Christopher Janaway

In this paper I juxtapose two well-known thought-experiments concerning duplicate art works, and point out that they appear to have directly conflicting results. I then make a proposal as to how to reconcile the two cases. The two cases are Borges' story of Pierre Menard, in which a text coinciding exactly with Cervantes' Don Quixote is nonetheless a distinct work from it, and Nelson Goodman's claim that a musical work cannot be forged, because anything complying with a work's notation is that work (or a performance of it), not anything distinct. Both claims seem correct, but how can they be reconciled? I suggest two factors that must be present for two indistinguishable works to be numerically distinct: divergent causal histories and distinct 'privileged interpretational instructions'. Notational equivalence of W and W1 plus the instruction to interpret W as W1 leads to the impossiblity of forgery. But in the absence of such instruction, W and W1 can constitute distinct works.

Against the claim that Nietzsche’s early and late views on confronting the truth about human existence differ widely, this article argues that in The Birth of Tragedy tragic art is affirmative of life and not limited to beautifying illusion, while later works still contain the idea that artistic production of beauty is a falsification necessary to make existence bearable for us. Nietzsche did not start with the view that art’s value lies in sheer illusion, nor end with the view that truth should be confronted wholly without illusion, but is ambivalent on this issue throughout

Designed for readers with no or little prior knowledge of the subject, this concise anthology brings together key texts in aesthetics and the philosophy of art. Designed for readers with no or little prior knowledge of the subject. Presents two contrasting pieces on each of six topics. Texts range from Plato’s famous critique of art in the ‘Republic’ through Nietzsche’s ‘The Birth of Tragedy’ to Barthes’ ‘The Death of the Author’ 'and pieces in recent philosophical aesthetics from a number of traditions. Interactive editorial commentary helps readers to engage with the philosophical train of thought. Explains the argumentative and historical context in which each piece was written. Includes questions for debate and suggestions for further reading.

This paper aims to distinguish a conception of ‘free will’ that Nietzsche opposes (that of the pure agent unaffected by contingencies of character and circumstance) and one that he supports. In Human, All Too Human Nietzsche propounds the ‘total unfreedom’ of the will. But by the time of Beyond Good and Evil and the Genealogy he is more concerned (a) to trace the affective psychological states underlying beliefs in both free will and ‘unfree will’, (b) to suggest that the will might become free in certain individuals, a matter of having a consistent strong character, self-knowledge, and ability to create values. The paper explores the kind of autonomy required in agents who would ‘revalue’ existing values.

One feature of my book (Beyond Selflessness: Reading Nietzsche's Genealogy) that is perhaps worth some comment is the historical background that I place Nietzsche against.2 It is noteworthy, I think, that in GM P, Nietzsche mentions just two thinkers as his antagonists: Schopenhauer and Rée. My aim was to take these thinkers, the former still somewhat underread by Nietzsche commentators (though the situation is improving) and the latter very poorly studied until recently, and map out Nietzsche’s position as structured in opposition to them in the first instance. Why does this matter? First, some of the detail of what he says in certain places makes better sense if these are his targets. Just to give some examples, the famous passage on perspectives and affects in GM III:12 is directed against conceiving “objectivity” as the stance of a “pure, will-less, painless, timeless subject of knowledge,” which is precisely Schopenhauer’s view of objectivity (attainable in aesthetic experience). Nietzsche’s preoccupation with attacking compassion (Mitleid) stems from the fact that compassion is the sole moral incentive in Schopenhauer’s ethics. Again, the account of the origins of morality given by the so-called English psychologists with which Nietzsche opens GM I is demonstrably Rée’s account; as is the account of punishment as deterrence criticized in GM II for confusing the uses or meanings of a thing with its origins. In general, if we are to get a picture of what is truly bugging Nietzsche, as it were, it may be helpful to take a closer look at his targets. For example, much [End Page 124] has been made recently about Nietzsche opposing theories of morality that are based on a particular notion of free will, that of the causa sui, uncaused cause, neutral subject of free choice, and so on. Well, yes, Nietzsche is opposed to such theories, but if that were his dominating concern, why would he be so explicitly against Schopenhauer and Rée, both adamant determinists? Alternatively, we may think that Nietzsche’s main point is to oppose theistic metaphysics: but both his named antagonists are already decided atheists. Recently it has been suggested that Nietzsche’s guiding aim is to oust everything supernatural or transcendent and establish a strict form of naturalism. That is one of his aims, but although Rée at least is as strict a naturalist as you could want in the late nineteenth century, Nietzsche nonetheless represents himself as saying no to everything he found in Rée’s book The Origin of the Moral Sensations—and even Schopenhauer, though overall a metaphysician offering a global account of the thing in itself that Nietzsche must oppose, believes that the empirical world can be correctly described in wholly causal, materialist terms. It seems to me important that Nietzsche treats as his principal opponents thinkers who are atheists, naturalists, and determinists—not because they hold these positions but on other grounds, which we should seek to clarify. What unites Schopenhauer and Rée—and I think Nietzsche makes this very clear in GM P—is the centrality they give to “the unegoistic” in their account of morality or, as Nietzsche says, to “the value of the unegoistic, of the instincts of compassion, self-denial, self-sacrifice” (GM P:5).

The essay draws attention to some of the different uses made of Schopenhauer throughout Nietzsche's writings. Different roles for Schopenhauer coexist at all stages of Nietzsche's writing. He functions as an exemplar for European culture, but at the same time Nietzsche can find serious fault with his philosophical doctrines, as he does in early unpublished notes. In later writings Schopenhauer is assigned the role of Nietzsche's antipode, but even then Schopenhauer is paid the compliment of being Nietzsche's great and only teacher. The essay includes a commentary on Genealogy III:12 in which Nietzsche's conception of 'perspectival knowledge' is anti-Schopenhauerian, but can only be seen for what it is once an underlying Schopenhauerian structure is made explicit.

This flexible introductory textbook explores several key themes in philosophy, and helps the reader learn to engage with the key arguments by introducing and analysing a selection of classic readings. Fully integrated introductory text with readings for beginning students of philosophy. Each chapter focusses on a core philosophical topic, and contains an introduction to the topic, 2 classic readings and interactive commentaries on the readings. An introductory book which doesn't merely _tell_ the reader about the subject, but requires them to engage philosophically with the text. A pedagogical resource developed in the classroom by the authors at the University of London.

Nietzsche vehemently attacks the traditional conception of the unitary self. This essay tries to show that some of the undermining of that conception had already been done in Schopenhauer’s work. We should not ignore the obvious fact that while Nietzsche is a philosopher of cultures, classes and epochs, Schopenhauer’s view of knowledge and ethics remains firmly ahistorical. 1 Nevertheless, if we first try to inhabit Schopenhauer’s point of view, we can look forward to Nietzsche and illuminate him from one (partial) perspective. 2 For Nietzsche’s opposition to Schopenhauer’s conceptions of the subject and of the will is interwoven with more positive debts to his predecessor’s philosophy, and he by no means fully overcomes its problems and tensions.

This paper elucidates and interrogates Schopenhauer’s notion of will and its relation to ideas about the unconscious, with the aim of addressing its significance as an exercise in philosophical psychology. Schopenhauer aims at a global metaphysics, a theory of the essence of the world as it is in itself. He calls this essence will (Wille), which, to put it briefly, he understands as a blind striving for existence, life, and reproduction. Human beings have the same essence as all other manifestations of will in the world, and this has several consequences for Schopenhauer's conception of humanity. Neither rationality, nor intentional action, nor consciousness is primary or foundational in human beings. The true core of the personality is not the self-conscious ‘I’ or subject of knowledge, but rather the will, which is fundamentally blind and without knowledge, but which interacts with the intellect almost as an agent distinct from it. Schopenhauer makes a number of psychological observations about the interplay of intellect and will. These include the omnipresence of sexual desire in or beneath our experience; the persistence of desires and affects unknown to the self-conscious intellect; the will's capacity to prohibit representations in the intellect that are liable to arouse certain emotions; and the occurrence of madness when memories painful to the will are shielded from the intellect and arbitrary representations are substituted.

The article argues against various proposals to treat the term 'beauty' as standing for a single, generic concept of aesthetic value, which has application both to natural objects and to art. It argues that in Kant's aesthetic theory 'beauty' must be treated as ambiguous because in the case of art, but not in that of nature, part of beauty is the expession of aesthetic ideas. This gives rise to the dilemma: either beauty is always the ultimate aesthetic value of any thing, in which case there is no single account of beauty to be had that covers both art and nature, or being beautiful is the same for both art and nature, but must constitute only part of the aesthetic value of art. It is argued that certain late twentieth century theories of beauty do not overcome this problem.

This series of lectures was originally scheduled to include a talk on Schopenhauer by Patrick Gardiner. Sadly, Patrick died during the summer, and I was asked to stand in. Patrick must, I am sure, have been glad to see this series of talks on German Philosophy being put on by the Royal Institute, and he, probably more than anyone on the list, deserves to have been a part of it. Patrick Gardiner taught and wrote with unfailing integrity and quiet refinement in the Oxford of the 1950s, '60s, '70s and '80s, when the changing fashions in philosophy, and Oxford philosophy in particular, were quite remote from his own central interests. He went his own way, radically but quite undemonstratively. His book on Schopenhauer, originally published in 1963, was a beacon in the night as far as English-language publications on that philosopher are concerned. It is still a leader in the field, and I am pleased to say it has been re-issued just this year after being out of print for too long. Patrick worked in aesthetics, on Kant, and on the German Idealists, showing an expertise and a fondness for Fichte which now seem well ahead of their time. He also contributed well known books on Kierkegaard and on the philosophy of history. I am honoured to be invited as Patrick's replacement. He was a true pioneer, whom all of us working in these several fields that have now grown more fashionable and more populated should pause to salute

Schopenhauer defends the view that emotions impair cognition, while Nietzsche apparently replies that they are ineliminable from cognition, and that they enhance it. Schopenhauer argues that human individuals are naturally disposed to comprehend their environment in affective terms. At the same time, his evaluative position concerning this relation is negative: cognition is spoiled, warped, or tainted by its inability to shake off the emotions, desires, or drives that belong to human nature. Human individuals are not cut out for cognition proper, unless they become ‘pure subject of cognition’ in aesthetic experience, or in total self-negation of the will. Nietzsche accepts something analogous to Schopenhauer’s descriptive position: the self is a complex of drives and it is primarily these drives and their associated affects that interpret the world. But he firmly rejects Schopenhauer’s evaluative stance. He denies the possibility of a pure, objective, affect-free cognition. Nietzsche argues for a reversal of Schopenhauer’s evaluative stance: cognition is improved by affect, and by multiplying affects. This is a key point in Nietzsche’s so-called perspectivism im Genealogy III, 12. The view that Nietzsche regards affects as necessary for cognition has been challenged as either trivial or implausible by recent commentators. The essay addresses these challenges, arguing that it is quite plausible for Nietzsche to be holding such a view, and that it can be construed in ways that make it a more attractive view in itself.

This volume of translations unites three shorter works by Arthur Schopenhauer that expand on themes from his book The World as Will and Representation. In On the Fourfold Root he takes the principle of sufficient reason, which states that nothing is without a reason why it is, and shows how it covers different forms of explanation or ground that previous philosophers have tended to confuse. Schopenhauer regarded this study, which he first wrote as his doctoral dissertation, as an essential preliminary to The World as Will. On Will in Nature examines contemporary scientific findings in search of corroboration of his thesis that processes in nature are all a species of striving towards ends; and On Vision and Colours defends an anti-Newtonian account of colour perception influenced by Goethe's famous colour theory. This is the first English edition to provide extensive editorial notes on the different published versions of these works.

With the publication of the Parerga and Paralipomena in 1851, there finally came some measure of the fame that Schopenhauer thought was his due. Described by Schopenhauer himself as 'incomparably more popular than everything up till now', the Parerga is a miscellany of essays addressing themes that complement his work The World as Will and Representation, along with more divergent, speculative pieces. It includes his 'Aphorisms on the Wisdom of Life', reflections on fate and clairvoyance, trenchant views on the philosophers and universities of his day, and an enlightening survey of the history of philosophy. The present volume offers a new translation, a substantial introduction explaining the context of the essays, and extensive editorial notes on the different published versions of the work. This readable and scholarly edition will be an essential reference for those studying Schopenhauer, the history of philosophy, and nineteenth-century German philosophy.

This original new book argues for a reassessment of Plato's challenge to the arts. Plato was the first great figure in Western philosophy to assess the value of the arts; he argued in the Republic that traditionally accepted forms of poetry, drama, and music are unsound. While this view has been widely rejected, Janaway argues that Plato's hostile case is a more coherent and profound challenge to the arts than has sometimes been supposed. Denying that Plato advocates "good art" in any modern sense, Janaway seeks both to understand Plato's critique in the context of his own philosophy and to locate him in today's philosophy of art, showing how issues in aesthetics arise from responses to his charges.