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Anita Superson

University of Kentucky
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    44
    • Most Recent
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  •  Events
    2
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 More details
  • University of Kentucky
    Department of Philosophy
    Professor
Areas of Specialization
Meta-Ethics
Philosophy of Gender, Race, and Sexuality
Normative Ethics
Philosophy of Action
Areas of Interest
Applied Ethics
Meta-Ethics
Normative Ethics
Social and Political Philosophy
Philosophy of Gender, Race, and Sexuality
  • All publications (44)
  •  71
    Feminist Ethics: Defeating the Why-Be-Moral Skeptic
    Journal of Social Philosophy 29 (2): 59-86. 1998.
    Feminist EthicsMoral RationalityInternalism and Externalism about Reasons
  •  106
    Thomas Pogge's Rawlsian Revival
    Dialogue 30 (1-2): 109-. 1991.
    In Realizing Rawls, Thomas Pogge defends a Rawlsian conception of justice. The book is divided into three main parts; this discussion will concentrate on the first two. Part 1 constitutes a defence of some aspects of Rawls's theory against objections raised by Nozick and Michael Sandel. This is followed by a second part on the two principles of justice—what they amount to, and some applications of them. Part 3 argues that the Rawlsian scheme should apply globally, not merely to a single state. R…Read more
    In Realizing Rawls, Thomas Pogge defends a Rawlsian conception of justice. The book is divided into three main parts; this discussion will concentrate on the first two. Part 1 constitutes a defence of some aspects of Rawls's theory against objections raised by Nozick and Michael Sandel. This is followed by a second part on the two principles of justice—what they amount to, and some applications of them. Part 3 argues that the Rawlsian scheme should apply globally, not merely to a single state. Readers will find Pogge's book very detailed and well organized. Pogge defends his claims with numerous helpful references to Rawls and his critics. His is a serious book, though I found the pace to be a bit slow at times, mostly because a lot of time is spent examining alternative interpretations before rejecting them.
    International EthicsDistributive JusticeGlobal Justice
  •  102
    Scepticism about Moral Motives
    Dialogue 35 (1): 15-. 1996.
    Traditionally, the problem of defeating scepticism about the rationality of morality is that of showing that every morally required act is rationally required. Little or no direct attention has been paid to whether we must also show that it is rational for the agent to have and act from the morally appropriate motive, whatever that may be. This is not to say that philosophers have entirely ignored the issue of motives; a fair number—Kant and Aristotle come to mind—are concerned in part with the …Read more
    Traditionally, the problem of defeating scepticism about the rationality of morality is that of showing that every morally required act is rationally required. Little or no direct attention has been paid to whether we must also show that it is rational for the agent to have and act from the morally appropriate motive, whatever that may be. This is not to say that philosophers have entirely ignored the issue of motives; a fair number—Kant and Aristotle come to mind—are concerned in part with the kind of motive agents ought to have and from which they ought to act. But the link to scepticism has not been clearly made. At issue is whether scepticism is fully defeated if we show that every morally required act is rationally required, even if we leave it possible that a fully rational person who performs the act just “goes through the motions” in doing so
    Moral ReasonsMoral MotivationInternalism and Externalism about Reasons
  •  127
    Gender Basics: Feminist Perspectives on Women and MenAnne Minas Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 1993, xiv + 545 pp (review)
    Dialogue 35 (2): 412-416. 1996.
    Philosophy of GenderFeminist Metaphysics
  •  702
    Deformed Desires and Informed Desire Tests
    Hypatia 20 (4): 109-126. 2000.
    The formal theory of rational choice as grounded in desire-satisfaction cannot account for the problem of such deformed desires as women's slavish desires. Traditional “informed desire” tests impose conditions of rationality, such as full information and absence of psychoses, but do not exclude deformed desires. I offer a Kantian-inspired addendum to these tests, according to which the very features of deformed desires render them irrational to adopt for an agent who appreciates her equal worth.
    Feminist Philosophy
  •  159
    The Employer-Employee Relationship and the Right to Know
    Business and Professional Ethics Journal 3 (1): 45-58. 1983.
    Business Ethics
  •  120
    Privilege, immorality, and responsibility for attending to the "facts about humanity"
    Journal of Social Philosophy 35 (1). 2004.
    Social and Political PhilosophyMoral Character, MiscMoral MotivationFeminism: OppressionFeminist App…Read more
    Social and Political PhilosophyMoral Character, MiscMoral MotivationFeminism: OppressionFeminist Approaches to Philosophy
  •  50
    From Morality to Virtue (review)
    Social Theory and Practice 20 (2): 221-244. 1994.
    Value TheoryGovernment and Democracy
  •  158
    Right-wing women: Causes, choices, and blaming the victim
    Journal of Social Philosophy 24 (3): 40-61. 1993.
    Social and Political PhilosophyFeminist Ethics
  •  119
    The Rationality of Dispositions and the Rationality of Actions: The Interdependency Thesis
    Dialogue 44 (3): 439-468. 2005.
    I defend the Interdependency Thesis, according to which rational evaluations of dispositions and actions are made in light of each other. I invoke a model of rationality that relies on various levels of consistency existing between an agent’s reasons for adopting a moral disposition, the argument for the moral theory she endorses (relying on the Kantian notion that all persons are equal in humanity), her desires, disposition, and choice to be a moral person as reflected in the maxim she adopts. …Read more
    I defend the Interdependency Thesis, according to which rational evaluations of dispositions and actions are made in light of each other. I invoke a model of rationality that relies on various levels of consistency existing between an agent’s reasons for adopting a moral disposition, the argument for the moral theory she endorses (relying on the Kantian notion that all persons are equal in humanity), her desires, disposition, and choice to be a moral person as reflected in the maxim she adopts. The Interdependency Thesis shows that we do not need to demonstrate the rationality of every morally required action in order to defeat scepticism fully.
    Moral Rationality
  •  117
    Strategies for Making Feminist Philosophy Mainstream Philosophy
    Hypatia 26 (2): 410-418. 2011.
    Feminist History of Philosophy
  •  151
    Mackenzie, Catriona, ; Rogers, Wendy; and Dodds, Susan, eds. Vulnerability: New Essays in Ethics and Feminist Philosophy.New York: Oxford University Press, 2014. Pp. 318. $99.00 (review)
    Ethics 125 (4): 1210-1215. 2015.
    AutonomyAutonomy in Applied EthicsFeminist Approaches to Philosophy
  •  5
    David Schmidtz, Rational Choice and Moral Agency (review)
    Philosophy in Review 16 135-140. 1996.
    Social and Political PhilosophyEthics
  •  217
    Out from the Shadows: Analytical Feminist Contributions to Traditional Philosophy (edited book)
    with Sharon L. Crasnow
    Oxford University Press. 2012.
    This collection showcases the work of 18 analytical feminists from a variety of traditional areas of philosophy. It highlights successful uses of concepts and approaches from traditional philosophy, and illustrates the contributions that feminist approaches have made and could make to the analysis of issues in key areas of traditional philosophy, while also demonstrating that traditional philosophy ignores feminist insights and feminist critiques of traditional philosophy at its own peril.
    Feminist EthicsFeminist EpistemologyFeminist Philosophy of ScienceFeminist Philosophy of LanguageFem…Read more
    Feminist EthicsFeminist EpistemologyFeminist Philosophy of ScienceFeminist Philosophy of LanguageFeminist MetaphysicsFeminist Political PhilosophyAnalytic FeminismScience and Values
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