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Susana Monsó

Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia
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 More details
  • Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia
    Logic, History and Philosophy of Science
    Associate Professor
Universidad Nacional de Educación a Distancia
PhD, 2016
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Madrid, Community of Madrid, Spain
0000-0002-1450-8089
Areas of Specialization
Animal Minds
Animal Ethics
Areas of Interest
Philosophy of Mind
Applied Ethics
Meta-Ethics
Normative Ethics
Philosophy of Biology
Philosophy of Cognitive Science
1 more
  • All publications (32)
  •  106
    The moral dimension of pre-reflective self-awareness
    Animal Sentience 1 (10). 2016.
    Rowlands offers a de-intellectualised account of personhood that is meant to secure the unity of a mental life. I argue that his characterisation also singles out a morally relevant feature of individuals. Along the same lines that the orthodox understanding of personhood reflects a fundamental precondition for moral agency, Rowlands’s notion provides a fundamental precondition for moral patienthood.
    Persons, MiscNonconceptual/Prereflective Self-ConsciousnessMetacognitionAnimal Consciousness, MiscAn…Read more
    Persons, MiscNonconceptual/Prereflective Self-ConsciousnessMetacognitionAnimal Consciousness, MiscAnimal Self-ConsciousnessAnimal Moral Cognition
  •  1133
    Animals as reflexive thinkers: The aponoian paradigm
    with Mark Rowlands
    In Linda Kalof (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of Animal Studies, Oxford University Press. pp. 319-341. 2017.
    The ability to engage in reflexive thought—in thought about thought or about other mental states more generally—is regarded as a complex intellectual achievement that is beyond the capacities of most nonhuman animals. To the extent that reflexive thought capacities are believed necessary for the possession of many other psychological states or capacities, including consciousness, belief, emotion, and empathy, the inability of animals to engage in reflexive thought calls into question their other…Read more
    The ability to engage in reflexive thought—in thought about thought or about other mental states more generally—is regarded as a complex intellectual achievement that is beyond the capacities of most nonhuman animals. To the extent that reflexive thought capacities are believed necessary for the possession of many other psychological states or capacities, including consciousness, belief, emotion, and empathy, the inability of animals to engage in reflexive thought calls into question their other psychological abilities. This chapter attacks the idea that reflexive thought is required in this pervasive way and holds that supposing that it is derives from a tendency among philosophers and scientists toward overcomplication. Against this tendency, it recommends an aponoian framework, from apó, “away from” and noûs, “intelligence” or “thought,” arguing that seemingly complex psychological abilities are often not as complex as they seem, and do not require the ability to engage in reflexive thought.
    Animal Self-ConsciousnessAnimal Consciousness, MiscAnimal EmotionAnimal Minds, MiscEmpathy and Sympa…Read more
    Animal Self-ConsciousnessAnimal Consciousness, MiscAnimal EmotionAnimal Minds, MiscEmpathy and Sympathy
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