Richard Taylor

Prophecy is conspicuous by its complete absence from all three of the commentaries on De Anima by Averroes. However, prophecy and philosophical metaphysics are discussed by him in his Commentary on the Parva Naturalia, a work written before his methodological work on philosophy and religion, the Faṣl al-maqāl, generally held to have been written ca. 1179-1180. The analyses and remarks of Averroes presented in that Commentary have been characterized by Herbert Davidson as “extremely radical” to the extent that “The term prophet would, on this reading, mean nothing more than the human author of Scripture; and the term revelation would mean a high level of philosophical knowledge”. In the present article I discuss Averroes on method in matters of religion and philosophy as well as prophecy in philosophically argumentative works and in dialectical works, with particular consideration of the reasoning of his Commentary on the Parva Naturalia. I conclude that Averroes found in philosophy and its sciences the most complete and precise truth content and highest levels of knowledge and understanding and from them constructed his worldview, while he found prophecy and religion to be like an Aristotelian practical science in that they concern good and right conduct in the achievement of an end attained in action, not truths to be known for their own sake.

Este artículo explica la comprensión de Averroes sobre el entendimiento humano y la abstracción en estos tres comentarios al De Anima de Aristóteles. Mientras que las visiones de Averroes sobre la naturaleza del intelecto material humano cambian a través de tres comentarios hasta que alcanza su famosa visión de la unidad del intelecto material como uno para todos los seres humanos, su visión del intelecto agente como 'forma para nosotros' se sostiene a través de estas obras. En su Gran comentario al De Anima revela su dependencia ante Al Farabi por esta noción y provee una crítica detallada de la noción farabiana que sostiene que el intelecto agente es 'forma para nosotros' sólo como causa agente, no como verdadera causa formal. Aunque Averroes sostiene que el intelecto agente debe, de alguna manera, ser intrínseco a nosotros como nuestra forma, ya que los humanos son racionales per se y emprenden actos de conocimiento por voluntad, se muestra que su visión se funda en un uso equívoco de la noción de causa formal. El intelecto agente no puede ser propiamente nuestro principio intrínseco formal mientras permanezca ontológicamente separable.

Philosophy written in Arabic and in the Islamic world represents one of the great traditions of Western philosophy. Inspired by Greek philosophical works and the indigenous ideas of Islamic theology, Arabic philosophers from the ninth century onwards put forward ideas of great philosophical and historical importance. This collection of essays, by some of the leading scholars in Arabic philosophy, provides an introduction to the field by way of chapters devoted to individual thinkers or groups, especially during the 'classical' period from the ninth to the twelfth centuries. It also includes chapters on areas of philosophical inquiry across the tradition, such as ethics and metaphysics. Finally, it includes chapters on later Islamic thought, and on the connections between Arabic philosophy and Greek, Jewish, and Latin philosophy. The volume also includes a useful bibliography and a chronology of the most important Arabic thinkers.

The Kalam fi mahd al-khair, generally known in the West as the Liber de causis, is a small collection of propositions devoted, for the most part, to a consideration of the First Cause and the higher realities of Medieval and Ancient Metaphysics. While this work appears not to have had great influence in the Islamic Philosophical milieu, its Twelfth Century Latin translation played a fundamentally important role in the formation of Western Medieval thought and came to be adopted as part of the Medieval Aristotelian corpus thanks to its ascription to Aristotle. The purpose of this dissertation is to provide the proper foundations for study of this treatise as an influential philosophical work. ;In Part I the notion of being as originated and as Originating is examined in the context of other Proclean and Plotinian Arabic philosophical texts, after a discussion of the general Greek philosophical background. The notion of being in those texts and the Mahd al-khair is shown to be fundamentally the same and quite possibly to have the thought of Porphyry as its source. ;Part II considers the Mahd al-khair historically. After examination of the relevant testimonia, the questions of the title and composition and author are dealt with in detail. The title found in the Ankara and Istanbul manuscripts, Kalam fi mahd al-khair, "Discourse on the Pure Good," is taken as the work's original title. It is also determined that the anonymous author was probably a Muslim or Christian philosophical thinker living in the Middle East between 833 and 922 A.D. whose thought was influenced by the Plotiniana Arabica. Finally, it is shown that it is not impossible that the Mahd al-khair and the Proclus Arabus texts recently edited by Gerhard Endress came from a single Arabic translation of Proclus' Elements of Theology. ;Part III contains descriptions of the materials used in the edition together with discussions of other editions, the tradition of the text and the methodology for this critical edition. ;Part IV contains the Arabic text, the English translation and detailed notes to these. ;Finally, the study is supplemented by five appendices including relevant Arabic materials and also detailed critical observations and remarks on the Latin Liber de causis

The Arabic philosophical tradition played an important role in the formation of theological, philosophical and scientific thought in medieval Europe subsequent to the translations from Arabic into Latin in the 12th and 13th centuries. The influence of that Arabic classical rationalist tradition in works by al-Farabi, Avicenna, Averroes and the Liber de causis is evident in the thought of Thomas Aquinas, though the breadth and depth of that influence is often insufficiently noted and explained by scholars of Aquinas. This course focuses on the metaphysics, epistemology and psychology of Aquinas in the development of his philosophical conceptions of soul and intellect in the context of his use of sources in Aristotle and works by philosophers of the Arabic tradition, particularly Avicenna and Averroes. Readings are selected from writings from each of the four major periods of his career starting with his first major work, the Commentary on the Sentences. The course was planned to be taught at Marquette, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven and the Universidad Panamericana as a hybrid course. That is, it was taught using online tools and resources and also in the classroom with face-to-face meetings once per week. And it was taught at Marquette, KU Leuven and the Universidad Panamericana simultaneously. On Thursdays students met online with video and audio for questions and discussion with Profs. Taylor, Robiglio and López-Farjeat and the student groups in Milwaukee, Leuven and Mexico City live.

Born in 1126 to a family of Maliki legal scholars, Ibn Rushd, known as Averroes, enjoyed a long career in religious jurisprudence at Seville and Cordoba while at the same time advancing his philosophical studies of the works of Aristotle. This translation of Averroes’ Long Commentary on Aristotle’s _De Anima_ brings to English-language readers the complete text of this influential work of medieval philosophy. Richard C. Taylor provides rich notes on the Long Commentary and a generous introduction that discusses Averroes’ most mature reflections on Aristotle’s teachings as well as Averroes' comprehensive philosophical views on soul and intellect. It is only in the Long Commentary that Averroes finally resolves to his satisfaction the much vexed issue of the nature of intellect, Taylor shows

Abu al-Walid Muhammad ibn Ahmad ibn Muhammad ibn Rushd (ca. 1126-98), who came to be known in the Latin West as Averroes, was born at Cordoba into a family prominent for its expert devotion to the study and development of religious law (shar'ia). In Arabic sources al-Hafid (“the Grandson”) is added to his name to distinguish him from his grandfather (d. 1126), a famous Malikite jurist who served the ruling Almoravid regime as qadi (judge) and even as imam (prayer leader and chief religious authority) at the magnificent Great Mosque which still stands today in the city of Averroes' birth and where Averroes himself served as Grand Qadi (chief judge). When the governing regime changed with the success of 'Abd al-Mu'min (r. 1130-63), founder of the Almohad (al-Muwahhidun) dynasty, the members of the family continued to flourish under a new religious orientation based on the teachings of the reformer, al-Mah. di ibn Tumart (d. ca. 1129-30). Although insistent on the strict adherence to religious law, Ibn Tumart's teachings were at the same time equally insistent on the essential rationality of human understanding of the existence and unity (tawhid) of God and his creation as well as the rationality of the Qur'an and its interpretation.

Al-Fârâbî’s thought on intellect was known to the Latin West through the translation of his Letter on the Intellect, through the Long Commentary on the De Anima by Averroes and through some other works. Al-Fârâbî identified the active power of intellect in Aristotle’s De Anima 3.5 as the unique and separately existing Agent Intellect, but the role of the Agent Intellect in forming intelligibles in act in the human soul is by no means unequivocally clear. Further, the apprehension of intelligibles by human beings and the intellectual development of the soul, oftentimes described as an activity of abstracting (intaza`a), seems to be a genuineabstraction from experience, yet it somehow involves the emanative power of the Agent Intellect. This paper works to provide a coherent explanation of the natureof abstraction and the role of Agent Intellect in that activity

After a very brief introduction, Davidson begins with an informed and detailed account of the views of Aristotle and his major commentators, whose writings had enormous influence on the development of the medieval traditions. Davidson's account is supplemented with a critical exposition of the relevant teachings from the Plotiniana Arabica, from al-Kindi, and from a treatise on the soul attributed to Porphyry in the Arabic tradition. Impressive as all this is, it is simply stage setting for Davidson's detailed accounts of the doctrines and arguments of al-Farabi, Avicenna, and Averroes.