• PhilPapers
  • PhilPeople
  • PhilArchive
  • PhilEvents
  • PhilJobs
  • Sign in
PhilPeople
 
  • Sign in
  • News Feed
  • Find Philosophers
  • Departments
  • Radar
  • Help
 
profile-cover
Drag to reposition
profile picture

Isaac Levi
(1930 - 2018)

PhD: Columbia University
  •  Home
  •  Publications
    165
    • Most Recent
    • Most Downloaded
    • Topics
  •  News and Updates
    81

 More details
  • Columbia University
    Department of Philosophy
    Unknown
Columbia University
Department of Philosophy
PhD, 1967
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Epistemology
Philosophy of Probability
General Philosophy of Science
  • All publications (165)
  •  148
    Reply to Maher
    Economics and Philosophy 5 (1): 79. 1989.
    Decision Theory
  •  75
    Reviews (review)
    British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 19 (1): 73-81. 1968.
  •  145
    Deductive cogency in inductive inference
    Journal of Philosophy 62 (3): 68-77. 1965.
    Reasoning
  •  110
    The logic of consistency and the logic of truth
    Dialectica 58 (4). 2004.
    In “Truth and Probability” Ramsey claimed that the logic of consistency for probability is not a logic of truth. After supporting this claim, he proceeded to explore the possibilities for a logic of truth for probability. An examination of Ramsey's intent reveals that Ramsey was far from being an orthodox Bayesian when it comes to statistical reasoning. The relations between Ramsey's thought and the ideas of Keynes and Peirce are discussed
    Logic and Philosophy of LogicNonclassical Logics
  •  24
    Identity and Conflict
    Social Research: An International Quarterly 74 (1): 25-50. 2007.
    A sketch of a way of characterizing multidimensional value commitments and the way they can come into conflict derived from my book Hard Choices is presented and applied to the question of how to characterize the relevance of identity to value commitments and conflict. The views of A.K. Sen and A. Bilgrami are examined in the light of these ideas.
  •  142
    Possibility and probability
    Erkenntnis 31 (2-3): 365--86. 1989.
    De Finetti was a strong proponent of allowing 0 credal probabilities to be assigned to serious possibilities. I have sought to show that (pace Shimony) strict coherence can be obeyed provided that its scope of applicability is restricted to partitions into states generated by finitely many ultimate payoffs. When countable additivity is obeyed, a restricted version of ISC can be applied to partitions generated by countably many ultimate payoffs. Once this is appreciated, perhaps the compelling ch…Read more
    De Finetti was a strong proponent of allowing 0 credal probabilities to be assigned to serious possibilities. I have sought to show that (pace Shimony) strict coherence can be obeyed provided that its scope of applicability is restricted to partitions into states generated by finitely many ultimate payoffs. When countable additivity is obeyed, a restricted version of ISC can be applied to partitions generated by countably many ultimate payoffs. Once this is appreciated, perhaps the compelling character of the Shimony argument will be less overwhelming and the attractiveness of de Finetti's more permissive attitude will become more apparent.I want to push the permissive tendency in de Finetti still further. It seems doubtful that RUIWC should be required as de Finetti apparently suggested. It is also excessively dogmatic and restrictive to require that the credal states of ideally situated rational agents be numerically definite (Levi 1974, 1980). And de Finetti's rejection of objectivism in statistics overreached itself when he dismissed objective probabilities as meaningless metaphysical artefacts (Levi 1986). In this respect, the philosophically most important lessons de Finetti has to teach us are to be found not in his celebrated representation theorem but in his discussions of the relations between 0-probability and possibility, conditional probability and countable additivity. Perhaps, the technical issues involved are remote and pedantic. But the attitude de Finetti sought to inculcate is of profound importance
    Probabilistic Principles, Misc
  •  120
    Certainty, probability and the correction of evidence
    Noûs 5 (3): 299-312. 1971.
    ConditionalizationEpistemic FallibilismBetting Interpretations and Dutch BooksInductive Reasoning
  •  32
    The American Pragmatists, by Cheryl Misak, The Oxford History of Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, xvi + 286 pp. ISBN 978-0-19-923120-1 hb £25 (review)
    European Journal of Philosophy 22 (S1). 2014.
  •  1
    Gambling with Truth: An Essay on Induction and the Aims of Science
    Synthese 17 (1): 444-448. 1967.
  •  446
    On indeterminate probabilities
    Journal of Philosophy 71 (13): 391-418. 1974.
    Imprecise Credences
  •  114
    Consensus as shared agreement and outcome of inquiry
    Synthese 62 (1). 1985.
    Government and Democracy
  •  1
    Feasibility
    In Cristina Bicchieri & Maria Luisa Dalla Chiara (eds.), Knowledge, Belief, and Strategic Interaction, Cambridge University Press. pp. 1--20. 1992.
    Distributive Justice
  •  183
    Money pumps and diachronic books
    Proceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2002 (3). 2002.
    The idea that rational agents should have acyclic preferences and should obey conditionalization has been defended on the grounds that otherwise an agent is threatened with becoming a “money pump.” This essay argues that such arguments fail to prove their claims
    Conditionalization
  •  16
    11 Beware of Syllogism: Statistical Reasoning and Conjecturing According to Peirce
    In Cheryl Misak (ed.), The Cambridge companion to Peirce, Cambridge University Press. pp. 257. 2004.
    Metaphilosophical Views
  •  65
    Statistical and Inductive Probabilities (review)
    Journal of Philosophy 60 (1): 21-25. 1963.
    Applications of Probability
  • Prev.
  • 1
  • 2
  • 3
  • 4
  • 5
  • 6
  • Next
PhilPeople logo

On this site

  • Find a philosopher
  • Find a department
  • The Radar
  • Index of professional philosophers
  • Index of departments
  • Help
  • Acknowledgments
  • Careers
  • Contact us
  • Terms and conditions

Brought to you by

  • The PhilPapers Foundation
  • The American Philosophical Association
  • Centre for Digital Philosophy, Western University
PhilPeople is currently in Beta Sponsored by the PhilPapers Foundation and the American Philosophical Association
Feedback