Philip Clayton

The author expresses appreciation to Professor Drees for his careful and mostly accurate reading of God and Contemporary Science. The exchange provides the opportunity to step back from the specifics of the debate and clarify what it is that gives rise to the increasing talk of panentheism within religion‐science discussions today. What is the central challenge that the natural sciences raise for theistic belief? How far does panentheism go toward answering this challenge, and what work still needs to be done? Locating the book in this way clarifies questions of where the burden of proof lies, especially with regard to the relation of physical, mental, and spiritual qualities.

"The connection between being and time makes possible a closer link between philosophical reflection and the biblical experience of reality" : with these words Pannenberg summarizes the thesis of his recent Metaphysics and the Concept of God. Pannenberg's long-term project has been to overcome the ghettoization of theology and to demonstrate "the convergence of philosophy and religion." Here he engages in a sustained conversation with the metaphysical tradition as the dialogic partner most suited for clarifying theology's concept of God. The volume offers an excellent introduction to the crisscrossings of theology and metaphysics over the last two thousand years, as well as an example of a theologian engaged in metaphysical reflection at a sophisticated level.

This Afterword looks back over both parts of the discussion of “God and the World of Signs”—“Semiotics and the Emergence of Life” in the previous issue of Zygon and “Semiotics and Theology” in this issue. Three central questions in this extended debate are identified: What is the nature of biological organisms and biological evolution? What is the relationship between the natural world and the Triune God of the Christian theological tradition? What should be the goals of Science/Religion Studies? I summarize the answers that Christopher Southgate and Andrew Robinson have given in their program and the challenges raised by their critics. Their strengths and weaknesses are assessed. In the conclusion I ask readers to imagine that this particular research program were to be taken as a model program in science-and-religion research (with some tweaking) and then consider the features of the program that could function as standards for scholars working in other areas of the dialogue

Strong forms of dualism and eliminative materialism block any significant dialogue between the neurosciences and theology. The present article thus challenges the Sufficiency Thesis, according to which neuroscientific explanations will finally be sufficient to fully explain human behavior. It then explores the various ways in which neuroscientific results and theological interpretations contribute to an overall theory of the person. Supervenience theories, which hold that mental events are dependent on their physical substrata but not reducible to them, are explained. Challenging the determinism of “strong” supervenience, I defend a version of “soft” supervenience that allows for genuine mental causation. This view gives rise in turn to an emergentist theory of the person. Still, I remain a monist: there are many types of properties encountered in the world, although it is only the one nature that bears all these properties. The resulting position, emergentist monism, allows for diversity within the context of the one world. This view is open at the top for theological applications and interpretations while retaining the close link to neuroscientific study and its results. Theology offers an interpretation of the whole world based on a yet higher order of emergence, although the notion of God moves beyond the natural order as a whole. It therefore supplements the natural scientific study of the world without negating it.