•  20
    The Possibility of knowledge: Nozick and his critics (edited book)
    Rowman & Littlefield. 1987.
    This volume of original essays assesses Nozick's analyses of knowledge and evidence and his approach to skepticism. Several of the contributors claim that Nozick has not succeeded in rebutting the skeptic; some offer fresh accounts of skepticism and its flaws; others criticize Nozick's externalist accounts of knowledge and evidence; still others welcome externalism but attempt to replace Nozick's accounts of knowledge and evidence with more plausible analyses.
  •  7
    Two Arguments for the Harmlessness of Death
    with Nicolas Bommarito
    In Michael Bruce Steven Barbone (ed.), Just the Arguments: 100 of the Most Important Arguments in Western Philosophy, Wiley-blackwell. pp. 99--101. 2011.
  •  214
    Posthumous Harm
    American Philosophical Quarterly 41 (1). 2004.
    According to Epicurus (1966a,b), neither death, nor anything that occurs later, can harm those who die, because people who die are not made to suffer as a result of either. In response, many philosophers (e.g., Nagel 1970, Feinberg 1984, and Pitcher 1984) have argued that Epicurus is wrong on both counts. They have defended the mortem thesis: death may harm those who die. They have also defended the post-mortem thesis: posthumous events may harm people who die. Their arguments for this joint vie…Read more
  •  21
    Ideally, our account of knowledge would help us to understand the appeal of (and flaws in) skepticism,2 while remaining consistent with our ‘intuitions,' and supporting epistemic principles that seem eminently plausible. Of course, we don't always get what we want; we may not be able to move from intuitions and principles to an account that fully squares with them. As a last resort, we may have to move in the other direction, and give up intuitions or principles that are undermined by an otherwi…Read more
  •  221
    Dretske on knowledge closure
    Australasian Journal of Philosophy 84 (3). 2006.
    In early essays and in more recent work, Fred Dretske argues against the closure of perception, perceptual knowledge, and knowledge itself. In this essay I review his case and suggest that, in a useful sense, perception is closed, and that, while perceptual knowledge is not closed under entailment, perceptually based knowledge is closed, and so is knowledge itself. On my approach, which emphasizes the safe indication account of knowledge, we can both perceive, and know, that sceptical scenarios …Read more
  •  25
    To the death
    The Philosophers' Magazine 64 125-126. 2014.
  •  53
    The Easy Argument
    Acta Analytica 22 (4). 2007.
    Suppose Ted is in an ordinary house in good viewing conditions and believes red, his table is red, entirely because he sees his table and its color; he also believes not-white, it is false that his table is white and illuminated by a red light, because not-white is entailed by red. The following three claims about this table case clash, but each seems plausible: 1. Ted’s epistemic position is strong enough for him to know red. 2. Ted cannot know not-white on the basis of red. 3. The epistemic …Read more
  •  27
    Review of Bernard Schumacher, Death and Mortality in Contemporary Philosophy (review)
    Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews 2011 (1). 2011.
  •  41
    Moore's Missing Principle
    Philosophical Papers 36 (1): 151-161. 2007.
    Philosophical Papers 36.1 (2007): 151-161.
  •  147
    Epistemic relativism
    Philosophical Issues 14 (1). 2004.
    Epistemic relativism rejects the idea that claims can be assessed from a universally applicable, objective standpoint. It is greatly disdained because it suggests that the real ‘basis’ for our views is something fleeting, such as ‘‘the techniques of mass persuasion’’ (Thomas Kuhn 1970) or the determination of intellectuals to achieve ‘‘solidarity’’ (Rorty 1984) or ‘‘keep the conversation going’’ (Rorty 1979). But epistemic relativism, like skepticism, is far easier to despise than to convincingl…Read more
  •  127
    Contrastivism and Skepticism
    International Journal for the Study of Skepticism 2 (1): 51-58. 2012.
    Recently, Jonathan Schaffer has defended a contrastivist analysis of knowledge. By appealing to his account, he has attempted to steer a path between skepticism and Moore-style antiskepticism: much like sensitivity theorists and contextualists, he offers significant concessions to, but ultimately rejects, both. In this essay I suggest that in fact Schaffer ends up succumbing to skepticism
  •  161
    The Philosophy of Death
    Cambridge University Press. 2009.
    The Philosophy of Death is a discussion of the basic philosophical issues concerning death, and a critical introduction to the relevant contemporary philosophical literature. Luper begins by addressing questions about those who die: What is it to be alive? What does it mean for you and me to exist? Under what conditions do we persist over time, and when do we perish? Next, he considers several questions concerning death, including: What does dying consist in; in particular, how does it differ fr…Read more
  •  183
    The Absurdity of Life
    Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 1-17. 1992.
  •  10
    To the death
    The Philosophers' Magazine 64 125-126. 2014.
  •  196
    The epistemic closure principle
    Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. 2008.
    Most of us think we can always enlarge our knowledge base by accepting things that are entailed by (or logically implied by) things we know. The set of things we know is closed under entailment (or under deduction or logical implication), which means that we know that a given claim is true upon recognizing, and accepting thereby, that it follows from what we know. However, some theorists deny that knowledge is closed under entailment, and the issue remains controversial. The arguments against cl…Read more