Gerald K. Harrison

The hyper libertarian is compatibilist about control, but incompatibilist about free will. This paper argues that such a position has more to recommend it than either compati- bilism or traditional libertarianism. It com- bines what is strongest about both positions, without encountering their principle weak- nesses. Furthermore it has the resources to help render intelligible the reality of moral luck

Sterba argues that God would be ethically bound to implement a set of exceptionless evil prevention requirements. However, he argues that the world as we know it is not as it would be if God were applying them. Sterba concludes that God does not exist. In this paper, I offer a penal colony theodicy that will show how the world as we know it is entirely compatible with God’s implementation of such evil prevention requirements.

This paper argues that if the principle of alternate possibilities is false, as many now believe, then there is a non-question begging reason to favour a hyper libertarian position over compatibilism. It will be argued that only a hyper libertarian position has the resources to provide a principled explanation of the reality of moral luck, something a compatibilist position cannot do