-
45Knowledge as True BeliefIn Erik J. Olson Sebastian Enqvist (ed.), Belief Revision Meets Philosophy of Science, Springer. pp. 269--302. 2011.
-
44Book Review:Probabilistic Metaphysics Patrick Suppes (review)Philosophy of Science 55 (4): 646-. 1988.In the introduction to Probabilistic Metaphysics, Patrick Suppes declares his intention to refute each of five central tenets of “neotraditional metaphysics”. These tenets run as follows:The future is determined by the past.Every event has a sufficient determinant cause.Knowledge must be grounded in certainty.Scientific knowledge can in principle be made complete.Scientific knowledge and method can in principle be unified.
-
43Contracting From Epistemic Hell is RoutineSynthese 135 (1): 141-164. 2003.I respond to Erik Olsson's critique of my account of contraction frominconsistent belief states, by admitting that such contraction cannot be rationalized as adeliberate decision problem. It can, however, be rationalized as a routine designed prior toinadvertent expansion into inconsistency when the deliberating agent embraces a consistent point of view.
-
42Rationality, prediction, and autonomous choiceCanadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (sup1): 339-363. 1993.
-
40Two notions of epistemic validity-Epistemic models for Ramsey's conditionalsSynthese 109 (2): 217-262. 1996.How to accept a conditional? F. P. Ramsey proposed the following test in . 'If A, then B' must be accepted with respect to the current epistemic state iff the minimal hypothetical change of it needed to accept A also requires accepting B. In this article we propose a formulation of , which unlike some of its predecessors, is compatible with our best theory of belief revision, the so-called AGM theory , chapters 1-5 for a survey). The new test, which, we claim, encodes some of the crucial insight…Read more
-
40Symposium on “Cognition and Rationality: Part I” Minimal rationality (review)Mind and Society 5 (2): 199-211. 2006.An argument is advanced to show why E-admissibility should be preferred over maximality as a principle of rational choice where rationality is understood as minimal rationality. Consideration is given to the distinction between second best and second worst options in three way choice that is ignored according to maximality. It is shown why the behavior exhibited in addressing the problems posed by Allais (Econometrica 21:503–546, 1952) and by Ellsberg (Q Econ 75:643–669, 1961) do not violate the…Read more
-
40Change in View: Principles of Reasoning by Gilbert Harman (review)Journal of Philosophy 84 (7): 376-384. 1987.
-
39Concepts, Theories, and the Mind-Body Problem (review)Journal of Philosophy 58 (9): 241-249. 1961.
-
39Gambling with truthMIT Press. 1967.This comprehensive discussion of the problem of rational belief develops the subject on the pattern of Bayesian decision theory. The analogy with decision theory introduces philosophical issues not usually encountered in logical studies and suggests some promising new approaches to old problems."We owe Professor Levi a debt of gratitude for producing a book of such excellence. His own approach to inductive inference is not only original and profound, it also clarifies and transforms the work of …Read more
-
39Value commitments, value conflict, and the separability of belief and valuePhilosophy of Science 66 (4): 509-533. 1999.Leeds (1990) levels an objection against the criterion of rational choice I have proposed (Levi 1997, Ch. 6; 1980; 1986), pointing out that the criterion is sensitive to the way possible consequences are partitioned. Seidenfeld, Kadane and Schervish (1989) call into question the defense of the cross product rule by appeal to Pareto Unanimity Principles that I had invoked in my 1986. I offer clarifications of my proposals showing that the difference between my views and those of my critics concer…Read more
-
38Should Bayesians sometimes neglect base rates?Behavioral and Brain Sciences 4 (3): 342-343. 1981.
-
38The logic of consistency and the logic of truthDialectica 58 (4). 2004.In “Truth and Probability” Ramsey claimed that the logic of consistency for probability is not a logic of truth. After supporting this claim, he proceeded to explore the possibilities for a logic of truth for probability. An examination of Ramsey's intent reveals that Ramsey was far from being an orthodox Bayesian when it comes to statistical reasoning. The relations between Ramsey's thought and the ideas of Keynes and Peirce are discussed
-
37Money Pumps and Diachronic BooksPhilosophy of Science 69 (S3). 2002.The idea that rational agents should have acyclic preferences and should obey conditionalization has been defended on the grounds that otherwise an agent is threatened with becoming a “money pump.” This essay argues that such arguments fail to prove their claims.
-
36Prediction, Bayesian Deliberation and Correlated EquilibriumVienna Circle Institute Yearbook 5 173-185. 1998.In a pair of controversy provoking papers1, Kadane and Larkey argued that the normative or prescriptive understanding of expected utility theory recommended that participants in a game maximize expected utility given their assessments of the probabilities of the moves that other players would make. They observed that no prescription, norm or standard of Bayesian rationality recommends how they should come to make probability judgments about the choices of other players. For any given player, it …Read more
-
34Counterexamples to Recovery and the Filtering ConditionStudia Logica 73 (2): 209-218. 2003.David Makinson has argued that the compelling character of counterexamples to the Recovery Condition on contraction is due to an appeal to justificational structure. In “naked theories” where such structure is ignored or is not present, Recovery does apply. This note attempts to show that Makinson is mistaken on both counts. Recovery fails when no appeal is made to justificational structure.
Isaac Levi
(1930 - 2018)
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Probability |
General Philosophy of Science |