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42Rationality, prediction, and autonomous choiceCanadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (sup1): 339-363. 1993.
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45Knowledge as True BeliefIn Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist (ed.), Belief Revision Meets Philosophy of Science, Springer. pp. 269--302. 2011.
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1FeasibilityIn Cristina Bicchieri & Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interaction, Cambridge University Press. pp. 1--20. 1992.
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7IrrelevanceIn A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen (eds.), Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory, D. Reidel. pp. 263--273. 1978.
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1Dewey's logic of inquiryIn Molly Cochran (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Dewey, Cambridge University Press. pp. 80-100. 2010.
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85The Fixation of Belief and its Undoing: Changing Beliefs Through InquiryCambridge University Press. 1991.Isaac Levi's new book is concerned with how one can justify changing one's beliefs. The discussion is deeply informed by the belief-doubt model advocated by C. S. Peirce and John Dewey, of which the book provides a substantial analysis. Professor Levi then addresses the conceptual framework of potential changes available to an inquirer. A structural approach to propositional attitudes is proposed, which rejects the conventional view that a propositional attitude involves a relation between an ag…Read more
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44Book Review:Probabilistic Metaphysics Patrick Suppes (review)Philosophy of Science 55 (4): 646-. 1988.In the introduction to Probabilistic Metaphysics, Patrick Suppes declares his intention to refute each of five central tenets of “neotraditional metaphysics”. These tenets run as follows:The future is determined by the past.Every event has a sufficient determinant cause.Knowledge must be grounded in certainty.Scientific knowledge can in principle be made complete.Scientific knowledge and method can in principle be unified.
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9Dissonance and Consistency according to Shackle and ShaferPSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1978. 1978.
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92Imprecision and indeterminacy in probability judgmentPhilosophy of Science 52 (3): 390-409. 1985.Bayesians often confuse insistence that probability judgment ought to be indeterminate (which is incompatible with Bayesian ideals) with recognition of the presence of imprecision in the determination or measurement of personal probabilities (which is compatible with these ideals). The confusion is discussed and illustrated by remarks in a recent essay by R. C. Jeffrey
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56Messianic vs Myopic RealismPSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1984 617-636. 1984.Two views of the role of truth as an aim of inquiry are contrasted: The Peirce-Popper or messianic view of approach to the truth as an ultimate aim of inquiry and the myopic view according to which a concern to avoid error is a proximate aim common to many otherwise diverse inquiries. The messianic conception is held to be responsible for the tendency to conflate fallibilism with corrigibilism and for the consequent problems faced by Peirceans and Popperians alike in squaring the alleged relevan…Read more
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43Contracting From Epistemic Hell is RoutineSynthese 135 (1): 141-164. 2003.I respond to Erik Olsson's critique of my account of contraction frominconsistent belief states, by admitting that such contraction cannot be rationalized as adeliberate decision problem. It can, however, be rationalized as a routine designed prior toinadvertent expansion into inconsistency when the deliberating agent embraces a consistent point of view.
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7Caution and Nonmonotonic InferencePoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 51 101-116. 1997.
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6Review: Illusions about Uncertainty (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (3). 1985.
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30Escape from Boredom: Edification According to RortyCanadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (4). 1981.Richard Rorty sings in the antifoundationalist chorus. His song equates the rise of foundationalist epistemology with the professionalization of philosophy. The discordant notes he finds in the foundationalist score become, as a consequence, subversive of philosophy as an autonomous discipline.Nonetheless, the most salient feature of Rorty's recent book, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, is that it is by a professional philosopher, for professional philosophers and about the future of philoso…Read more
Isaac Levi
(1930 - 2018)
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Probability |
General Philosophy of Science |