-
14The Second Worst in Practical ConflictIn Peter Baumann & Monika Betzler (eds.), Practical Conflicts: New Philosophical Essays, Cambridge University Press. pp. 159. 2004.
-
59The Covenant of Reason: Rationality and the Commitments of ThoughtCambridge University Press. 1997.Isaac Levi is one of the preeminent philosophers in the areas of pragmatic rationality and epistemology. This collection of essays constitutes an important presentation of his original and influential ideas about rational choice and belief. A wide range of topics is covered, including consequentialism and sequential choice, consensus, voluntarism of belief, and the tolerance of the opinions of others. The essays elaborate on the idea that principles of rationality are norms that regulate the coh…Read more
-
Induction and the Aims of InquiryIn Ernest Nagel, Sidney Morgenbesser, Patrick Suppes & Morton Gabriel White (eds.), Philosophy, Science, and Method, St. Martin's Press. pp. 99. 1969.
-
40Symposium on “Cognition and Rationality: Part I” Minimal rationality (review)Mind and Society 5 (2): 199-211. 2006.An argument is advanced to show why E-admissibility should be preferred over maximality as a principle of rational choice where rationality is understood as minimal rationality. Consideration is given to the distinction between second best and second worst options in three way choice that is ignored according to maximality. It is shown why the behavior exhibited in addressing the problems posed by Allais (Econometrica 21:503–546, 1952) and by Ellsberg (Q Econ 75:643–669, 1961) do not violate the…Read more
-
65Pragmatism and inquiry: selected essaysOxford University Press. 2012.This volume presents a series of essays which investigate the nature of intellectual inquiry: what its aims are and how it operates. The startingpoint is the work of the American pragmatists C.S. Peirce and John Dewey. Inquiry according to Peirce is a struggle to replace doubt by true belief. Dewey insisted that the transformation was from an indeterminate situation to a determinate or non-problematic one. So Isaac Levi's subject is changes in doxastic commitments, which may involve changes in a…Read more
-
38Should Bayesians sometimes neglect base rates?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3): 342-343. 1981.
-
252Contraction: On the Decision-Theoretical Origins of Minimal Change and EntrenchmentSynthese 152 (1). 2006.We present a decision-theoretically motivated notion of contraction which, we claim, encodes the principles of minimal change and entrenchment. Contraction is seen as an operation whose goal is to minimize loses of informational value. The operation is also compatible with the principle that in contracting A one should preserve the sentences better entrenched than A (when the belief set contains A). Even when the principle of minimal change and the latter motivation for entrenchment figure pro…Read more
-
28Obligation and permission when there is a second best and when there is a second worstAnálisis Filosófico 26 (2): 356-372. 2006.A comparison is made between the criterion of choice of E-admissibility I proposed in Levi, 1974 and elaborated in Levi, 1980 and 1986, and the ideas about norms elaborated by Alchourrón and Bulygin with an emphasis on the fact that choice cannot always be evaluated in terms of binary comparisons as the distinction between second worst and not second worst illustrates. Se establece una comparación entre el criterio de E-admisibilidad propuesto en Levi,1974 y elaborado en Levi,1980 y 1986 y las i…Read more
-
1Convexity and Separability in Representing ConsensusIn Kaushik Basu & Ravi Kanbur (eds.), Arguments for a Better World: Essays in Honor of Amartya Sen: Volume I: Ethics, Welfare, and Measurement and Volume Ii: Society, Institutions, and Development, Oxford University Press. 2008.
-
42Rationality, prediction, and autonomous choiceCanadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (sup1): 339-363. 1993.
-
1FeasibilityIn Cristina Bicchieri & Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interaction, Cambridge University Press. pp. 1--20. 1992.
-
45Knowledge as True BeliefIn Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist (ed.), Belief Revision Meets Philosophy of Science, Springer. pp. 269--302. 2011.
Isaac Levi
(1930 - 2018)
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Probability |
General Philosophy of Science |