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110The logic of consistency and the logic of truthDialectica 58 (4). 2004.In “Truth and Probability” Ramsey claimed that the logic of consistency for probability is not a logic of truth. After supporting this claim, he proceeded to explore the possibilities for a logic of truth for probability. An examination of Ramsey's intent reveals that Ramsey was far from being an orthodox Bayesian when it comes to statistical reasoning. The relations between Ramsey's thought and the ideas of Keynes and Peirce are discussed
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24Identity and ConflictSocial Research: An International Quarterly 74 (1): 25-50. 2007.A sketch of a way of characterizing multidimensional value commitments and the way they can come into conflict derived from my book Hard Choices is presented and applied to the question of how to characterize the relevance of identity to value commitments and conflict. The views of A.K. Sen and A. Bilgrami are examined in the light of these ideas.
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142Possibility and probabilityErkenntnis 31 (2-3): 365--86. 1989.De Finetti was a strong proponent of allowing 0 credal probabilities to be assigned to serious possibilities. I have sought to show that (pace Shimony) strict coherence can be obeyed provided that its scope of applicability is restricted to partitions into states generated by finitely many ultimate payoffs. When countable additivity is obeyed, a restricted version of ISC can be applied to partitions generated by countably many ultimate payoffs. Once this is appreciated, perhaps the compelling ch…Read more
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32The American Pragmatists, by Cheryl Misak, The Oxford History of Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, xvi + 286 pp. ISBN 978-0-19-923120-1 hb £25 (review)European Journal of Philosophy 22 (S1). 2014.
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1Gambling with Truth: An Essay on Induction and the Aims of ScienceSynthese 17 (1): 444-448. 1967.
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446
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1FeasibilityIn Cristina Bicchieri & Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interaction, Cambridge University Press. pp. 1--20. 1992.
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183Money pumps and diachronic booksProceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2002 (3). 2002.The idea that rational agents should have acyclic preferences and should obey conditionalization has been defended on the grounds that otherwise an agent is threatened with becoming a “money pump.” This essay argues that such arguments fail to prove their claims
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1611 Beware of Syllogism: Statistical Reasoning and Conjecturing According to PeirceIn Cheryl Misak (ed.), The Cambridge companion to Peirce, Cambridge University Press. pp. 257. 2004.
Isaac Levi
(1930 - 2018)
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Interest
| Epistemology |
| Philosophy of Probability |
| General Philosophy of Science |