David DeGrazia

This paper defends a qualified version of moral vegetarianism. It defends a weak thesis and, more tentatively, a strong thesis, both from a very broad basis that assumes neither that animals have rights nor that they are entitled to equal consideration. The essay's only assumption about moral status, an assumption defended in the analysis of the wrongness of cruelty to animals, is that sentient animals have at least some moral status. One need not be a strong champion of animal protection, then, to embrace moral vegetarianism. One need only assume some reasonable view of animals' moral status.

Opening with a vignette about Francis, who wants to use medications to achieve particular changes in his personality, the paper asks the following: whether his plan involves the use of a biomedical enhancement and, if so, whether this makes his plan morally problematic; whether his plan poses a threat to his identity in a problematic way; and whether his intentions are inauthentic. In response to, it is argued that Francis’ plan does involve biomedical enhancement on either of two plausible understandings of the latter concept, but that its status as involving enhancement is not problematic per se. In response to, the paper distinguishes numerical and narrative senses of identity and argues that avoiding conflation of these two senses largely neutralizes concerns about enhancement as identity-threatening. In response to, the concept of authenticity is analyzed in the service of vindicating the authenticity of Francis’ self-transformation project. The analysis also shows that some self-transformation projects can prove inauthentic due to an agent’s failure to demonstrate sufficient self-respect. Finally, the paper concludes by suggesting redirection of moral attention to certain issues that already confront us.

Edited by Thomas A. Shannon, this series provides anthologies of critical essays and reflections by leading ethicists in four pivotal areas: reproductive technologies, genetic technologies, death and dying, and health care policy. The goal of this series is twofold: first, to provide a set of readers on thematic topics for introductory or survey courses in bioethics or for courses with a particular theme or time limitation. Second, each of the readers in this series is designed to help students focus more thoroughly and effectively on specific topics that flesh out the ethical issues at the core of bioethics. The series is also highly accessible to general readers interested in bioethics

In this essay I attempt to shed some light on the moral status of animals and provide a framework for further illumination. I attempt in chapter one to determine the necessary and sufficient conditions for having moral status, which I tie to having interests. My conclusion is that the key characteristic is conation. ;In chapter two I distinguish the concepts of equal moral status and equal consideration of identical interests--which have not been clearly distinguished, leading to confusion. Moral status is the degree of moral resistance to having one's interests thwarted. Crucially, the principle of equal consideration --which I defend--is consistent with the thesis that differences in moral status exist. ;In chapter three I defend a moral methodology that employs both an intuitive method and a principle of maximizing interests. In doing so I attempt to refute various misconceptions regarding intuition. I then examine categories of judgments I call 'fixed intuitions' and 'strong intuitions' and assess their epistemological strength. ;In chapter four I endeavor to identify the most important interests--experiential welfare, freedom, autonomy, and life--and the characteristics that underlie them. Then I make suggestions regarding which animals possess these interests . I also discuss various interests typically had by humans that substantially add to the value of their lives. I reach various normative conclusions by interest-maximization. While some are general in character, concerning, for example, the comparative values of different kinds of lives, others are more specific and concern the harmful use of animals in research. For example, I contend that research animals are usually provided inadequate living space. ;Finally, I test these conclusions in chapter five with the intuitive method, using fixed and strong intuitions, before concluding. I contend that differences in moral status show up mainly with respect to life-interests and freedom-interests, but that the principle of equal consideration evens out moral status to a greater degree than is generally acknowledged