•  37
    Identity and extrinsicness
    Mind 97 (385): 105-109. 1988.
  •  1
    Vagueness, identity and the world
    Logique Et Analyse 135 (1): 349. 1991.
  •  174
    Bermudez on self-consciousness
    Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210): 96-101. 2003.
    I argue that José Luis Bermúdez has not shown that there is a paradox in our concept of self-consciousness. The deflationary theory is not a plausible theory of self-consciousness, so its paradoxicality is irrelevant. A more plausible theory, 'the simple theory', is not paradoxical. However, I do think there is a puzzle about the connection between self-consciousness and 'I'-thoughts
  •  12
    Some Thoughts on Animalism
    In Klaus Petrus (ed.), On Human Persons, Heusenstamm Nr Frankfurt: Ontos Verlag. pp. 41-46. 2003.
  •  2
    Johnston on fission
    Sorites 15 (December): 87-93. 2004.
    In this discussion paper, I evaluate some arguments of Mark Johnston's which appear in his articles «Fission and the Facts» and «Reasons and Reductionism» . My primary concern is with his description of fission cases, and his assessment of the implications of such cases for value theory. In particular, Johnston advances the following three claims:Rejecting the intrinsicness of identity is an arbitrary response to the paradox of fission;Fission cases involve indeterminate identity;Contra Parfit, …Read more
  •  183
    Why is there something rather than nothing? Does God exist? Does time flow? What are we? Do we have free will? What is truth? Metaphysics is concerned with ourselves and reality, and the most fundamental questions regarding existence. This clear and accessible introduction covers the central topics in metaphysics in a concise but comprehensive way. Brian Garrett discusses the crucial concepts in a highly readable manner, easing the reader in with a look at some important philosophical problems. …Read more
  •  162
    Personal identity and reductionism
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 51 (June): 361-373. 1991.
  •  76
    Dummett on Bringing About the Past
    Philosophia 44 (1): 113-115. 2016.
    In ‘Bringing about the Past’ Michael Dummett attempted to defend the coherence of the idea of bringing about the past. I agree that bringing about the past is conceptually no more problematic than bringing about the future, but argue, against Dummett, that there is no need to restrict the scope of an agent’s knowledge in order to make sense of intentionally bringing about past events
  •  113
    Tim, Tom, Time and Fate: Lewis on Time Travel
    Analytic Philosophy 57 (3): 247-252. 2016.
    In his well-known time travel story, David Lewis claims that there is a sense in which Tim can go back in time and kill his Grandfather and a (more inclusive) sense in which he cannot. Lewis describes Tim’s predicament as semi-fatalist, but holds that this does not compromise Tim’s freedom or his ability to kill Grandfather. I argue that if semi-fatalism is true of Tim, it is true of everyone, and that this is a troubling conclusion.