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79Newcomb's many problemsIn A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen (eds.), Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory: Vol.II: Epistemic and Social Applications, D. Reidel. pp. 369--383. 1978.
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35Caution and Nonmonotonic InferencePoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 51 101-116. 1997.
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74
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Liberty and welfareIn Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams (eds.), Utilitarianism and Beyond, Cambridge University Press. 1982.
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102Symposium on “Cognition and Rationality: Part I” Minimal rationality (review)Mind and Society 5 (2): 199-211. 2006.An argument is advanced to show why E-admissibility should be preferred over maximality as a principle of rational choice where rationality is understood as minimal rationality. Consideration is given to the distinction between second best and second worst options in three way choice that is ignored according to maximality. It is shown why the behavior exhibited in addressing the problems posed by Allais (Econometrica 21:503–546, 1952) and by Ellsberg (Q Econ 75:643–669, 1961) do not violate the…Read more
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170Direct inference and confirmational conditionalizationPhilosophy of Science 48 (4): 532-552. 1981.The article responds to some of the points raised by B. van Fraassen concerning probability kinematics and direct inference within the framework of the approach to the revision of probability judgment proposed by Levi in The Enterprise of Knowledge. In particular, the critical importance of the question of direct inference is emphasized and explained
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39The Second Worst in Practical ConflictIn Peter Baumann & Monika Betzler (eds.), Practical Conflicts: New Philosophical Essays, Cambridge University Press. pp. 159. 2004.
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260Imprecision and indeterminacy in probability judgmentPhilosophy of Science 52 (3): 390-409. 1985.Bayesians often confuse insistence that probability judgment ought to be indeterminate (which is incompatible with Bayesian ideals) with recognition of the presence of imprecision in the determination or measurement of personal probabilities (which is compatible with these ideals). The confusion is discussed and illustrated by remarks in a recent essay by R. C. Jeffrey
Isaac Levi
(1930 - 2018)
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Interest
| Epistemology |
| Philosophy of Probability |
| General Philosophy of Science |