Richard Taylor

Prophecy is conspicuous by its complete absence from all three of the commentaries on De Anima by Averroes. However, prophecy and philosophical metaphysics are discussed by him in his Commentary on the Parva Naturalia, a work written before his methodological work on philosophy and religion, the Faṣl al-maqāl, generally held to have been written ca. 1179-1180. The analyses and remarks of Averroes presented in that Commentary have been characterized by Herbert Davidson as “extremely radical” to the extent that “The term prophet would, on this reading, mean nothing more than the human author of Scripture; and the term revelation would mean a high level of philosophical knowledge”. In the present article I discuss Averroes on method in matters of religion and philosophy as well as prophecy in philosophically argumentative works and in dialectical works, with particular consideration of the reasoning of his Commentary on the Parva Naturalia. I conclude that Averroes found in philosophy and its sciences the most complete and precise truth content and highest levels of knowledge and understanding and from them constructed his worldview, while he found prophecy and religion to be like an Aristotelian practical science in that they concern good and right conduct in the achievement of an end attained in action, not truths to be known for their own sake.

Este artículo explica la comprensión de Averroes sobre el entendimiento humano y la abstracción en estos tres comentarios al De Anima de Aristóteles. Mientras que las visiones de Averroes sobre la naturaleza del intelecto material humano cambian a través de tres comentarios hasta que alcanza su famosa visión de la unidad del intelecto material como uno para todos los seres humanos, su visión del intelecto agente como 'forma para nosotros' se sostiene a través de estas obras. En su Gran comentario al De Anima revela su dependencia ante Al Farabi por esta noción y provee una crítica detallada de la noción farabiana que sostiene que el intelecto agente es 'forma para nosotros' sólo como causa agente, no como verdadera causa formal. Aunque Averroes sostiene que el intelecto agente debe, de alguna manera, ser intrínseco a nosotros como nuestra forma, ya que los humanos son racionales per se y emprenden actos de conocimiento por voluntad, se muestra que su visión se funda en un uso equívoco de la noción de causa formal. El intelecto agente no puede ser propiamente nuestro principio intrínseco formal mientras permanezca ontológicamente separable.

Philosophy written in Arabic and in the Islamic world represents one of the great traditions of Western philosophy. Inspired by Greek philosophical works and the indigenous ideas of Islamic theology, Arabic philosophers from the ninth century onwards put forward ideas of great philosophical and historical importance. This collection of essays, by some of the leading scholars in Arabic philosophy, provides an introduction to the field by way of chapters devoted to individual thinkers or groups, especially during the 'classical' period from the ninth to the twelfth centuries. It also includes chapters on areas of philosophical inquiry across the tradition, such as ethics and metaphysics. Finally, it includes chapters on later Islamic thought, and on the connections between Arabic philosophy and Greek, Jewish, and Latin philosophy. The volume also includes a useful bibliography and a chronology of the most important Arabic thinkers.

The Kalam fi mahd al-khair, generally known in the West as the Liber de causis, is a small collection of propositions devoted, for the most part, to a consideration of the First Cause and the higher realities of Medieval and Ancient Metaphysics. While this work appears not to have had great influence in the Islamic Philosophical milieu, its Twelfth Century Latin translation played a fundamentally important role in the formation of Western Medieval thought and came to be adopted as part of the Medieval Aristotelian corpus thanks to its ascription to Aristotle. The purpose of this dissertation is to provide the proper foundations for study of this treatise as an influential philosophical work. ;In Part I the notion of being as originated and as Originating is examined in the context of other Proclean and Plotinian Arabic philosophical texts, after a discussion of the general Greek philosophical background. The notion of being in those texts and the Mahd al-khair is shown to be fundamentally the same and quite possibly to have the thought of Porphyry as its source. ;Part II considers the Mahd al-khair historically. After examination of the relevant testimonia, the questions of the title and composition and author are dealt with in detail. The title found in the Ankara and Istanbul manuscripts, Kalam fi mahd al-khair, "Discourse on the Pure Good," is taken as the work's original title. It is also determined that the anonymous author was probably a Muslim or Christian philosophical thinker living in the Middle East between 833 and 922 A.D. whose thought was influenced by the Plotiniana Arabica. Finally, it is shown that it is not impossible that the Mahd al-khair and the Proclus Arabus texts recently edited by Gerhard Endress came from a single Arabic translation of Proclus' Elements of Theology. ;Part III contains descriptions of the materials used in the edition together with discussions of other editions, the tradition of the text and the methodology for this critical edition. ;Part IV contains the Arabic text, the English translation and detailed notes to these. ;Finally, the study is supplemented by five appendices including relevant Arabic materials and also detailed critical observations and remarks on the Latin Liber de causis

456 JOURNAL OF THE HISTORY or PHILOSOPHY 34:3 JULY 1996 of reflection about rhetorical practices that I suspect Aristotle was trying to elicit in his own time and that Garver is trying to elicit in his. DAVID J. DEPEW California State University, FuUerton Fran O'Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1999. Pp. xvi + 3oo. Cloth, $8o.oo. The importance of doctrines found in the Latin translations of the late fifth-century Greek works of pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite for the formation of the theologi- cal and philosophical thought of Thomas Aquinas is obvious to anyone well-versed in the texts of Aquinas. However, it is by no means obvious how Aquinas read, under- stood, and transformed the Christian Neoplatonic theology of this apparent disciple of Proclus or Damascius so as to make it an integral part of his understanding of God and creation. O'Rourke rightly conceived his task as twofold: first, the texts of Dionysius must be properly understood; second, the interpretation and use of these by Aquinas can itself be assessed and appreciated in its own thirteenth-century con- text. In the first part of the book he examines the question of knowledge of God, with one chapter devoted to Dionysius and a second devoted to Aquinas's use of "Dionysian Elements" in discovering God. Part Two examines their teachings on the "Transcendence of Being and Good" in chapters 3 and 4. Part Three contains three chapters on the "Unity..

Al-Fârâbî’s thought on intellect was known to the Latin West through the translation of his Letter on the Intellect, through the Long Commentary on the De Anima by Averroes and through some other works. Al-Fârâbî identified the active power of intellect in Aristotle’s De Anima 3.5 as the unique and separately existing Agent Intellect, but the role of the Agent Intellect in forming intelligibles in act in the human soul is by no means unequivocally clear. Further, the apprehension of intelligibles by human beings and the intellectual development of the soul, oftentimes described as an activity of abstracting , seems to be a genuineabstraction from experience, yet it somehow involves the emanative power of the Agent Intellect. This paper works to provide a coherent explanation of the natureof abstraction and the role of Agent Intellect in that activity

This article explicates Averroes's understanding of human knowing and abstraction in this three commentaries on Aristotle's De Anima. While Averroes's views on the nature of the human material intellect changes through the three commentaries until he reaches is famous view of the unity of the material intellect as one for all human beings, his view of the agent intellect as 'form for us' is sustained throughout these works. In his Long Commentary on the De Anima he reveals his dependence on al-Fârâbî for this notion and provides a detailed critique of the Farabian notion that the agent intellect is 'form for us' only as agent cause, not as our true formal cause. Although Averroes argues that the agent intellect must somehow be intrinsic to us as our form since humans are per se rational and undertake acts of knowing by will, his view is shown to rest on an equivocal use of the notion of formal cause. The agent intellect cannot be properly our intrinsic formal principle while remaining ontologically separate.

Conçu comme un complément du volume consacré Aux origines du lexique philosophique européen, cet ouvrage contient des études qui tentent de montrer comment le vocabulaire philosophique a été élaboré au Moyen Âge occidental. Les penseurs médiévaux — tant les traducteurs des textes philosophiques grecs, hébraïques et arabes que les philosophes et les théologiens — ont contribué à la multiplication de néologismes et à l’affinement du sens d’anciens concepts. Par leur «travail» linguistique, qui allait de pair avec des efforts de conceptualisation, ils ont forgé un langage propre à leurs diverses disciplines et orientations philosophiques. Les penseurs du Moyen Âge — d’Augustin à Suárez, en passant par tant d’autres maîtres de la scolastique — ont joué de diverses manières un rôle primordial dans la formation du vocabulaire philosophique.