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39Feminist Ethics: Defeating the Why-Be-Moral SkepticJournal of Social Philosophy 29 (2): 59-86. 1998.
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23The Self‐Interest Based Contractarian Response to the Why‐Be‐Moral SkepticSouthern Journal of Philosophy 28 (3): 427-447. 1990.
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11Theorizing Backlash: Philosophical Reflections on the Resistance to Feminism (edited book)Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. 2002.Contrary to the popular belief that feminism has gained a foothold in the many disciplines of the academy, the essays collected in Theorizing Backlash argue that feminism is still actively resisted in mainstream academia. Contributors to this volume consider the professional, philosophical, and personal backlashes against feminist thought, and reflect upon their ramifications. The conclusion is that the disdain and irrational resentment of feminism, even in higher education, amounts to a backlas…Read more
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32Deformed Desires and Informed Desire TestsHypatia 20 (4): 109-126. 2005.The formal theory of rational choice as grounded in desire-satisfaction cannot account for the problem of such deformed desires as women's slavish desires. Traditional “informed desire” tests impose conditions of rationality, such as full information and absence of psychoses, but do not exclude deformed desires. I offer a Kantian-inspired addendum to these tests, according to which the very features of deformed desires render them irrational to adopt for an agent who appreciates her equal worth.
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17Thomas Pogge's Rawlsian RevivalDialogue 30 (1-2): 109-. 1991.In Realizing Rawls, Thomas Pogge defends a Rawlsian conception of justice. The book is divided into three main parts; this discussion will concentrate on the first two. Part 1 constitutes a defence of some aspects of Rawls's theory against objections raised by Nozick and Michael Sandel. This is followed by a second part on the two principles of justice—what they amount to, and some applications of them. Part 3 argues that the Rawlsian scheme should apply globally, not merely to a single state. R…Read more
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19Scepticism about Moral MotivesDialogue 35 (1): 15-. 1996.Traditionally, the problem of defeating scepticism about the rationality of morality is that of showing that every morally required act is rationally required. Little or no direct attention has been paid to whether we must also show that it is rational for the agent to have and act from the morally appropriate motive, whatever that may be. This is not to say that philosophers have entirely ignored the issue of motives; a fair number—Kant and Aristotle come to mind—are concerned in part with the …Read more
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36Moral luck and partialist theoriesJournal of Value Inquiry 30 (1-2): 213-227. 1996.I argue that partialist theories that require us to give special weight to the desires, needs, and interests of ourselves or our social group, are national. I depend this impartialist principle: if the only difference between two persons to some property, where having the property to dependent on luck, morality's demanding that we disfavor either person because the person has this property, to national
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82Right-wing women: Causes, choices, and blaming the victimJournal of Social Philosophy 24 (3): 40-61. 1993.
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70The Employer-Employee Relationship and the Right to KnowBusiness and Professional Ethics Journal 3 (1): 45-58. 1983.
Areas of Specialization
Meta-Ethics |
Philosophy of Gender, Race, and Sexuality |
Normative Ethics |
Philosophy of Action |