Christopher Janaway

The article argues that Schopenhauer seeks to defend art against Plato's critique, but that he does so by adopting two distinct strategies that to some extent conflect: a 'cognitivist strategy' according to which art provides the most objective knowledge of reality, and an 'aesthetic experience' strategy, in which there is a peculiarly aesthetic state of mind which gives our pleasure in art a value of its own. The truly unifying notion in Schopenhauer's aesthetic theory is that of tranquil, will-less contemplation, a state of non-identification with the striving, suffering, bodily individual that one is. The Ideas testify to the endurance of Schopenhauer's early Platonic ambitions, but they do not really produce a convincing theory. At one end of the spectrum, the Ideas are otiose: pleasure is in the tranquility of contemplation, which may well be of an empirical object. At the other end of the spectrum, apprehension of the Ideas serves an all-important cognitive function, but our pleasure cannot stem from our knowing the horrifying Idea of humanity per se. Rather, the key to the satisfaction we take in tragedy is, in Schopenhauer's account, the will-lessness of sublime resignation in face of the Idea.

Nietzsche is concerned with what he calls ‘affirmation of life’, or ‘saying Yes to life’. This article examines attitudes or processes that Nietzsche describes as ‘affirmation’ or ‘Yes-saying’ (Bejahung, Jasagen). Nietzsche often speaks of something other than an individual as the locus of affirmation. Surveying Nietzsche’s uses from the period of Daybreak onwards, we find Bejahung, Jasagen and cognates with a variety of grammatical subjects, referring to human individuals, cultural products and practices such as art forms and value-systems, and sub-personal items such as instincts and drives. This raises the question how he conceives the attitude or process of ‘Yes-saying’. Taking a distinction made by Ken Gemes, between ‘naïve affirmation’ and ‘reflective affirmation’, the article argues that Nietzsche gives priority to affirmation that is the direct expression of instincts or drives in action. However, many drives or instincts are culturally acquired, for Nietzsche. Dispositions to action, feeling and thought can become drives or instincts through cultural transmission, and operate outside conscious control to influence culture in turn. The notion that a drive ‘in us’ says Yes to life and the notion that a surrounding culture says Yes to life do not conflict but are two sides of the same coin.

Plato's writings about the arts play a foundational role in the history of aesthetics, not simply because they are the earliest substantial contribution to the subject. The arts are a central, rather than a marginal topic for Plato, and for him the whole of culture must reflect and inculcate the values that concern him. His philosophy of art (as we would call it) is closely integrated with his metaphysics, ethics and politics. We shall examine in outline the major issues that a reading of Plato is likely to raise for modern aesthetics.

With the publication of Parerga and Paralipomena in 1851, there finally came some measure of the fame that Schopenhauer thought was his due. Described by Schopenhauer himself as 'incomparably more popular than everything up till now', Parerga is a miscellany of essays addressing themes that complement his work The World as Will and Representation, along with more divergent, speculative pieces. It includes essays on method, logic, the intellect, Kant, pantheism, natural science, religion, education, and language. The present volume offers a new translation, a substantial introduction explaining the context of the essays, and extensive editorial notes on the different published versions of the work. This readable and scholarly edition will be an essential reference for those studying Schopenhauer, the history of philosophy, and nineteenth-century German philosophy.

In their recent book The Soul of Nietzsche’s Beyond Good and Evil, Maudemarie Clark and David Dudrick claim that Nietzsche takes Plato’s theory of the soul to be ‘a hypothesis, which his own psychology is an attempt to refine’. This essay accepts that claim, but argues for a more streamlined account of the relation between Nietzsche and Plato than Clark and Dudrick give. There is no justification for their suggestion that Nietzsche diagnoses an ‘atomistic need’ as responsible for what he objects to in Plato’s model. The claim that ‘reason’ is a motivationally inert set of cognitive capacities is not necessarily a point of disagreement with Plato. Nietzsche’s psychology does not require a generalized ‘will to value’ as a counterpart to the will to truth. Clark and Dudrick fail to recognize the Platonic soul-elements as drives, and that the element which for Plato should govern in the best of souls can be interpreted as closely analogous to Nietzsche’s will to truth

Against the claim that Nietzsche’s early and late views on confronting the truth about human existence differ widely, this article argues that in The Birth of Tragedy tragic art is affirmative of life and not limited to beautifying illusion, while later works still contain the idea that artistic production of beauty is a falsification necessary to make existence bearable for us. Nietzsche did not start with the view that art’s value lies in sheer illusion, nor end with the view that truth should be confronted wholly without illusion, but is ambivalent on this issue throughout

In response to Michael Wreen, 'Once is Not Enough?' (British Journal of Aesthetics 1990), this article argues that the short story by Jorge Luis Borges, 'Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote' supports Arthur Danto's account of the individuation of art works, according to which two verbally identical compositions can be two distinct works. Wreen argues that the Menard story is a case of copying. But the story is one of intentional coincidence of texts, not copying. Hence Wreen lacks a convincing case for denying that the the text of Borges' Menard constitutes a work distinct from Cervantes' Don Quixote.

Janaway provides a detailed and critical account of Schopenhauer's central philosophical achievement: his account of the self and its relation to the world of objects. The author's approach to this theme is historical, yet is designed to show the philosophical interest of such an approach. He explores in unusual depth Schopenhauer's often ambivalent relation to Kant, and highlights the influence of Schopenhauer's view of self and world on Wittgenstein and Nietzsche, as well as tracing the many points of contact between Schopenhauer's thought and current philosophical debates about the self.

There are two familiar strategic approaches to Kant's Critique of Judgement which commentators have not always found easy to combine. One would regard the work as fitting snugly into Kant's enterprise as the keystone that absorbs the forces of his theoretical and practical philosophies, uniting them and itself into a single sound structure. That Kant saw it this way is obvious from his Introduction to the Critique. But the other approach has sometimes seemed more fruitful: start with the Analytic of the Beautiful and take it not as the completion but as the beginning of something, a treatise which, in offering possibly the fullest and most rigorous account of the autonomy of aesthetic judgement, plays a foundational role in the discipline now known as aesthetics. On this approach questions concerning morality and the unity of Kant's philosophy can be set aside for attention later, if ever

The final part of Schopenhauer’s argument in The World as Will and Representation concerns “affirmation and negation of the will”. He argues, with a fervor that borders on the religious, that “negation of the will” is a condition of unique value, the only state that enables “true salvation, redemption from life and from suffering”. Some commentators have asserted without qualification that this condition is his “highest good.” However, Schopenhauer in fact claims that there cannot be a highest good, because 'good' is always relative to sstisfaction of a will, and there is no possible final satisfaction of the will. It is only figuratively the will-lessness is the highest good. The article examines the coherence of Schopenhauer's position. Because of the relation of 'good' to willing, he appears reluctant to call will-lessness 'good' at all, despite rating it a state of superior value. The article suggests that Schopenhauer should either abandon his univocal account of 'good' as related to willing, or accept that things can be good in relation to different kinds of willing, namely egoistic and non-egoistic willing. It is argued that the latter resolution if preferable.

Arthur Schopenhauer's The Two Fundamental Problems of Ethics consists of two groundbreaking essays: 'On the Freedom of the Will' and 'On the Basis of Morals'. The essays make original contributions to ethics and display Schopenhauer's erudition, prose-style and flair for philosophical controversy, as well as philosophical views that contrast sharply with the positions of both Kant and Nietzsche. Written accessibly, they do not presuppose the intricate metaphysics which Schopenhauer constructs elsewhere. This is the first English translation of these works to re-unite both essays in one volume. It offers a new translation by Christopher Janaway, together with an introduction, editorial notes on Schopenhauer's vocabulary and the different editions of his essays, a chronology of his life, a bibliography, and a glossary of names.

This paper gives an account of the argument of Schopenhauer's essay On the Freedom of the Human Will, drawing also on his other works. Schopenhauer argues that all human actions are causally necessitated, as are all other events in empirical nature, hence there is no freedom in the sense of liberum arbitrium indifferentiae. However, our sense of responsibility or agency (being the ) is nonetheless unshakeable. To account for this Schopenhauer invokes the Kantian distinction between empirical and intelligible characters. The paper highlights divergences between Schopenhauer and Kant over the intelligible character, which for Schopenhauer can be neither rational nor causal. It raises the questions whether the intelligible character may be redundant to Schopenhauer's position, and whether it can coherently belong to an individual agent, suggesting that for Schopenhauer a more consistent position would have been to deny freedom of will to the individual

It is sometimes assumed that Kant’s claim that a judgement of taste is grounded in a pleasure ‘without concepts’ leaves little room for any credible account of critical judgements of art. I argue that even Kant’s conception of free (as opposed to dependent) beauty can provide the framework for an analysis of aesthetic judgements about art works. It is a matter of understanding what roles for concepts Kant prohibits in his analysis of pure judgements of taste: conceptual cognition must be neither what gives rise to the subject’s pleasure nor part of the evidential basis for the subject’s judgement. But this does not entail that the subject encounters the object in a wholly ‘concept–free’ manner. Kant’s account of free beauty is quite different from Schopenhauer’s superficially similar theory, and is compatible with the thought that increased conceptual knowledge can enhance critical judgements of art