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1010Reverse-engineering in Cognitive-ScienceIn Marcin Miłkowski & Konrad Talmont-Kaminski (eds.), Regarding Mind, Naturally, Cambridge Scholars Press. pp. 12-29. 2013.I discuss whether there are some lessons for philosophical inquiry over the nature of simulation to be learnt from the practical methodology of reengineering. I will argue that reengineering serves a similar purpose as simulations in theoretical science such as computational neuroscience or neurorobotics, and that the procedures and heuristics of reengineering help to develop solutions to outstanding problems of simulation.
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103Jak wyróżniać moduły umysłowe? Problemy ze specjalizacją i konfirmacjąStudia Z Kognitywistyki I Filozofii Umysłu 6 (2): 27-48. 2012.W artykule przedstawiono argumenty, że konfirmacja tezy, iż istnieją moduły umysłowe wyjaśniające cechy umysłu, jest z kilku powodów kłopotliwa. Po pierwsze, istnieje kilka konkurencyjnych teorii modularności, które zresztą nie zawsze się wykluczają, przez co nie można między nimi rozstrzygać eksperymentalnie. Po drugie, tezy na temat modularności często oparte są na bezzasadnym założeniu, iż wyróżnianie specyficznych dziedzin (semantycznych lub składniowych) działania modułów nie jest problemat…Read more
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713Filozofia jako inżynieria odwrotna: rzecz o naturalizmie Daniela C. DennettaPrzeglad Filozoficzny - Nowa Seria 50 (2): 75-89. 2004.
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162Czym jest i jak istnieje umysł?Diametros 3 27-55. 2005.The goal of the article is to show that a complete answer to the title question can be given only in the context of the natural sciences. We believe that the group of cognitive sciences are the most reliable source of information about cognitive mental processes is. Making use of their achievements, we present a series of criteria for possessing a mind. We distinguish between many kinds of minds. We attempt to outline the conditions that must be fulfilled by an adequate model of the mind. In our…Read more
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553On the Social Nature of Linguistic PrescriptionsPsychology of Language and Communication 17 (2): 175-187. 2013.The paper proposes an empirical method to investigate linguistic prescriptions as inherent corrective behaviors. The behaviors in question may but need not necessarily be supported by any explicit knowledge of rules. It is possible to gain insight into them, for example by extracting information about corrections from revision histories of texts (or by analyzing speech corpora where users correct themselves or one another). One easily available source of such information is the revision history …Read more
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644Wyjaśnianie w kognitywistycePrzeglad Filozoficzny - Nowa Seria 86 (2): 151-166. 2013.The paper defends the claim that the mechanistic explanation of information processing is the fundamental kind of explanation in cognitive science. These mechanisms are complex organized systems whose functioning depends on the orchestrated interaction of their component parts and processes. A constitutive explanation of every mechanism must include both appeal to its environment and to the role it plays in it. This role has been traditionally dubbed competence. To fully explain how this role is…Read more
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74A Mechanistic Account of Computational Explanation in Cognitive Science and Computational NeuroscienceIn Vincent C. Müller (ed.), Computing and philosophy: Selected papers from IACAP 2014, Springer. pp. 191-205. 2016.Explanations in cognitive science and computational neuroscience rely predominantly on computational modeling. Although the scientific practice is systematic, and there is little doubt about the empirical value of numerous models, the methodological account of computational explanation is not up-to-date. The current chapter offers a systematic account of computational explanation in cognitive science and computational neuroscience within a mechanistic framework. The account is illustrated with a…Read more
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603Naturalizing the MindIn Marcin Miłkowski & Konrad Talmont-Kamiński (eds.), Regarding Mind, Naturally, Cambridge Scholars Press. 2013.The introduction to the volume and the overview of the idea of naturalizing the mind.
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836Is Evolution Algorithmic?Minds and Machines 19 (4): 465-475. 2009.In Darwin’s Dangerous Idea, Daniel Dennett claims that evolution is algorithmic. On Dennett’s analysis, evolutionary processes are trivially algorithmic because he assumes that all natural processes are algorithmic. I will argue that there are more robust ways to understand algorithmic processes that make the claim that evolution is algorithmic empirical and not conceptual. While laws of nature can be seen as compression algorithms of information about the world, it does not follow logically tha…Read more
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495Evaluating Artificial Models of CognitionStudies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 40 (1): 43-62. 2015.Artificial models of cognition serve different purposes, and their use determines the way they should be evaluated. There are also models that do not represent any particular biological agents, and there is controversy as to how they should be assessed. At the same time, modelers do evaluate such models as better or worse. There is also a widespread tendency to call for publicly available standards of replicability and benchmarking for such models. In this paper, I argue that proper evaluation o…Read more
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67Beyond Description. Naturalism and Normativity (edited book)College Publications. 2010.The contributors to this volume engage with issues of normativity within naturalised philosophy. The issues are critical to naturalism as most traditional notions in philosophy, such as knowledge, justification or representation, are said to involve normativity. Some of the contributors pursue the question of the correct place of normativity within a naturalised ontology, with emergentist and eliminativist answers offered on neighbouring pages. Others seek to justify particular norms within a na…Read more
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954The Hard Problem Of Content: Solved (Long Ago)Studies in Logic, Grammar and Rhetoric 41 (1): 73-88. 2015.In this paper, I argue that even if the Hard Problem of Content, as identified by Hutto and Myin, is important, it was already solved in natu- ralized semantics, and satisfactory solutions to the problem do not rely merely on the notion of information as covariance. I point out that Hutto and Myin have double standards for linguistic and mental representation, which leads to a peculiar inconsistency. Were they to apply the same standards to basic and linguistic minds, they would either have to e…Read more
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139Explaining the Computational MindMIT Press. 2013.In the book, I argue that the mind can be explained computationally because it is itself computational—whether it engages in mental arithmetic, parses natural language, or processes the auditory signals that allow us to experience music. All these capacities arise from complex information-processing operations of the mind. By analyzing the state of the art in cognitive science, I develop an account of computational explanation used to explain the capacities in question.
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8Reprezentacje w systemach klasycznych i koneksjonistycznychStudia Z Kognitywistyki I Filozofii Umysłu 3. 2009.Autor artykułu broni tezy, że niektóre systemy obliczeniowe mogą mieć własności semantyczne. Wskazana została klasa systemów obliczeniowych, w których reprezentacje mogą mieć przynajmniej dwie własności: własność odnoszenia się do obiektów (desygnowanie) i własność wspomagania rozpoznawania obiektów oznaczanych przez daną reprezentację (konotowanie). Autor argumentuje także, że własności semantyczne reprezentacji nie zależą wyłącznie od architektury systemów obliczeniowych, w których te reprezen…Read more
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38Limits of Computational Explanation of CognitionIn Vincent C. Müller (ed.), Philosophy and Theory of Artificial Intelligence, Springer. pp. 69-84. 2013.In this chapter, I argue that some aspects of cognitive phenomena cannot be explained computationally. In the first part, I sketch a mechanistic account of computational explanation that spans multiple levels of organization of cognitive systems. In the second part, I turn my attention to what cannot be explained about cognitive systems in this way. I argue that information-processing mechanisms are indispensable in explanations of cognitive phenomena, and this vindicates the computational expla…Read more
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417Heroizm idylliczny - Epikur w oczach NietzschegoPrzeglad Filozoficzny - Nowa Seria 28 (4): 121-135. 1998.Nietzsche's treatment of Epicurus is an interesting example of philosophical hermeneutics. Epicurus bas tren notoriously misinterpreted, claims Nietzsche, because bis mask bas been taken for bis true face. Traditionally Epicurus is presented as a utilitarian or hedonist avant la lettre. This is a simplification motivated by a desire to deprecate bis philosophy. To Nietzsche Epicurus was „an idyllic hero”, a teacher with anistocratic predilections aun his own concept of good, critical of the trad…Read more
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417Computational Mechanisms and Models of ComputationPhilosophia Scientiae 18 215-228. 2014.In most accounts of realization of computational processes by physical mechanisms, it is presupposed that there is one-to-one correspondence between the causally active states of the physical process and the states of the computation. Yet such proposals either stipulate that only one model of computation is implemented, or they do not reflect upon the variety of models that could be implemented physically. In this paper, I claim that mechanistic accounts of computation should allow for a broad …Read more
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337Situatedness and Embodiment of Computational SystemsEntropy 19 (4): 162. 2017.In this paper, the role of the environment and physical embodiment of computational systems for explanatory purposes will be analyzed. In particular, the focus will be on cognitive computational systems, understood in terms of mechanisms that manipulate semantic information. It will be argued that the role of the environment has long been appreciated, in particular in the work of Herbert A. Simon, which has inspired the mechanistic view on explanation. From Simon’s perspective, the embodied view…Read more
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57When Weak Modularity is Robust Enough?Análisis Filosófico 28 (1): 77-89. 2008.In this paper, I suggest that the notion of module explicitly defined by Peter Carruthers in The Architecture of The Mind (Carruthers 2006) is not really In use in the book. Instead, a more robust notion seems to be actually in play. The more robust notion, albeit implicitly assumed, seems to be far more useful for making claims about the modularity of mind. Otherwise, the claims would become trivial. This robust notion will be reconstructed and improved upon by putting it into a more general fr…Read more
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637Computation and Multiple RealizabilityIn Vincent C. Müller (ed.), Fundamental Issues of Artificial Intelligence, Springer. pp. 29-41. 2016.Multiple realizability (MR) is traditionally conceived of as the feature of computational systems, and has been used to argue for irreducibility of higher-level theories. I will show that there are several ways a computational system may be seen to display MR. These ways correspond to (at least) five ways one can conceive of the function of the physical computational system. However, they do not match common intuitions about MR. I show that MR is deeply interest-related, and for this reason, dif…Read more
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146Idyllic heroism: Nietzsche's View of EpicurusJournal of Nietzsche Studies 15 70-79. 1998.In this paper, Nietzsche's interpretation of Epicurus is sketched. The ancient philosopher is seen as subscribing to 'idyllic heroism', i.e., heroically adopting an idyllic way of life.
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535Explanatory completeness and idealization in large brain simulations: a mechanistic perspectiveSynthese 193 (5): 1457-1478. 2016.The claim defended in the paper is that the mechanistic account of explanation can easily embrace idealization in big-scale brain simulations, and that only causally relevant detail should be present in explanatory models. The claim is illustrated with two methodologically different models: Blue Brain, used for particular simulations of the cortical column in hybrid models, and Eliasmith’s SPAUN model that is both biologically realistic and able to explain eight different tasks. By drawing on th…Read more
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Analityczna metafizyka umysłu: najnowsze kontrowersje (edited book)Wydawn. Instytutu Filozofii i Socjologii Polskiej Akademii Nauk. 2008.