Edward MacKinnon

The revolt against logical positivism within the philosophy of science has now lasted long enough to produce something of a counter-revolution. As the more strident charges (positivistic analyses misrepresent the most fundamental features of the scientific enterprise and have contributed little or nothing to its clarification) and counter-charges (any attempt to induce a philosophy of science from studies in the history of science rests on a massive genetic fallacy) gradually subside, critical interest is focussing on the presuppositions that guide and structure various interpretations of science. Here epistemological positions, often implicitly assumed, play a pivotal role. In the present article we shall try to make different positions and presuppositions explicit by examining some current developments in the philosophy of science. This examination will be focused on, though not limited to, three recent books by I. Schefller, S. Körner, and E. Harris.

One of the key interpretative problems generated by the development of quantum theory was the conceptual consistency underlying scientific change, a problem not adequately treated by any of the leading theories of scientific development. In different but related ways Quine, Sellars, and Davidson have treated the problem of conceptual consistency by showing how one can begin with ordinary language and proceed to specialized extensions. Their techniques have not been applied to modern physics. However, one basis for applying them arises from the deep similarities between some of the work of these analysts and the Copenhagen interpretation rightly interpreted. To make this more concrete three concepts whose meanings have changed as a result of scientific progress are considered: 'atom', 'state of a system', and 'particle'. Each functions in a different way and requires a different type of analysis.

ABSTRACT. The objectivity of physics has been called into question by social theorists, Kuhnian relativists, and by anomalous aspects of quantum mechanics. Here we focus on one neglected background issue, the categorical structure of the language of classical physics. The first half is an historical overview of the formation of the language of classical physics, beginning with Aristotle's Categories and the novel idea of the quantity of a quality introduced by medieval Aristotelians. Descartes and Newton at-tempted to put the new mechanics on an ontological foundation of atomism. Euler was the pivotal figure in basing mechanics on a macroscopic concept of matter. The second scientific revolution, led by Laplace, took mechanics as foundational and attempted to fit the Baconian sciences into a framework of atomistic mechanism. This protracted effort had the unintended effect of supplying an informal unification of physics in a mixture of ordinary language and mechanistic terms. The second half treats LCP as a linguistic para-site that can attach itself to any language and effect mutations in the host without chang-ing its essential form. This puts LCP in the context of a language of discourse and sug-gests that philosophers should concentrate more on the dialog between experimenters and theoreticians and less on analyses of theories. This orientation supplies a basis for treating objectivity