Brian Garrett

Sur la base de ce qu’il a appelé « le principe d’héritabilité causale », Jaegwon Kim a soutenu que les propriétés réalisables de façons multiples ne constituent pas des sortes causales scientifiques. Mon principal objectif est de répondre aux arguments de Kim contre le physicalisme non réductionniste. Je défends l’idée qu’il existe plus de pouvoirs causaux que les seuls pouvoirs causaux physiques. Cela n’a rien de surprenant puisqu’il existe plus de particuliers que le nombre total de particules physiques fondamentales. Et la réflexion sur la nature des individus, et plus spécifiquement sur leur capacité à préserver leur identité à travers le changement ou le remplacement de leurs parties, indique que les individus ont des pouvoirs causaux distincts de ceux des particuliers physiques qui les constituent. Je soutiens que si cela est plausible, alors l’abandon du principe d’héritabilité causale l’est tout autant.Jaegwon Kim has recently argued, using what he calls “The Causal Inheritance Principle”, that multiply realizable properties are not causal, scientific kinds. My primary concern is to reply to Kim's arguments against nonreductive physicalism. I shall defend the idea that there are, indeed, more causal powers than the physical. But this should come as no surprise, since there are more individuals than the total number of fundamental physical particles. Reflections on the nature of individuals, specifically, on their ability to survive through change or replacement of their parts, indicates that individuals have causal powers nonidentical with the causal powers of the physical individuals that constitute them. I claim that, if this is plausible, the rejection of The Causal Inheritance Principle is also plausible

Elementary Logic explains what logic is, how it is done, and why it can be exciting. The book covers the central part of logic that all students have to learn: propositional logic. It aims to provide a crystal-clear introduction to what is often regarded as the most technically difficult area in philosophy. The book opens with an explanation of what logic is and how it is constructed. Subsequent chapters take the reader step-by-step through all aspects of elementary logic. Throughout, ideas are explained simply and directly, with the chapters packed with overviews, illustrative examples, and summaries. Each chapter builds on previous explanation and example, with the final chapters presenting more advanced methods. After a discussion of meta-logic and logical systems, the book closes with an exploration of how paradoxes can exist in the world of logic. Elementary Logic's clarity and engagement make it ideal for any reader studying logic for the first time

In this discussion paper, I evaluate some arguments of Mark Johnston's which appear in his articles «Fission and the Facts» and «Reasons and Reductionism» . My primary concern is with his description of fission cases, and his assessment of the implications of such cases for value theory. In particular, Johnston advances the following three claims:Rejecting the intrinsicness of identity is an arbitrary response to the paradox of fission;Fission cases involve indeterminate identity;Contra Parfit, fission cases have no implications for value theory in the actual world.I argue that and are false, and that , if true, is not true for any reason that Johnston gives