2009.Alston, Searle, and Williamson advocate the restrictive model of assertion , according to which certain constitutive assertoric norms restrict which propositions one may assert. Sellars and Brandom advocate the dialectical model of assertion , which treats assertion as constituted by its role in the game of giving and asking for reasons. Sellars and Brandom develop a restrictive version of the dialectical model. I explore a non-restrictive version of the dialectical model. On such a view, consti…Read more
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233The Causal Relevance of Content to ComputationPhilosophy and Phenomenological Research 88 (1): 173-208. 2012.Many philosophers worry that the classical computational theory of mind (CTM) engenders epiphenomenalism. Building on Block’s (1990) discussion, I formulate a particularly troubling version of this worry. I then present a novel solution to CTM’s epiphenomenalist conundrum. I develop my solution within an interventionist theory of causal relevance. My solution departs substantially from orthodox versions of CTM. In particular, I reject the widespread picture of digital computation as formal synta…Read more
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