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14The Second Worst in Practical ConflictIn Peter Baumann & Monika Betzler (eds.), Practical Conflicts: New Philosophical Essays, Cambridge University Press. pp. 159. 2004.
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12A Paradox for the BirdsIn R. S. Cohen, P. K. Feyerabend & M. Wartofsky (eds.), Essays in Memory of Imre Lakatos, Reidel. pp. 371--378. 1976.
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12How to fix a priorIn Dag Prawitz & Dag Westerståhl (eds.), Logic and Philosophy of Science in Uppsala, Kluwer Academic Publishers. pp. 185--204. 1994.
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11Chance, Cause, Reason: An Inquiry into the Nature of Scientific EvidenceNoûs 16 (4): 619-622. 1982.
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9Dissonance and Consistency according to Shackle and ShaferPSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1978. 1978.
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8The American Pragmatists, by Cheryl Misak, The Oxford History of Philosophy. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, xvi + 286 pp. ISBN 978-0-19-923120-1 hb £25 (review)European Journal of Philosophy 22 (S1). 2014.
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8The Logic of Consistency and the Logic of TruthDialectica 58 (4): 461-482. 2004.In “Truth and Probability” Ramsey claimed that the logic of consistency for probability is not a logic of truth. After supporting this claim, he proceeded to explore the possibilities for a logic of truth for probability. An examination of Ramsey's intent reveals that Ramsey was far from being an orthodox Bayesian when it comes to statistical reasoning. The relations between Ramsey's thought and the ideas of Keynes and Peirce are discussed.
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7IrrelevanceIn A. Hooker, J. J. Leach & E. F. McClennen (eds.), Foundations and Applications of Decision Theory, D. Reidel. pp. 263--273. 1978.
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7Caution and Nonmonotonic InferencePoznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 51 101-116. 1997.
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7Assessing Accident Risks in U.S. Commercial Nuclear Power Plants: Scientific Method and the Rasmussen ReportSocial Research: An International Quarterly 48. 1981.
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7Probabilistic MetaphysicsPhilosophy of Science 55 (4): 646-652. 1988.In the introduction to Probabilistic Metaphysics, Patrick Suppes declares his intention to refute each of five central tenets of “neotraditional metaphysics”. These tenets run as follows:The future is determined by the past.Every event has a sufficient determinant cause.Knowledge must be grounded in certainty.Scientific knowledge can in principle be made complete.Scientific knowledge and method can in principle be unified.
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6Review: Illusions about Uncertainty (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (3). 1985.
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6Illusions About Uncertainty (review)British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 36 (3): 331-340. 1985.
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6Suppes, Patrick probabilistic metaphysics-critical noticePhilosophy of Science 55 (4): 646-652. 1988.In the introduction to Probabilistic Metaphysics, Patrick Suppes declares his intention to refute each of five central tenets of “neotraditional metaphysics”. These tenets run as follows:The future is determined by the past.Every event has a sufficient determinant cause.Knowledge must be grounded in certainty.Scientific knowledge can in principle be made complete.Scientific knowledge and method can in principle be unified.
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4Dissonance and Consistency according to Shackle and ShaferPSA Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1978 (2): 466-477. 1978.R.A.Fisher introduced the fiducial argument as a means for obtaining something from nothing. He thought that on some occasions it was legitimate to obtain a posterior probability distribution over a range of simple statistical hypotheses without commitment to a prior distribution [4].H.Jeffreys thought he could tame Fisher by casting his argument in a Bayesian mold through a derivation of the fiducial posterior from a suitably constructed ignorance prior via Bayes’ theorem and conditionalization…Read more
Isaac Levi
(1930 - 2018)
New York City, New York, United States of America
Areas of Interest
Epistemology |
Philosophy of Probability |
General Philosophy of Science |