Christopher Janaway

It is sometimes assumed that Kant’s claim that a judgement of taste is grounded in a pleasure ‘without concepts’ leaves little room for any credible account of critical judgements of art. I argue that even Kant’s conception of free (as opposed to dependent) beauty can provide the framework for an analysis of aesthetic judgements about art works. It is a matter of understanding what roles for concepts Kant prohibits in his analysis of pure judgements of taste: conceptual cognition must be neither what gives rise to the subject’s pleasure nor part of the evidential basis for the subject’s judgement. But this does not entail that the subject encounters the object in a wholly ‘concept–free’ manner. Kant’s account of free beauty is quite different from Schopenhauer’s superficially similar theory, and is compatible with the thought that increased conceptual knowledge can enhance critical judgements of art

The article argues against various proposals to treat the term 'beauty' as standing for a single, generic concept of aesthetic value, which has application both to natural objects and to art. It argues that in Kant's aesthetic theory 'beauty' must be treated as ambiguous because in the case of art, but not in that of nature, part of beauty is the expession of aesthetic ideas. This gives rise to the dilemma: either beauty is always the ultimate aesthetic value of any thing, in which case there is no single account of beauty to be had that covers both art and nature, or being beautiful is the same for both art and nature, but must constitute only part of the aesthetic value of art. It is argued that certain late twentieth century theories of beauty do not overcome this problem.

This paper gives an account of the argument of Schopenhauer's essay On the Freedom of the Human Will, drawing also on his other works. Schopenhauer argues that all human actions are causally necessitated, as are all other events in empirical nature, hence there is no freedom in the sense of liberum arbitrium indifferentiae. However, our sense of responsibility or agency (being the ) is nonetheless unshakeable. To account for this Schopenhauer invokes the Kantian distinction between empirical and intelligible characters. The paper highlights divergences between Schopenhauer and Kant over the intelligible character, which for Schopenhauer can be neither rational nor causal. It raises the questions whether the intelligible character may be redundant to Schopenhauer's position, and whether it can coherently belong to an individual agent, suggesting that for Schopenhauer a more consistent position would have been to deny freedom of will to the individual

With the publication of the Parerga and Paralipomena in 1851, there finally came some measure of the fame that Schopenhauer thought was his due. Described by Schopenhauer himself as 'incomparably more popular than everything up till now', the Parerga is a miscellany of essays addressing themes that complement his work The World as Will and Representation, along with more divergent, speculative pieces. It includes his 'Aphorisms on the Wisdom of Life', reflections on fate and clairvoyance, trenchant views on the philosophers and universities of his day, and an enlightening survey of the history of philosophy. The present volume offers a new translation, a substantial introduction explaining the context of the essays, and extensive editorial notes on the different published versions of the work. This readable and scholarly edition will be an essential reference for those studying Schopenhauer, the history of philosophy, and nineteenth-century German philosophy.

Schopenhauer defends the view that emotions impair cognition, while Nietzsche apparently replies that they are ineliminable from cognition, and that they enhance it. Schopenhauer argues that human individuals are naturally disposed to comprehend their environment in affective terms. At the same time, his evaluative position concerning this relation is negative: cognition is spoiled, warped, or tainted by its inability to shake off the emotions, desires, or drives that belong to human nature. Human individuals are not cut out for cognition proper, unless they become ‘pure subject of cognition’ in aesthetic experience, or in total self-negation of the will. Nietzsche accepts something analogous to Schopenhauer’s descriptive position: the self is a complex of drives and it is primarily these drives and their associated affects that interpret the world. But he firmly rejects Schopenhauer’s evaluative stance. He denies the possibility of a pure, objective, affect-free cognition. Nietzsche argues for a reversal of Schopenhauer’s evaluative stance: cognition is improved by affect, and by multiplying affects. This is a key point in Nietzsche’s so-called perspectivism im Genealogy III, 12. The view that Nietzsche regards affects as necessary for cognition has been challenged as either trivial or implausible by recent commentators. The essay addresses these challenges, arguing that it is quite plausible for Nietzsche to be holding such a view, and that it can be construed in ways that make it a more attractive view in itself.

This paper aims to distinguish a conception of ‘free will’ that Nietzsche opposes (that of the pure agent unaffected by contingencies of character and circumstance) and one that he supports. In Human, All Too Human Nietzsche propounds the ‘total unfreedom’ of the will. But by the time of Beyond Good and Evil and the Genealogy he is more concerned (a) to trace the affective psychological states underlying beliefs in both free will and ‘unfree will’, (b) to suggest that the will might become free in certain individuals, a matter of having a consistent strong character, self-knowledge, and ability to create values. The paper explores the kind of autonomy required in agents who would ‘revalue’ existing values.

In this paper I juxtapose two well-known thought-experiments concerning duplicate art works, and point out that they appear to have directly conflicting results. I then make a proposal as to how to reconcile the two cases. The two cases are Borges' story of Pierre Menard, in which a text coinciding exactly with Cervantes' Don Quixote is nonetheless a distinct work from it, and Nelson Goodman's claim that a musical work cannot be forged, because anything complying with a work's notation is that work (or a performance of it), not anything distinct. Both claims seem correct, but how can they be reconciled? I suggest two factors that must be present for two indistinguishable works to be numerically distinct: divergent causal histories and distinct 'privileged interpretational instructions'. Notational equivalence of W and W1 plus the instruction to interpret W as W1 leads to the impossiblity of forgery. But in the absence of such instruction, W and W1 can constitute distinct works.

Nietzsche's aims and targets -- Reading Nietzsche's preface -- Naturalism and genealogy -- Selflessness : the struggle with Schopenhauer -- Nietzsche and Paul Rée on the origins of moral feelings -- Good and evil : affect, artistry, and revaluation -- Free will, autonomy, and the sovereign individual -- Guilt, bad conscience, and self-punishment -- Will to power in the Genealogy -- Nietzsche's illustration of the art of exegesis -- Disinterestedness and objectivity -- Perspectival knowing and the affects -- The ascetic ideal, meaning, and truth -- Beyond selflessness.

Designed for readers with no or little prior knowledge of the subject, this concise anthology brings together key texts in aesthetics and the philosophy of art. Designed for readers with no or little prior knowledge of the subject. Presents two contrasting pieces on each of six topics. Texts range from Plato’s famous critique of art in the ‘Republic’ through Nietzsche’s ‘The Birth of Tragedy’ to Barthes’ ‘The Death of the Author’ 'and pieces in recent philosophical aesthetics from a number of traditions. Interactive editorial commentary helps readers to engage with the philosophical train of thought. Explains the argumentative and historical context in which each piece was written. Includes questions for debate and suggestions for further reading

In On What Matters, Derek Parfit argues that Nietzsche does not disagree with central normative beliefs that ‘we’ hold. Such disagreement would threaten Parfit’s claim that normative beliefs are known by intuition. However, Nietzsche defends a conception of well-being that challenges Parfit’s normative claim that suffering is bad in itself for the sufferer. Nietzsche recognizes the phenomenon of ‘growth through suffering’ as essential to well-being. Hence, removal of all suffering would lead to diminished well-being. Parfit claims that if Nietzsche understood normative concepts in Parfit’s objectivist sense, he would not disagree with the claim that suffering is bad in itself – that intrinsic facts about suffering count in favour of our not wanting it. I argue that Nietzsche would disagree. Suffering for Nietzsche is not merely instrumentally necessary for psychological growth, nor is it easy to construe it as something bad in itself that contributes value as part of a good whole. Suffering that can be given meaning through growth is something we have reason to want. Suffering that remains brute and uninterpreted is something we have reason not to want. But for Nietzsche, suffering as such has no invariant value across all contexts.

Nietzsche is concerned with what he calls ‘affirmation of life’, or ‘saying Yes to life’. This article examines attitudes or processes that Nietzsche describes as ‘affirmation’ or ‘Yes-saying’ (Bejahung, Jasagen). Nietzsche often speaks of something other than an individual as the locus of affirmation. Surveying Nietzsche’s uses from the period of Daybreak onwards, we find Bejahung, Jasagen and cognates with a variety of grammatical subjects, referring to human individuals, cultural products and practices such as art forms and value-systems, and sub-personal items such as instincts and drives. This raises the question how he conceives the attitude or process of ‘Yes-saying’. Taking a distinction made by Ken Gemes, between ‘naïve affirmation’ and ‘reflective affirmation’, the article argues that Nietzsche gives priority to affirmation that is the direct expression of instincts or drives in action. However, many drives or instincts are culturally acquired, for Nietzsche. Dispositions to action, feeling and thought can become drives or instincts through cultural transmission, and operate outside conscious control to influence culture in turn. The notion that a drive ‘in us’ says Yes to life and the notion that a surrounding culture says Yes to life do not conflict but are two sides of the same coin.

Nietzsche is well known for stating that there is 'only a perspectival "knowing"'. What has been less remarked is the extent to which he thereby stands in radical opposition to a common philosophical position concerning the relationship between knowledge and the affects. This article argues that in Genealogy III: 12 Nietzsche makes the following two claims: (1) That it is impossible for there to be any knowing that is free of all affects, and (2) That multiplying different affects always improves knowing. The article examines the plausibility of this reading of Nietzsche, and its links with the his treatment of drives, freedom and self.

Arthur Schopenhauer's The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics consists of two groundbreaking essays: 'On the Freedom of the Will' and 'On the Basis of Morals'. The essays make original contributions to ethics and display Schopenhauer's erudition, prose-style and flair for philosophical controversy, as well as philosophical views that contrast sharply with the positions of both Kant and Nietzsche. Written accessibly, they do not presuppose the intricate metaphysics which Schopenhauer constructs elsewhere. This is the first English translation of these works to re-unite both essays in one volume. It offers a new translation by Christopher Janaway, together with an introduction, editorial notes on Schopenhauer's vocabulary and the different editions of his essays, a chronology of his life, a bibliography, and a glossary of names.

Plato's writings about the arts play a foundational role in the history of aesthetics, not simply because they are the earliest substantial contribution to the subject. The arts are a central, rather than a marginal topic for Plato, and for him the whole of culture must reflect and inculcate the values that concern him. His philosophy of art (as we would call it) is closely integrated with his metaphysics, ethics and politics. We shall examine in outline the major issues that a reading of Plato is likely to raise for modern aesthetics.

The essay draws attention to some of the different uses made of Schopenhauer throughout Nietzsche's writings. Different roles for Schopenhauer coexist at all stages of Nietzsche's writing. He functions as an exemplar for European culture, but at the same time Nietzsche can find serious fault with his philosophical doctrines, as he does in early unpublished notes. In later writings Schopenhauer is assigned the role of Nietzsche's antipode, but even then Schopenhauer is paid the compliment of being Nietzsche's great and only teacher. The essay includes a commentary on Genealogy III:12 in which Nietzsche's conception of 'perspectival knowledge' is anti-Schopenhauerian, but can only be seen for what it is once an underlying Schopenhauerian structure is made explicit.

Nietzsche vehemently attacks the traditional conception of the unitary self. This essay tries to show that some of the undermining of that conception had already been done in Schopenhauer’s work. We should not ignore the obvious fact that while Nietzsche is a philosopher of cultures, classes and epochs, Schopenhauer’s view of knowledge and ethics remains firmly ahistorical. 1 Nevertheless, if we first try to inhabit Schopenhauer’s point of view, we can look forward to Nietzsche and illuminate him from one (partial) perspective. 2 For Nietzsche’s opposition to Schopenhauer’s conceptions of the subject and of the will is interwoven with more positive debts to his predecessor’s philosophy, and he by no means fully overcomes its problems and tensions.