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110The Paradoxes of Allais and EllsbergEconomics and Philosophy 2 (1): 23. 1986.In The Enterprise of Knowledge, I proposed a general theory of rational choice which I intended as a characterization of a prescriptive theory of ideal rationality. A cardinal tenet of this theory is that assessments of expected value or expected utility in the Bayesian sense may not be representable by a numerical indicator or indeed induce an ordering of feasible options in a context of deliberation. My reasons for taking this position are related to my commitment to the inquiry-oriented appro…Read more
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18Perception as Input and as Reason for ActionCanadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (sup1): 135-154. 1995.
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24Identity and conflictSocial Research: An International Quarterly 74 (1): 25-50. 2007.A sketch of a way of characterizing multidimensional value commitments and the way they can come into conflict derived from my book Hard Choices is presented and applied to the question of how to characterize the relevance of identity to value commitments and conflict. The views of A.K. Sen and A. Bilgrami are examined in the light of these ideas
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293
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1Gambling with Truth: An Essay on Induction and the Aims of ScienceSynthese 17 (1): 444-448. 1967.
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101Money pumps and diachronic booksProceedings of the Philosophy of Science Association 2002 (3). 2002.The idea that rational agents should have acyclic preferences and should obey conditionalization has been defended on the grounds that otherwise an agent is threatened with becoming a “money pump.” This essay argues that such arguments fail to prove their claims
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29Fallacy and controversy about base ratesBehavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1): 31-32. 1996.Koehler's target article attempts a balanced view of the relevance of knowledge of base rates to judgments of subjective or credal probability, but he is not sensitive enough to the difference between requiring and permitting the equation of probability judgments with base rates, the interaction between precision of base rate and reference class information, and the possibility of indeterminate probability judgment.
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Wayward naturalism : saving Dewey from himselfIn John R. Shook & Paul Kurtz (eds.), The future of naturalism, Humanity Books. 2009.
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204Kyburg on random designatorsPhilosophy of Science 50 (4): 635-642. 1983.To ground judgments of credal probability on knowledge of chance via direct inference, one should appeal to the information about chances available relative to the most specific description known to be true of the trial event.Thus, to obtain a judgment of credal probability concerning the hypothesis that coin a landed heads at t given that it is known that at t it is known that a was tossed by Levi in 728 Philosophy Hall, the pertinent knowledge of chances concerns the chances of coin a landing …Read more
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64Commitment and change of viewIn José Luis Bermúdez & Alan Millar (eds.), Reason and Nature: Essays in the Theory of Rationality, Clarendon Press. pp. 209--232. 2002.
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44The logic of consistency and the logic of truthDialectica 58 (4). 2004.In “Truth and Probability” Ramsey claimed that the logic of consistency for probability is not a logic of truth. After supporting this claim, he proceeded to explore the possibilities for a logic of truth for probability. An examination of Ramsey's intent reveals that Ramsey was far from being an orthodox Bayesian when it comes to statistical reasoning. The relations between Ramsey's thought and the ideas of Keynes and Peirce are discussed
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52Probability logic, logical probability, and inductive supportSynthese 172 (1): 97-118. 2010.This paper seeks to defend the following conclusions: The program advanced by Carnap and other necessarians for probability logic has little to recommend it except for one important point. Credal probability judgments ought to be adapted to changes in evidence or states of full belief in a principled manner in conformity with the inquirer’s confirmational commitments—except when the inquirer has good reason to modify his or her confirmational commitment. Probability logic ought to spell out the …Read more
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11The American Pragmatists, by Cheryl Misak, The Oxford History of Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, xvi + 286 pp. ISBN 978-0-19-923120-1 hb £25 (review)European Journal of Philosophy 22 (S1). 2014.
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79On the seriousness of mistakesPhilosophy of Science 29 (1): 47-65. 1962.Several authors have recently contended that modern statistical theory provides a powerful argument in favor of the view that if scientists accept or reject hypotheses at all they do so only in a behavioral sense--i.e., in a sense which reduces "accepting P" to "acting on the basis of P relative to an objective O". In this paper, the argument from statistics in favor of a behavioral view is outlined; an interpretation of two statistical procedures (Bayes method and signifigance testing) is offer…Read more
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31Support and surprise: L. J. Cohen's view of inductive probability (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 30 (3): 279-292. 1979.
Isaac Levi
(1930 - 2018)
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Probability |
General Philosophy of Science |